Emc Corporation

Emc IP Holding Company LLC

Rsa Security Inc.

Other

John Gordon Brainard

Ari Juels

Nikolaos Triandopoulos

Daniel Vernon Bailey

Burton S Kaliski, Jr

William Duane

Ronald L Rivest

Michael J O'Malley

Marten Van Dijk

Kevin Bowers

Yedidya Dotan

Lawrence N Friedman

Robert S Philpott

Magnus Nyström

Michael Szydlo

Daniel Bailey Vernon

Gareth Richards

Samuel Curry

Sean Patrick Doyle

Marco Ciaffi

Robert Damon Hopley

Igor Shmukler

Robert S Phipott

In one aspect, authentication information is received from a first processing device in a second processing device, and a digital signature is generated in the second processing device by signing data that incorporates at least a portion of the received authentication information. The received authentication information is generated at least in part from a secret seed stored in the first processing device. The received authentication information may be combined with the digital signature generated by the second processing device to form a joint signature that is transmitted to an authentication server. In an illustrative embodiment, the received authentication information comprises a tokencode and the digital signature is generated by signing data that incorporates the tokencode. The data that is signed to generate the digital signature may comprise an electronic document having the tokencode appended thereto.

Authentication methods and apparatus for generating digital signatures

In one aspect, one or more key-encapsulating ciphertexts are generated and stored in a processing device. The processing device receives authentication information from another processing device, and utilizes the authentication information to decrypt at least one of the key-encapsulating ciphertexts to recover an associated key. The authentication information may comprise, for example, a tokencode. In an illustrative embodiment, the authentication information may comprise a plurality of gradually rotating keys with overlapping refresh intervals. As a more particular example, the authentication information may comprise a plurality of hash chains wherein successive ones of the hash chains overlap one another in a designated number of time steps.

Authentication methods and apparatus using key-encapsulating ciphertexts and other techniques

Techniques are provided for implementing predefined access policies based on auxiliary information embedded in one-time passcode authentication tokens. An exemplary method comprises receiving an authentication passcode generated by a token of a user, wherein the received authentication passcode is derived from a secret seed and based on at least one protocode and embedded auxiliary information; processing the received authentication passcode to extract the embedded auxiliary information from the received authentication passcode, wherein the embedded auxiliary information comprises (i) a silent alarm signal indicating a potential compromise of the token, and (ii) a drifting key signal indicating a current drifting key state of the token, wherein the drifting key signal is processed to detect a cloning of the token; and implementing a predefined access policy (e.g., replace or disable the token of one or more users) based on respective values of the silent alarm signal and the drifting key signal.

Predefined access policy implementation based on auxiliary information embedded in one-time authentication passcodes

Methods and apparatus are provided for randomizing state transitions for one-time authentication tokens. A user authentication passcode is generated by determining a generation time within an epoch for initiating computation of the user authentication passcode; initiating computation of the user authentication passcode at the determined generation time; and presenting the user authentication passcode at a presentation time that is de-coupled from the generation time. The generation time occurs, for example, at a random offset from a start of the epoch. A time difference between the presentation time and a completion of the computation of the user authentication passcode comprises, e.g., a uniformly distributed random variable over a range of values having a finite mean value. The epoch optionally comprises pre-computation epochs and a variable number of user authentication passcodes are optionally computed during a given pre-computation epoch. The number of passcodes generated per epoch can be varied in a random manner.

Randomizing state transitions for one-time authentication tokens

Techniques are provided for controlling user access to a protected resource based on an outcome of a one-time passcode authentication token and one or more predefined access policies. An exemplary method comprises the steps of: providing an authentication passcode generated by a token associated with a user to at least one authentication processing device, wherein the user is attempting to access a protected resource; receiving an authentication outcome from the at least one authentication processing device, the authentication outcome comprising an acceptance outcome of the received authentication passcode and at least one of an acceptance outcome with respect to one or more different signals, such as a silent alarm and an acceptance outcome with respect to a drifting key; and providing access of the user to the protected resource based on the authentication outcome and a predefined access policy. Predefined access policies that are specific to silent alarm alerts and drifting key alerts are also provided.

Controlling user access to protected resource based on outcome of one-time passcode authentication token and predefined access policy

Techniques are provided for security-aware single-server passcode verification for one-time authentication tokens. An exemplary method comprises the steps of: receiving an authentication passcode generated by a token associated with a user, wherein the received authentication passcode is based on at least one protocode and embedded auxiliary information; and processing the received authentication passcode using a single processing device to extract the embedded auxiliary information from the received authentication passcode, wherein the embedded auxiliary information comprises one or more of two different signals, such as a silent alarm signal and a drifting key signal. The single processing device optionally implements software modules of first and second authentication servers. The single processing device optionally comprises one or more sources of pseudorandom information for at least two of an auxiliary channel, a silent alarm and a drifting key.

