Nagravision S.a.

Qualcomm Incorporated

Nagrastar LLC

Jerome Perrine

William Michael Beals

Nicolas Fischer

Marco Macchetti

Didier Hunacek

Roan Hautier

Laurent Gauteron

Francois Fer

Andre Kudelski

Bernard Benoit

Gregory Duval

Hervé Goupil

Patrick Servet

Benjamin Brian Ellis

Jean-Claude Fournier

Nicolas Thaddee Courtois

Maurice Van Riek

Claudio Favi

Denis Pochuev

Osen Karl

Maurice Gerard Van Riek

Sebastien Bellon

Herve Goupil

Systems and techniques are provided for generating cryptographic keys. For instance, a process may include generating a plurality of master keys based on a plurality of generated random numbers, a second number, and a nonce number; storing a master key, of the plurality of master keys, along with a generated random number of the plurality of generated random numbers, the second number, and the nonce number used to generate the master key in a one-time programmable memory; generating public key-private key pairs for the plurality of master keys; transmitting public keys of the plurality of public key-private key pairs for audit; destroying an audited master key, along with the generated random number, second number, and the nonce number used to generate the audited master key, based on the audit; and storing a non-audited public key-private key pair corresponding to the master key that were not destroyed based on the audit.

Auditable master secrets and key vault

The disclosure relates to a method of obtaining a cryptographic key in a chipset (). An initial configuration message may be generated using a physical unclonable function (hereinafter: PUF) () of the chipset (). Said PUF () may generate a predetermined value when using the initial configuration message as input to the PUF (). The initial configuration message may be transmitted to a client access server (). An altered configuration message may be received from the client access server (), wherein the altered configuration message is generated by the client access server () based on the initial configuration message. The cryptographic key may be obtained from the PUF () using the altered configuration message as input to the PUF ().

Cryptographic key configuration using physical unclonable function

A method of programming a device comprising acquiring configuration data, loading the configuration data onto a programmable device, processing at least a portion of the configuration data through a one way function to form processed configuration data, and configuring at least one configurable module of the programmable device using the processed configuration data from the processing step.

Flexible cryptographic device

The disclosure relates to a method for enabling the secure functions of a chipset () and especially the encryption of the content of the secure memory () when the device goes into low power mode. The content of the secure memory () may be encrypted and stored in an external memory () during low power mode of the chipset ().

Securing data stored in a memory of an IoT device during a low power mode

System and method for establishing secure conference calls. In one example system, a central conference call server establishes point-to-point connections with accessory devices comprising a secure element and connected to corresponding participant devices. The conference call server includes an interface to a plurality of secure elements configured to perform scrambling and unscrambling of media signals communicated to and from the accessory devices. In another example, one of the participant devices operates as the central conference call server. In other examples, participant devices communicate on a conference call via point-to-point connections between all accessory devices connected to the participant devices. The accessory devices include secure elements for decryption and encryption of media signals communicated between the accessory devices.

Systems and methods for conducting secure VOIP multi-party calls

A method of monitoring execution in an execution environment of an operation, for example a cryptographic operation, comprising a sequence of instructions, is disclosed. Instructions sent in the sequence from a main processor to one or more auxiliary processors, for example cryptographic processors, to execute the operation are monitored and the sequence of instructions is verified using verification information. The method comprises enabling output from the execution environment of a result of the operation in response to a successful verification of the sequence, or generating a verification failure signal in response to a failed verification of the sequence.

Verification of instructions from main processor to auxiliary processor

An integrated circuit and a method of configuring a plurality of integrated circuits are disclosed. Each integrated circuit comprises a cryptographic key specific to it. Each integrated circuit comprises a cryptographic key specific to it. Each cryptographic key can be generated on the respective integrated circuit using a physical unclonable function and data associated with the cryptographic key, e.g. a configuration message comprising instructions for generating the cryptographic key using the physical unclonable function. The cryptographic key specific to the integrated circuit is not stored on the integrated circuit. Each of the plurality of integrated circuits are configured using a data file that is encrypted with the respective cryptographic key specific to the integrated circuit, circuit.

Integrated circuit personalisation

In an embodiment, a communication device receives a request to establish a media session with a remote endpoint. In response to receiving the request, the communication device exchanges media-session control data with the remote endpoint on behalf of a local endpoint to establish the requested media session between the local endpoint and the remote endpoint. The communication device is communicatively connected to the local endpoint via a Personal Area Network (PAN) communication link. The communication device relays media-session payload data between the local and remote endpoints. The media-session payload data (i) is associated with the media session and (ii) is encrypted based on at least one payload-data cryptographic key that is not accessible to the communication device.

Methods and systems for communication-session arrangement on behalf of cryptographic endpoints

Disclosed herein are methods and systems for encrypting communications using a secure element. An embodiment takes the form of a method including the steps of performing a key-exchange procedure with an endpoint via a voice-communication device to obtain a symmetric seed key for a secure voice session with the endpoint; generating first and second symmetric session keys for the secure voice session based on the obtained symmetric seed key; receiving outbound voice packets from the voice-communication device in connection with the secure voice session, each outbound voice packet including a header and an unencrypted payload; using a first symmetric encryption algorithm and the first symmetric session key, followed by a second symmetric encryption algorithm and the second symmetric session key to generate and output twice-encrypted outbound-voice-packet payloads to the voice-communication device for transmission to the endpoint in connection with the secure voice session.

Methods and systems for encrypting communications using a secure element

System and method for establish secure conference calls. In one example system, a central conference call server establishes point-to-point connections with accessory devices comprising a secure element and connected to corresponding participant devices. The conference call server includes an interface to a plurality of secure elements configured to perform scrambling and unscrambling of media signals communicated to and from the accessory devices. In another example, one of the participant devices operates as the central conference call server. In other examples, participant devices communicate on a conference call via point-to-point connections between all accessory devices connected to the participant devices. The accessory devices include secure elements for decryption and encryption of media signals communicated between the accessory devices.

Method for securing control words within a decoder in charge of descrambling digital content protected by these control words, comprising the following steps: for each descrambling unit of this decoder, loading in a directory a pairing key referenced by an identifier associating said key to a descrambling unit; receiving at least one encrypted control word referenced by an indication allowing to identify the descrambling unit for which it is intended; decrypting the control word by using a first key shared with a security module; identifying in the directory the pairing key whose identifier corresponds to the indication of destination associated to the control word; encrypting this control word by using this pairing key; and storing in a register the control word in a chronological and referenced way.

Method for protecting decryption keys in a decoder and decoder for implementing said method

Method and system for personalizing a chip, intended to be integrated into a smart card, comprising a tester associated to an FPGA device connected to the chip, the chip being part of a wafer comprising a plurality of chips and a disposable hardware module for verifying presence of the chip on the wafer. The tester sends a first secret code to the FPGA device, which commands the chip to initiate a test mode activation. The FPGA device encrypts a second secret code by using a secret encryption algorithm parameterized with a random number received from the chip and the first secret code to obtain a first cryptogram which is sent to the chip. The chip determines a second cryptogram by carrying out a Boolean function over a result obtained by decryption of the first cryptogram using the inverse algorithm parameterized with the random number and the first secret code. The second cryptogram is compared with a result obtained by carrying out the Boolean function over the second secret code temporarily stored on the chip. The FPGA device personalizes the chip only if the second cryptogram matches the calculated result.

Growing community of inventors

Romanel sur Morges, Switzerland

Jerome Perrine