Isara Corporation

Huawei Technologies Co., Limited

Kassem Kalach

Anton Mosunov

Atsushi Yamada

Teng Wu

Edward William Eaton

Ali Abbassi

Shane Daniel Kelly

Filip Kostis Pawlega

A module has a processor for executing an encryption process to encrypt a message to a cipher-text with authentication. The encryption process includes generating a tag from a secret message authentication code (MAC) key, a nonce, a message, and optionally an additional data using a Poly1305 function, generating a pseudorandom initialization vector (IV) from a secret encryption key and the tag using a first encryption function, and generating a cipher-text from the secret encryption key, the generated IV, and the message using a second encryption function. The module or a similar module may execute a corresponding decryption process to decrypt the cipher-text to a decrypted message and verify the authenticity of the cipher-text. At least one of the first and second encryption functions may be an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption function such as an AES-CTR encryption function, an AES-like encryption function, and/or other suitable encryption functions.

Authenticated encryption apparatus with initialization-vector misuse resistance and method therefor

An encoder encrypts a message by generating a nonce, using a first encryption key to encode the nonce, splitting the message into a first part and a second part, using the first encryption key and the encoded nonce to encrypt the first part of the message into a first ciphered part, using a second encryption key, the encoded nonce and the first ciphered part to generate an initialization vector, using the first encryption key and the initialization vector to encrypt the second part of the message into a second ciphered part, and generating a ciphertext comprising the first ciphered part, the second ciphered part, the initialization vector and the nonce. A decoder uses a reverse process to decrypt the message. The decryption comprises generating a copy of the initialization vector, which is compared to the initialization vector in order to verify that the message is properly decrypted.

Methods, encoder and decoder using encryption and authentication functions for encrypting and decrypting a message

In a general aspect, a supersingular isogeny-based cryptography process is performed. In some aspects, a first generator point is computed based on a secret integer of a first entity and a pair of elliptic curve points defined by a supersingular isogeny-based cryptosystem. An image curve is computed based on the secret integer, and a shared secret value is computed based on the image curve. An encrypted generator point is computed from the first generator point and the shared secret value. A public key of the first entity is sent to a second entity to enable the second entity to compute the shared secret value. The encrypted generator point is sent to the second entity to enable the second entity to validate the public key of the first entity.

Public key validation in supersingular isogeny-based cryptographic protocols

In a general aspect, a supersingular isogeny-based cryptography process is performed. In some aspects, a secret integer of a first entity is obtained. A public key of a second entity includes a first image curve and a first pair of elliptic curve points. A first pairing value is computed based on a second pair of elliptic curve points defined by a supersingular isogeny-based cryptosystem. A second pairing value is computed based on the first pair of elliptic curve points. Validating the public key includes verifying whether the first pairing value matches the second pairing value. A second image curve is computed based on the secret integer and the first pair of elliptic curve points. A shared secret value, shared by the first entity and the second entity, is computed based on the second image curve.

Pairing verification in supersingular isogeny-based cryptographic protocols

In a general aspect, a lattice basis parameter for a lattice-based cryptography system is generated. A first parameter for the lattice-based cryptography system is obtained. The first parameter includes a first set of values. Pseudorandom data is obtained from a pseudorandom generator. The lattice basis parameter is generated based on the first parameter and the pseudorandom data. The lattice basis parameter includes a second set of values. The second set of values includes a first subset and a second subset. The first subset are selected from the first set of values; the second subset are generated based on the pseudorandom data, independent of the first parameter. The lattice basis parameter is used to execute a lattice-based cryptography protocol in a communication system.

Generating a lattice basis for lattice-based cryptography

In a general aspect, a conversion scheme is used in a public key cryptosystem. In some aspects, an error vector derivation function is applied to a random value and a message value to produce an error vector. A plaintext value is generated based on the random value, the message value, and the error vector. The error vector and the plaintext value are used in an encryption function to produce a ciphertext component, and the ciphertext component is provided for transmission in a communication system.

Conversion schemes for public key cryptosystems

In a general aspect, a conversion scheme is used in a public key cryptosystem. In some aspects, a plaintext value is generated based on a message value, a constant value, and a random value. An error vector derivation function is applied to the plaintext value to produce an error vector. The plaintext value and the error vector are used in an encryption function to produce a ciphertext component, and the ciphertext component is provided for transmission in a communication network.

Using conversion schemes in public key cryptosystems

In a general aspect, a parameter is refreshed in a lattice-based cryptography system. In some aspects, a first value of a public parameter is obtained. The first value of the public parameter may have been previously used in an execution of a lattice-based cryptography protocol. A second value of the public parameter is generated based on the first value of the public parameter and random information. The second value of the public parameter is used in an execution of the lattice-based cryptography protocol.

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Waterloo, Canada

Kassem Kalach