Security-aware single-server passcode verification for one-time authentication tokens

In one aspect, a method comprises the steps of deriving a base point on an elliptic curve in a first processing device, generating authentication information in the first processing device utilizing the base point and a private key of the first processing device, and transmitting the authentication information from the first processing device to a second processing device. The base point on the elliptic curve may be derived, for example, by applying a one-way function to a current time value, or by computation based on a message to be signed.

Authentication methods and apparatus using base points on an elliptic curve and other techniques

Methods, apparatus and articles of manufacture for using steganography to protect cryptographic information on a mobile device are provided herein. A method includes querying a user to select one or more items of data stored on a computing device to be used in connection with one or more cryptographic actions associated with said computing device, and protecting one or more items of cryptographic information within the one or more selected items of data.

Using steganography to protect cryptographic information on a mobile device

Forward-secure one-time authentication tokens are provided with embedded time hints. A token generates a passcode for presentation to an authentication server by determining a current state of the token; generating a user authentication passcode based on the current state, wherein the generated user authentication passcode comprises an embedded time hint; and communicating the generated user authentication passcode to the authentication server. The passcode may be generated with the embedded time hint, for example, each time a user authentication passcode is generated or upon demand when a user authentication passcode is generated. A server processes a user authentication passcode by receiving the user authentication passcode, wherein the received user authentication passcode comprises an embedded time hint; and determining a time interval to search for another user authentication passcode based on the embedded time hint.

Forward secure one-time authentication tokens with embedded time hints

A recovery mechanism is provided for split-server passcode verification systems. An exemplary token-centric recovery scheme comprises at least one token and a plurality of authentication servers, comprises the steps of: determining that a first one of the plurality of authentication servers is unavailable; applying an authentication mechanism to a message requesting the token to change to a new split-state mode; and sending the authenticated message to the token. The authentication mechanism comprises, for example, a relying party signing the message using a next passcode of the new split-state mode. The new split-state mode comprises, for example, a single server passcode verification and wherein the next passcode of the new split-state mode comprises a next passcode of the single server. A client optionally changes to the new split-state mode after successfully verifying the authentication mechanism.

Recovery mechanism for fault-tolerant split-server passcode verification of one-time authentication tokens

Improved techniques involve selecting a set of authentication factors from among multiple factors based on a current situation and information about how well the multiple authentication factors have worked in similar situations in the past. Along these lines, when an authentication system performs an authentication operation on a requesting party, the authentication system first assesses a situational environment. Based on the assessment of the situational environment, the authentication system decides that it is necessary to re-authenticate the requesting party. In some arrangements, the authentication system may determine which set of factors has the highest likelihood of successfully verifying the user's identity when compared with other authentication factors. The authentication system then carries out an authentication operation on the selected set of factors and bases a successful authentication result on whether the selected set of factors can be verified.

Situationally aware authentication

Methods and apparatus are provided for improving resilience to forward clock attacks. A token generates a passcode from a user authentication token for presentation to an authentication server by detecting a forward clock attack; and communicating an indication of the forward clock attack to the authentication server. The generation of the user authentication passcodes is optionally suspended upon detecting the forward clock attack. The detection may be based on a comparison of a current device time of the token and a last used device time during a generation of a user authentication passcode.

Time synchronization solutions for forward-secure one-time authentication tokens

A method and system for use in generating authentication codes associated with devices is disclosed. In at least one embodiment, the method and system may generate a secret value that depends on event state data that specifies an operating condition of a device, and may generate a series of authentication codes that depends on the secret value and a series of dynamic values.

Generating authentication codes associated with devices

Multi-server one-time passcode verification is provided for respective high order and low order passcode portions. A user is authenticated by receiving an authentication passcode generated by a token associated with the user; and authenticating the user based on the received authentication passcode using at least a first authentication server and a second authentication server, wherein the first authentication server verifies a high-order portion of the received authentication passcode and wherein the second authentication server verifies a low-order portion of the received authentication passcode. The received authentication passcode is based on, for example, at least two protocodes Pand Pgenerated by the token and/or pseudorandom information R. A codebook C, based on the pseudorandom information R, can be used to embed additional auxiliary information into the authentication passcode.

Multi-server one-time passcode verification on respective high order and low order passcode portions

Techniques are provided for security-aware split-server passcode verification for one-time authentication tokens. An exemplary method comprises receiving an authentication passcode generated by a token; and processing the received authentication passcode using at least a first authentication server and a second authentication server. The received authentication passcode is based on a protocode and/or embedded auxiliary information. The embedded auxiliary information comprising a silent alarm and/or a drifting key is extracted from the received authentication passcode. In another exemplary method, the received authentication passcode is processed using a single processing device to extract the embedded auxiliary information comprising one or more of a silent alarm and a drifting key. Another exemplary aspect addresses the processing of an authentication outcome from at least one authentication processing device and providing access to a protected resource based on the authentication outcome and a predefined access policy.

Growing community of inventors

Sudbury, MA, United States of America

John Gordon Brainard