Apple Inc.

Jianlin Yu

Santiago Fernandez-Gomez

Erik P Machnicki

Jerrold Von Hauck

Manu Gulati

Michael G Frank

Jean-Didier Allegrucci

James D Ramsay

Samy R Makar

Herb Lopez-Aguado

In one embodiment, an SOC includes multiple components including a CPU complex and one or more non-CPU components such as peripheral interface controllers, memory controllers, media components, etc. The SOC also includes an SOC debug control unit, which is coupled to receive detected debug events from the components. Each component may include a local debug control unit that is configured to monitor for various debug events within that component. The debug events may be specific to the component. The local debug control units may transmit detected events to the SOC debug control unit. The SOC debug control unit may detect one or more events from one or more components, and may halt the components of the SOC responsive to detecting the selected events.

System on a chip (SOC) debug controllability

A method and apparatus for preventing the overwriting of memory contents during certain scan operations is disclosed. An integrated circuit (IC) may include a memory and a scan chain having a number of serially coupled scan elements. A number of the scan elements may be coupled to circuitry for inputting signals to or receiving signals output from the memory. An inhibit circuit may also be coupled to the circuitry for inputting signals to the memory. During scan shifting operations commensurate with a scan dump mode or a memory dump mode, the inhibit circuit may de-assert one or more control signals that otherwise enable access to the memory in order to prevent shifted data from overwriting the contents stored in the memory. The apparatus may also include a bypass unit coupled to a memory read port, which can be activated to prevent unauthorized access to protected data stored in the memory.

Memory content protection during scan dumps and memory dumps

An apparatus and method for protecting the contents of a secure register from scan accessibility is disclosed. The secure register may include a number of scannable elements within a scan chain. During a normal scan test mode, the scannable elements of the secure register may be accessibly, as data may be shifted to, from, or through these elements. During certain other modes (e.g., a scan dump or memory dump), a bypass circuit may be invoked to effectively separate the scan elements associated with the secure register from the remainder of the scan chain. During operation in one of these modes, no data may be shifted to, from, or through the scan elements of the secure register. Accordingly, the bypass path may protect secure data stored in the secure register from unauthorized access.

Secure register scan bypass

Methods for enabling a secure test mode, and integrated circuits (IC's) implementing the same are disclosed. An IC may include a secure functional unit that is protected from access from test access circuitry during normal operation. The secure functional unit may be rendered inaccessible the test access circuitry of the IC following a completion of a test that includes testing of the secure functional unit. An embodiment of an IC that includes circuitry to delay entry into a test mode while a chip-level reset is performed is also contemplated. Entry into the test mode may be delayed until all circuitry of the IC has been fully reset in order to clear stored information.

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Cupertino, CA, United States of America

Jianlin Yu