Honeywell International Inc.

Karl Abraham Keyzer

James Arthur McDonald

Anthony Pritchard

Guoqing Wang

Mark A Ahlbrecht

Kevin D Vanderwerf

Xiaoqiang Chen

Danhua Liang

Mei Zhang

Gary Duane Lemke

James Arthur Mcdonald

Techniques for providing evacuation guidance parameters to a vehicle traversing in a geographical region in the presence of interfering GNSS signals are disclosed. In some embodiments, a vehicle can determine evacuation guidance parameters from characteristics of at least one interfering source and implement evasive maneuvers based on the evacuation guidance parameters. Alternatively, a vehicle can send characteristics of at least one interfering source to a central processing system located remotely from the vehicle, and receive evacuation guidance parameters from the central processing system.

Systems and methods for determining interfering GNSS signal source and providing evasive maneuver guidance for evacuating the affected region

A system for detecting satellite signal spoofing using error state estimates is provided. The system includes at least one satellite receiver to receive satellite signals, at least one memory and at least one controller. The at least one memory is configured to store at least operation instructions. The at least one controller is in communication with the at least one satellite receiver and the at least one memory. The at least one controller is configured to determine state estimates from the received satellite signals. The at least one controller is further configured to determine error state estimates based at least in part on differences in current state estimates and differences in delayed state estimates. The controller further configured to determine if spoofing is occurring in one more of the received satellite signals when the error state estimates are greater than a select threshold.

Detecting satellite signal spoofing using error state estimates

Systems and methods for GNSS spoofing detection using C/No based monitoring are provided. In certain embodiments, a system including at least one GNSS receiver that provides C/No for GNSS signals received from GNSS satellites. The system also includes a processor coupled to the at least one GNSS receiver. The processor executes instructions that cause the processor to calculate new C/No comparison values based on the C/No measurements and previous C/No comparison values. Further, the instructions cause the processor to compare the C/No measurements against the previous C/No comparison values. Moreover, the instructions cause the processor to determine whether one or more of the GNSS signals are spoofed based on the comparison of the C/No measurements against the previous C/No comparison values. Additionally, the instructions cause the processor to set the new C/No comparison values as the previous C/No comparison values.

GNSS spoofing detection using carrier-to-noise based monitoring

Techniques for detecting GNSS spoofing using inertial mixing data are disclosed. One or more navigation parameters are determined by at least one GNSS receiver and a plurality of IRS from at least two periods of time. The navigation parameters from the GNSS receiver(s) and the IRS are compared at each time period, and the difference(s) between the compared navigation parameters are further compared to generate at least one differential value. A system can detect GNSS spoofing by comparing the at least one differential value to a suitable threshold. In one aspect each IRS navigation parameter is compared with a corresponding GNSS navigation parameter, wherein the plurality of differential values is mixed before threshold comparison. In another aspect, each IRS navigation parameter is mixed before comparison with a GNSS navigation parameter, and the resulting differential value is then compared against a threshold.

GNSS satellite spoofing detection using multi-independent inertial mixing

A spoofing detection system including at least one antenna, a receiver and a controller is provided. The at least one receiver is in communication with the at least one antenna to receive detected satellite signals. The controller is configured to determine raw pseudorange values from the received satellite signals. The controller is further configured to apply at least one first filter on the raw pseudorange values to generate at least an output of first filtered pseudorange values. The controller is also conjured to compare an output of the first filtered pseudorange values with one of the raw pseudorange values and second filtered pseudorange values from a second filter. The controller is further configured to determine if spoofing is present in the received satellite signals based on a determined divergence between the output of first filtered pseudorange values and one of the raw pseudorange values and the second filtered pseudorange values.

System for detecting signal spoofing by monitoring for abnormal divergence in pseudorange values

A navigation system to transition from a stationary alignment filter to an in-motion alignment filter is provided. The system comprises a processing unit configured to implement a stationary alignment Kalman filter (SAKF) in gyrocompass alignment mode to generate state estimates and provide corrections when the object is stationary, and to implement an algorithm to compute a covariance for the SAKF that accounts for uncertainty in the SAKF estimates; wherein the processing unit is further configured to implement a continuous alignment filter (CAF) that generates a secondary solution which remains unaffected by the SAKF corrections during a delay period accommodating a delay between the time of actual motion to the time of detected motion, and to implement an algorithm to compute a covariance for CAF that accounts for the uncertainty in CAF during delay period; and wherein outputs of the CAF and its covariance are communicated to an in-motion alignment filter.

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Minneapolis, MN, United States of America

Karl Abraham Keyzer