Fujitsu Corporation

Other

Leland Stanford Junior University

John C Mitchell

Avradip Mandal

Arnab Roy

Hart Montgomery

Steven R Mitchell

Elizabeth A Stinson

Thomas N Terning

According to some examples, computer-implemented methods to detect a potential privacy violation as a result of a release of a database are described. An example computer-implemented method may include anonymizing a database and calculating a measure of entropy resulting from a release of the anonymized database without releasing the anonymized database. The method may also include determining whether the calculated measure of entropy satisfies a privacy threshold and, responsive to a determination that the calculated measure of entropy satisfies the privacy threshold, releasing the anonymized database. The method may further include, responsive to a determination that the calculated measure of entropy does not satisfy the privacy threshold, not allowing the release of the anonymized database.

Detection and prevention of privacy violation due to database release

According to an aspect of an embodiment, a method of determining information leakage of a computer-readable program may include obtaining a first component of the computer-readable program. The first component may have a first information leakage that may be unknown. The first component may be comprised of a second component and a third component. The method may also include obtaining a second information leakage of the second component. The method may also include obtaining a third information leakage of the third component. The method may also include determining a relationship between the second component and the third component relative to the first component. The method may also include determining the first information leakage based on the second information leakage, the third information leakage, and the relationship.

Determining information leakage of computer-readable programs

A method of secure hash table implementation includes performing a secret key exchange between a server enclave of a server device and a client enclave of a client device and establishing an encrypted channel between the server enclave and the client enclave using the exchanged secret keys. The method includes generating a random key for a keyed hash function or a pseudo random function (PRF) and communicating the random key to the client enclave. The method includes receiving hashes of input data at the server enclave. The method includes building a hash table based on key-value pairs included in the received hashes. The method includes receiving a hash table query that includes keys. The method includes retrieving values that correspond to the keys. The method includes returning the retrieved values that correspond to the keys or a null if a value has not been inserted into the hash table for one of the keys.

Secure hash operations in a trusted execution environment

An anonymization system may include a merger to merge a public database and a private database to create a merged database. The merged database may include multiple blank entries and multiple initial values associated with multiple user identifiers. The anonymization system may include a value generator to fill values for the blank entries via a machine learning algorithm and based on the initial values to create a filled database including the initial values and the fill values. The anonymization system may include a perturber to perturb one or more of the initial values or the fill values of the filled database to create a perturbed database. The anonymization system may include a releaser to release at least a portion of the perturbed database.

Privacy preservation

Various approaches for detecting unauthorized actions on a computing platform are disclosed. In one approach, a memory region is designated as tainted if data is received from an untrusted source (such as the network) and written to that region. Thereafter, destination regions may be designated as tainted based on an operation having source and destination parameters in which at least a portion of an address range of the source overlaps an address range of a tainted memory region, and data from the source is used to update the destination. If an argument in an invocation of a function call references a tainted memory region, the call is determined to be unauthorized and data is output indicative of the unauthorized call.

Detection of malicious programs

A ladder rack for pickup trucks mounted in a detachable manner along one side of truck box. A pair of stanchions each having upper ends provided with arms for ladder support. Brackets attach to the truck box side wall in parallel therewith. Posts on each bracket as well as sockets defined by the brackets receive a weldment at each stanchion lower end the weldments having keyhole openings for post reception and pins for insertion into the bracket sockets. A flexible lock automatically engages a post on the stanchion to prevent accidental upward displacement of the stanchion during truck travel.

Detachably mounted ladder rack

A motorcycle sidecar securely accommodates a handicapped driver seated in a wheelchair. Handlebars are mounted directly in front of the driver for steering the motorcycle. Other controls, including a throttle, a front brake lever, and a clutch lever are mounted on the handle bars. A rear brake lever and a gear shifting control are conveniently located in the sidecar for manipulation by the handicapped driver. A retractable ramp is provided for permitting the driver to roll his wheelchair into the sidecar. Brackets are provided for securely attaching the sidecar to a conventional motorcycle.

Growing community of inventors

Stanford, CA, United States of America

John C Mitchell