Texas Instruments Corporation

At+t Corp.

AT&T Intellectual Property I, LP

Jin-Meng Ho

Wei Lin

Eric Thierry Peeters

Donald Phillip Shaver

Xiaolin Lu

Anuj Batra

Ariton E Xhafa

Kin K Leung

Liang A Hong

Herman Chien

Don Shaver

Elliott Hoole

Matthew Brendan Shoemake

Srinivas Lingam

Gangadhar Burra

Kofi Dankwa Anim-Appiah

Yonghe Liu

Joseph Michael Erickson

Jaiganesh Balakrishnan

Murtaza Ali

June Chul Roh

Alon Paycher

Harshal Shantanu Chhaya

Edward L Wallace

Richard T Baker

Gopal K Jaisingh

Yaser M Ibrahim

William C Timm

Terence J Riley

Ramautar Sharma

Horng-Ming Tai

JuneChul Roh

Allison Winifred Hicks

Eliott Hoole

Ricky Curtis

An electronic device, in disclosed embodiments, includes an antenna, transceiver circuitry coupled to the antenna, a memory configured to store a first operation key and instructions, and a processor coupled to the transceiver and to the memory. The processor is configured to execute the instructions stored in the memory to cause the electronic device to, in response to receiving a first transmission containing an encrypted version of a second operation key that is encrypted by the first operation key, decrypt the encrypted version of the second operation key using the first operation key to recover the second operation key, store the second operation key in the memory, transmitting, by a transmitter of the electronic device, a second transmission that contains the first operation key and a command.

Certificate-based pairing of key fob device and control unit

A method for pairing a key fob with a control unit is provided. The key fob executes an ID authenticated key agreement protocol with a pairing device based on a key fob identification to authenticate one another and to generate a first encryption key. The pairing device encrypts a control unit identification using the first encryption key. The key fob receives the encrypted control unit identification transmitted from the pairing device. The key fob then executes an ID authenticated key agreement protocol with the control unit based on the control unit identification to authenticate one another and to generate a second encryption key. The key fob then receives an operational key transmitted from the control unit that is encrypted with the second encryption key.

ID-based control unit-key fob pairing

An electronic key fob device, in one embodiment, includes a transmitter, a counter configured to provide a current counter value indicated by a plurality of bits, a memory configured to store an operation key, and a processor coupled to the transmitter and memory. The processor is configured to encrypt the current counter value using the operation key to produce an encrypted counter value, select a subset of the plurality of bits of the current counter value, transmit a message the includes the encrypted counter value and the subset of plurality of bits of the current counter value.

Retention and revocation of operation keys by a control unit

Key fob and vehicle control unit identifiers (IDs) are used for entity authentication or trust transfer to achieve a secured initial pairing. The key fob is capable of transmitting only (not receiving) and is paired with a control unit in a vehicle or with any other control device. Use of the key fob and control unit IDs prevents unauthorized pairing and access to the operation key (OpKey) that is later used for communications between the devices. Elliptical curve cryptography (ECC) is used for strong security and efficient implementation. In the pairing process, device IDs are used for entity authentication and public key cryptography is used for easy key management. Symmetric encryption is used for fast normal operation and to accommodate key fob addition or revocation after key fob loss.

One-way key fob and vehicle pairing

A control unit device in one disclosed embodiment includes a receiver and a memory that stores one or more operation keys and program instructions. The control unit further includes a processor coupled to the receiver and the memory. The program instructions are executable by the processor to cause the control unit device to, in response to a revocation command received by the receiver, perform a revocation process by selecting which of the one or more operation keys to retain in the memory based on, for each of the one or more operation keys, whether the control unit receives a message encrypted by the operation key during the revocation process.

A system and method for managing power in a subnet having a hub in communication with one or more nodes is disclosed. The hub and nodes communicate using one or more non-contention access methods, such as scheduled, polled or posted access. The node may enter a sleep or hibernation state while no scheduled, polled or posted allocation interval is pending. The hibernation state allows the node to hibernate through one or more entire beacon periods. In the sleep state, the node may be asleep between any scheduled, polled and posted allocation intervals for the node or during another node's scheduled allocation interval in a current beacon period. By selecting which access scheme is in use, the node and hub can increase the node's chances to be in hibernation or sleep state and minimize power consumption.

Access and power management for centralized networks

A system and method for establishing a pairwise temporal key (PTK) between two devices based on a shared master key and using a single message authentication codes (MAC) algorithm is disclosed. The devices use the shared master key to independently compute four MACs representing the desired PTK, a KCK, and a first and a second KMAC. The Responder sends its first KMAC to the Initiator, which retains the computed PTK only if it verifies that the received first KMAC equals its computed first KMAC and hence that the Responder indeed possesses the purportedly shared master key. The Initiator sends a third message including the second KMAC to the Responder. The Responder retains the computed PTK only if it has verified that the received second KMAC equals its computed second KMAC and hence that the Initiator indeed possesses the purportedly shared master key.

Pairwise temporal key creation for secure networks

A system and method for minimizing or preventing interference between wireless networks is disclosed. A network hub broadcasts a beacon signal within repeating beacon periods. The position of the beacon signal shifts within each beacon period based upon a predetermined pseudo-random sequence. The beacon signal includes data identifying the current beacon shift sequence and the current phase of the sequence. Neighboring hubs independently or jointly determine and broadcast their own beacon shift sequences and phases for their respective networks from a predetermined list. Nodes connected with the network hubs are assigned allocation intervals having a start time that is set relative to the beacon signal. The start time and duration of the allocation interval wraps around the beacon period if the allocation-interval would otherwise start or continue in a next beacon period.

Mitigation of interference between wireless networks

A control unit, in a disclosed embodiment, includes a transceiver, memory, and a processor. The processor is coupled to the transceiver and memory and executes instructions from the memory to cause the control unit to receive a first transmission containing a certificate, verify the authenticity of the certificate, and, after verifying authenticity of the certificate, execute a public key agreement protocol to generate a first common secret encryption key, receive a second transmission containing an encrypted first public key that is encrypted by the first common secret encryption key, decrypt the encrypted first public key using the first common secret encryption key to determine the first public key, execute a public key agreement protocol to generate a second common secret encryption key, generate an operational key, encrypt the operational key using the second common secret encryption key, and transmit the encrypted operational key.

A system and method for providing communications between a hub (medical controller) and a node (an implant) are disclosed. The hub selects an operating channel within a channel group in accordance with applicable regulations, and transmits signals to facilitate communications with nodes. A node sequentially tunes to individual channels within the group, monitoring each channel for a hub transmission during a monitoring period. If a hub transmission is detected, the node stays on the current channel. Otherwise, the node tunes to a next channel in the channel group. The hub transmission may be directed to unconnected nodes, to a single connected node, or to a group of connected nodes. The node transmits a first frame to the hub at a designated transmission time and receives a response. The node reports an emergency by sequentially transmitting emergency frames on each of the channels until receiving an acknowledgment from the hub.

Implant access in the medical implant communications service band

A key fob device, in one embodiment, includes a transceiver that receives and sends signals, a memory that stores a public key and a certificate of authenticity associated with the key fob device, and a processor coupled to the transceiver and memory. The processor is configured to execute instructions causing the key fob device to transmit the public key and the certificate of authenticity, execute a public key agreement protocol to generate a common secret encryption key, and receive an operation key encrypted with the common secret encryption key.

Growing community of inventors

Plano, TX, United States of America

Jin-Meng Ho