Abb Schweiz Ag

Hitachi Energy Ltd

Abb Inc.

Hitachi Energy Switzerland Ag

Junho Hong

Reynaldo Nuqui

Dmitry Ishchenko

Anil K Kondabathini

Zhenyuan Wang

David Coats

Kee Ho Shin

Abrez Mondal

Hyojong Lee

Anil Kondabathini

Systems, methods, techniques and apparatuses of nested microgrids are disclosed. One exemplary embodiment is a method for removing false data in a nested microgrid system, the method comprising: calculating a first local state estimation using a first plurality of local measurements and a second local state estimation using a second plurality of local measurements; calculating, with a central control system, a plurality of global state estimations including a first global state estimation a second global state estimation; performing a first false data detection test using the first local state estimation and one global state estimation of the plurality of global state estimations; performing a second false data detection test using the first global state estimation and the second global state estimation; detecting false data; and updating the first global state estimation, the second global state estimation, or the first local state estimation in response to detecting the false data.

Decentralized false data mitigation for nested microgrids

Technologies for detecting cyber-attacks against electrical distribution devices include a controller. The controller includes circuitry to determine a first measured value of a first operational parameter of a transformer based upon one or more signals received from one or more sensors of the transformer. The circuitry is also to determine a second measured value of a second operational parameter of the transformer based upon one or more signals received from the one or more sensors of the transformer, calculate a first expected value of the first operational parameter based on the second measured value of the second operational parameter and a model of the transformer that relates the first and second operational parameters, compare the first measured value of the first operational parameter to the first expected value of the first operational parameter, and identify when a difference between the first measured value and the first expected value exceeds a first threshold.

Technologies for detecting cyber-attacks against electrical distribution devices

Technologies for detecting abnormal activities in an electric vehicle charging station include an apparatus. The apparatus includes circuitry configured determine a cyber security threat level for the charging station in which the electric vehicle charger is located. Additionally, the circuitry is configured to perform, as a function of the determined cyber security threat level, a responsive action to protect the charging station from a cyber security threat.

Technologies for detecting abnormal activities in an electric vehicle charging station

An example method for detecting and mitigating attacks on electric power substations comprises detecting a command to open or close a circuit breaker in the electric power substation. A modified extended substation model for the electric power substation is generated, based on the detected command and based on measurements in substation, where the modified extended substation model is a power flow model for the substation and for one or more directly connected neighboring substations. A power flow analysis is performed, using the modified extended substation model, to generate a predicted voltage for each of a plurality of nodes in the substation and in the one or more directly connected neighboring substations. Each predicted voltage is compared to a corresponding allowable voltage range, and execution of the command is blocked in response to determining that one or more of the voltages is outside the corresponding allowable voltage range.

Securing against malicious control of circuit breakers in electrical substations

Systems, methods, techniques and apparatuses of DER registration and de-registration are disclosed. One exemplary embodiment is a power distribution system including a distributed energy resource (DER), a DER controller, and a central controller. The DER interface controller includes a DER controller interface configured to communicate with the DER controller using a DER controller native format, an external device interface configured to communicate with the central controller using one of a plurality of communication protocols, a registration circuitry configured to transmit a registration request to the central controller, and a mapping circuitry. The central controller is configured to receive the registration request, and update a DER registry in response receiving the registration request. The mapping circuitry is configured to receive input defining power distribution characteristics in response to the central controller updating the DER registry.

Distributed energy resource registration

A system and method for hardware tamper detection and mitigation for a circuit breaker. The method includes detecting and mitigating a breach to a circuit breaker of an electrical power management system, wherein the circuit breaker includes a housing, an electrical circuit, and switch coupled to and controllable by the electrical circuit. An alert identifying a detected breach event at the circuit breaker is generated and transmitted to a computing device. The circuit breaker device experiencing the detected breach event is disabled in response to the alert. An electrical power management system includes a plurality of circuit breakers each having a breach detector coupled to an electrical circuit, and a switch coupled to and controllable by the electrical circuit. A circuit breaker controller controls the state of the circuit breaker as determined by the breach detector.

Method and system for hardware tamper detection and mitigation for solid state circuit breaker and its controller

Unique systems, methods, techniques and apparatuses of a power grid control system. One exemplary embodiment is a nested microgrid system comprising a first microgrid including a network controller, a second microgrid, a third microgrid, a first restoration path selectively coupled between the second portion of the first microgrid and the second microgrid, and a second restoration path selectively coupled between the second portion of the first microgrid and the third microgrid. The network controller is configured isolate the first portion of the first microgrid from the second portion of the first microgrid, calculate weighting factors for the first and second restoration paths, select the first restoration path using the first weighting factor and the second weighting factor, and couple the second portion of the first microgrid to the second microgrid using the first restoration path.

Power restoration in nested microgrids

Unique systems, methods, techniques and apparatuses of a power grid control system. One exemplary embodiment is a microgrid comprising a plurality of switching devices, a plurality of distribution line segments, a plurality of measuring devices, each measuring device corresponding to one of the plurality of switching devices, and a network controller. The network controller is configured to: receive measurements from the plurality of measurement devices, determine a fault is occurring within the microgrid using the measurements, assign a topology classification to each of the plurality of distribution line segments, assign a proximity classification to each of the plurality of distribution line segments, determine fault location using the topology classification and the proximity classification, and isolate the fault by transmitting open commands to the two switching devices of the plurality of switching devices closest to the fault.

Fault detection and location in nested microgrids

Unique systems, methods, techniques and apparatuses of a configurable extended interface device are disclosed. One exemplary embodiment is an interface device for coupling a power system device of a microgrid with a microgrid controller utilizing a data communication standard incompatible with the power system device, the interface device comprising three input ports configured to receive input from a power system device; a microgrid interface configured to provide output formatted according to any of a plurality of communication protocols, each being compatible with the data communication standard and configured to receive input defining microgrid configuration characteristics; data mapping logic structured to convert any of the input to output formatted according to any of the plurality of communication protocols; and parsing logic configured to parse the received input defining microgrid configuration characteristics effective to cause the data mapping logic to perform mapping of the received input to one of the plurality of communication protocols.

Reconfigurable extended communication interface devices for monitoring and control of power system devices

Unique systems, methods, techniques and apparatuses of a substation phasor data concentrator (ssPDC) is disclosed herein. One exemplary embodiment is a method for operating an electrical substation including a merging unit (MU), a phasor measurement unit (PMU), and a substation phasor data concentrator (ssPDC). The method includes receiving, with the MU and the PMU, input information corresponding to a set of electrical characteristics of the electrical substation; measuring, with the MU, the input information; measuring, with the PMU, the input information; a and estimating, with the ssPDC, electrical characteristics of the electrical substation using the received false measurement and the one of the MU measurement and the PMU measurement, determining in substantially real time the false measurement does not correspond to the set of electrical characteristics using the estimated electric characteristics, and replacing the false measurement with the received the one of the MU measurement and the PMU measurement.

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Cary, NC, United States of America

Junho Hong