Apple Inc.

Intel Corporation

Other

Jerrold Von Hauck

Li Li

Colin Whitby-Strevens

David T Haggerty

Kevin P McLaughlin

Arun Godfrey Mathias

Xiangying Yang

Mitchell David Adler

Christopher Brooke Sharp

Wade Benson

Stephan Vincent Schell

Yannick L Sierra

Dallas Blake De Atley

Michael Brouwer

Ahmer Ali Khan

Marc Jason Krochmal

John Joseph Iarocci

Ivan Krstic

Andrew Roger Whalley

Guy Cote

Gregory B Novick

Ian C Hendry

Najeeb M Abdulrahiman

Christopher P Tann

Timothy R Paaske

Conrad Sauerwald

Arthur L Spence

Steven Porter Hotelling

Paul Stephen Drzaic

Jean-Pierre Simon Guillou

Joakim Linde

Indranil S Sen

Moshe Laifenfeld

Craig Alan Marciniak

Lynn Richard Youngs

Anup K Sharma

Jeffry E Gonion

Eric Cabot Hannah

Richard L Coulson

Patrick L Coffman

Gregory N Christie

Steve Porter Hotelling

Thomas P Mensch

Yousuf H Vaid

David W LaFollette

Ben-Heng Juang

Alexander R Ledwith

Lucia Elena Ballard

Libor Sykora

Onur E Tackin

Yehonatan Perez

Oren M Elrad

Mehdi Ziat

Vanessa Cristina Heppolette

David P Finkelstein

Saket R Vora

Jeffrey C Lee

Ross Thompson

Jonathan Pokrass

Thorsten Gernoth

Yifan Zhang

Alejandro J Marquez

Feng Tang

Zachary A Rosen

James C Wilson

Michael Ross Malone

Matthew G Watson

Matthew C Waldon

Tae-Wook Koh

Michael D Ford

Jason D Gosnell

Raman S Thiara

Tristan F Schaap

Tal Kaitz

Jean-Marc Padova

Matthias Lerch

Avinash Narasimhan

Michael G Frank

George R Dicker

Erik P Machnicki

Ali Sazegari

Josh P De Cesare

Randy Richard Dunton

Robert L Farrell

Julien F Freudiger

Roberto G Yepez

Hervé Sibert

Jeremy A Wyld

Santiago Fernandez-Gomez

Pierre-Olivier J Martel

Tahoma Madrone Toelkes

William S Duckwall

Jean-Didier Allegrucci

Kelsey Yukio Ho

Erik C Neuenschwander

Eric Daniel Friedman

Brad W Hosler

Mukesh Kataria

Lars M Lindberg

Zhimin Chen

Techniques are disclosed relating to secure data storage. In various embodiments, a mobile device includes a wireless interface, a secure element, and a secure circuit. The secure element is configured to store confidential information associated with a plurality of users and to receive a request to communicate the confidential information associated with a particular one of the plurality of users. The secure element is further configured to communicate, via the wireless interface, the confidential information associated with the particular user in response to an authentication of the particular user. The secure circuit is configured to perform the authentication of the particular user. In some embodiments, the mobile device also includes a biosensor configured to collect biometric information from a user of the mobile device. In such an embodiment, the secure circuit is configured to store biometric information collected from the plurality of users by the biosensor.

Secure element having multiple CRS applets

In some examples, a method comprises determining, at an electronic device having a first component of a first component type, a unique identifier associated with the first component. In some examples, in accordance with a determination that the unique identifier does not match the expected identifier of the component of the first component type in the electronic device, determining that the first component associated with the unique identifier satisfies one or more eligibility criteria. In some examples, in accordance with the determination that the first component associated with the unique identifier satisfies the one or more eligibility criteria, authenticating an association of the first component with the electronic device, including updating an installation counter associated with the first component, and updating the expected identifier for the component of the first type based on the unique identifier of the first component.

Systems and methods for authenticating components on an electronic device

Some embodiments of the invention provide a method for a trusted (or originator) device to modify the security state of a target device (e.g., unlocking the device) based on a securing ranging operation (e.g., determining a distance, proximity, etc.). The method of some embodiments exchanges messages as a part of a ranging operation in order to determine whether the trusted and target devices are within a specified range of each other before allowing the trusted device to modify the security state of the target device. In some embodiments, the messages are derived by both devices based on a shared secret and are used to verify the source of ranging signals used for the ranging operation. In some embodiments, the method is performed using multiple different frequency bands.

