Amazon Technologies, Inc.

Kasper Søe Luckow

Neha Rungta

John Byron Cook

Andrew Jude Gacek

Carsten Varming

Tyler Stuart Bray

Daniel George Peebles

Pauline Virginie Bolignano

Alexander Watson

Jeff Puchalski

Cole Nathan Schlesinger

Michael Gough

Andrea Nedic

Techniques for more precise access control policy findings, use a conditional injection of policy constraints into a findings analysis. The injection of a policy constraint of a policy being analyzed into the findings analysis is conditioned on the policy itself. In particular, the injection is conditioned on whether the policy constraint is trusted in the context of the policy (e.g., unlikely to be spoofed or manipulated in the policy context). As a result, where a policy constraint can be trusted in the context of a given policy, a more precise (e.g., more specific) findings analysis of the policy based on the policy constraint can be conducted than if the policy constraint were not included in the policy finding analysis (e.g., because the policy constraint is not trusted in other policy contexts).

Conditional access control policy finding generation

The appropriate scoping of an access policy can be determined using the observed access and usage of various resources covered under that policy. Information about access requests received over a period of time can be logged, and actions represented in the log data can be mapped to the permissions of the access policy. A new access policy can be generated that includes grant permissions only for those actions that were received and/or granted during the monitored period of time. The new policy can be processed using policy logic to ensure that changes in permission comply with rules or policies for the target resources. The new policy can be at least partially implemented, or can be provided to an authorized user, who can choose to adopt or deny the new policy, or to accept some of the recommendations for modifying the current policy.

Policy scope management

Techniques for intent-based governance are described. For example, in some instances a method of receiving an indication of a change involving of one or more of code, a policy, a network configuration, or a governance requirement rule impacting a resource in a provider network for an account that is to be analyzed using one or more governance requirement rules; determining one or more governance requirement rules to evaluate for compliance after the update; evaluating the determined one or more governance requirement rules for compliance using one or more reasoning engines according to one or more policies; and making a result of the evaluating available to a user provides such governance.

Intent-based governance service

A security policy analyzer service of a computing resource service provider performs evaluations of security policies provided by the service provider's users, to determine whether the security policies are valid, satisfiable, accurate, and/or sufficiently secure. The service may compare the user-provided policy to a stored or best-practices policy to begin the evaluation, translating encoded security permissions into propositional logic formulae that can be compared to determine which policy is more permissive. The service determines values of the parameters in a request for access to a computing resource based on the policy comparison, and generates request contexts using the values. The service uses the request contexts to generate one or more comparative policies that are then used iteratively as the second policy in the comparison to the user-provided policy, in order to produce additional request contexts that represent allow/deny 'edge cases' along the borders of policy permission statements.

Request context generator for security policy validation service

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Sunnyvale, CA, United States of America

Kasper Søe Luckow