Modifying security state with secured range detection

A secure ranging system can use a secure processing system to deliver one or more ranging keys to a ranging radio on a device, and the ranging radio can derive locally at the system ranging codes based on the ranging keys. A deterministic random number generator can derive the ranging codes using the ranging key and one or more session parameters, and each device (e.g. a cellular telephone and another device) can independently derive the ranging codes and derive them contemporaneously with their use in ranging operations.

Methods and architectures for secure ranging

Techniques are disclosed relating to biometric authentication, e.g., facial recognition. In some embodiments, a device is configured to verify that image data from a camera unit exhibits a pseudo-random sequence of image capture modes and/or a probing pattern of illumination points (e.g., from lasers in a depth capture mode) before authenticating a user based on recognizing a face in the image data. In some embodiments, a secure circuit may control verification of the sequence and/or the probing pattern. In some embodiments, the secure circuit may verify frame numbers, signatures, and/or nonce values for captured image information. In some embodiments, a device may implement one or more lockout procedures in response to biometric authentication failures. The disclosed techniques may reduce or eliminate the effectiveness of spoofing and/or replay attacks, in some embodiments.

Biometric authentication techniques

Techniques are disclosed relating to securing computing devices during boot. In various embodiments, a secure circuit of a computing device generates for a public key pair and signs, using a private key of the public key pair, configuration settings for an operating system of the computing device. A bootloader of the computing device receives a certificate for the public key pair from a certificate authority and initiates a boot sequence to load the operating system. The boot sequence includes the bootloader verifying the signed configuration settings using a public key included in the certificate and the public key pair. In some embodiments, the secure circuit cryptographically protects the private key based on a passcode of a user, the passcode being usable by the user to authenticate to the computing device.

Securely signing configuration settings

Techniques are disclosed relating to application verification. In various embodiments, a computing device includes a secure circuit configured to maintain a plurality of cryptographic keys of the computing device. In such an embodiment, the computing device receives, from an application, a request for an attestation usable to confirm an integrity of the application, instructs the secure circuit to use one of the plurality of cryptographic keys to supply the attestation for the application, and provides the attestation to a remote computing system in communication with the application. In some embodiments, the secure circuit is configured to verify received metadata pertaining to the identity of the application and use the cryptographic key to generate the attestation indicative of the identity of the application.

Application integrity attestation

Secure element having multiple users

Techniques are disclosed relating to relating to a public key infrastructure (PKI). In one embodiment, an integrated circuit is disclosed that includes at least one processor and a secure circuit isolated from access by the processor except through a mailbox mechanism. The secure circuit is configured to generate a key pair having a public key and a private key, and to issue, to a certificate authority (CA), a certificate signing request (CSR) for a certificate corresponding to the key pair. In some embodiments, the secure circuit may be configured to receive, via the mailbox mechanism, a first request from an application executing on the processor to issue a certificate to the application. The secure circuit may also be configured to perform, in response to a second request, a cryptographic operation using a public key circuit included in the secure circuit.

Secure circuit for encryption key generation

Systems and methods for storing and recovering data for a device are described. In one embodiment, factory generated calibration data can be generated, sealed and restored securely even if two sensors in two different devices, such as a first ambient light sensor and a second ambient light sensor have the same sensor identifier. In one embodiment, a device transmits a database key to cause storage or recovery of the calibration data, and the database key includes a sensor identifier and a public cryptographic key of the device.

Factory data storage and recovery

Techniques are disclosed relating to the secure communication of devices. In one embodiment, a first device is configured to perform a pairing operation with a second device to establish a secure communication link between the first device and the second device. The pairing operation includes receiving firmware from the second device to be executed by the first device during communication over the secure communication link, and in response to a successful verification of the firmware, establishing a shared encryption key to be used by the first and second devices during the communication. In some embodiments, the pairing operation includes receiving a digital signature created from a hash value of the firmware and a public key of the second device, and verifying the firmware by extracting the hash value from the digital signature and comparing the extracted hash value with a hash value of the received firmware.

Secure device pairing

The present disclosure describes techniques for changing a required authentication type based on a request for a particular type of information. For example, consider a situation where a user has asked a virtual assistant 'who owns this device?' By default, the device may allow biometric authentication to unlock. In response to identification of the owner by the virtual assistant, however, the device may require one or more other types of authentication (e.g., manual entry of a passcode) to unlock the device. In various embodiments, the disclosed techniques may increase the security of the device by making it more difficult for malicious entities to obtain the sensitive information or to access device functionality once the sensitive information has been disclosed. In various embodiments, this may prevent or reduce unauthorized access to the device.

Authentication techniques in response to attempts to access sensitive information

Growing community of inventors

Windermere, FL, United States of America

Jerrold Von Hauck