Texas Instruments Corporation

Texas Instruments France S.a.

Texas Instruments France

Jerome Laurent Azema

Gregory Remy Philippe Conti

Alain Bruno Chateau

Eric Balard

Narendar M Shankar

Erdal Paksoy

Gregory R Conti

Jerome Neanne

Guillaume Leterrier

Constantin Haidamous

A method and system of verifying proper execution of a secure mode entry sequence. At least some of the exemplary embodiments may be a method comprising delivering an instruction from a memory to a processor across an instruction bus (the instruction at least partially configures the processor for secure mode of operation different that privilege modes of the processor), verifying delivery of the instruction across the instruction bus, and checking for proper execution of the instruction using a trace port of the processor.

Monitoring circuit for allowing a processor to enter secure mode upon confirming proper execution of a non-speculative instruction

A computing system comprising a processor having a first and second bus (the processor on a first semiconductor die mounted within a semiconductor package), a monitoring device coupled to both the first and second bus of the processor (the monitoring device on the first semiconductor die mounted within the semiconductor package), a memory coupled to the processor via the first bus (coupled to the monitoring device via a security signal, the memory on a second semiconductor die mounted within the semiconductor package), and a user interface external of the semiconductor package (the user interface coupled to the processor via the second data and instruction bus). The monitoring device checks one or both of the first and second busses to determine whether a secure mode entry sequence is delivered to the processor. The first bus and the security signal are only coupled to and accessible by devices within the semiconductor package.

System and method for secure mode for processors and memories on multiple semiconductor dies within a single semiconductor package

State machine for monitoring a trace port and verifying proper execution of a secure mode entry sequence instruction

A system comprising a first logic adapted to use qualifiers received from a component to determine which of a plurality of storages matches the qualifiers, the first logic generates a first signal indicative of a storage matching the qualifiers. The system also comprises a second logic coupled to the first logic and adapted to use a target address received from the component to determine which of the plurality of storages matches the target address, the second logic generates a second signal indicative of a storage matching the target address. Another logic is adapted to determine whether the storage associated with the first signal matches the storage associated with the second signal. The qualifiers indicate security mode attributes associated with the component.

Value generator coupled to firewall programmable qualifier data structure logics

A system is provided that includes a processor and a system memory coupled to the processor, the system memory stores at least one application for execution by the processor. The system also includes logic coupled to the processor, the logic providing a secure time reference. The processor selectively accesses the secure time reference to generate a virtual time reference for the at least one application.

Secure time/date virtualization

A system and method of identifying and preventing security violations within a computing system. Some exemplary embodiments may be a method comprising monitoring activity on a core bus coupled to a processor core (the processor core operating in a computing system), identifying activity on the core bus as a security violation, and preventing execution of an instruction within the processor core in response to the security violation.

System and method of identifying and preventing security violations within a computing system

A computing platform () protects system firmware () using a manufacturer certificate (). The manufacturer certificate binds the system firmware () to the particular computing platform (). The manufacturer certificate also stores configuration parameters and device identification numbers. A secure run-time platform data checker () and a secure run-time checker () check the system firmware during operation of the computing platform () to ensure that the system firmware () or information in the manufacturer certificate () has not been altered. Application software files () and data files () are bound to the particular computing device () by a platform certificate (). Configuration parameters may be stored in a data file () with an associated platform certificate ().

Secure management of configuration parameters in a computing platform

A computing platform () protects system firmware () using a manufacturer certificate (). The manufacturer certificate binds the system firmware () to the particular computing platform (). The manufacturer certificate may also store configuration parameters and device identification numbers. A secure run-time platform data checker () and a secure run-time checker () check the system firmware during operation of the computing platform () to ensure that the system firmware () or information in the manufacturer certificate () has not been altered. Application software files () and data files () are bound to the particular computing device () by a platform certificate (). A key generator may be used to generate a random key and an encrypted key may be generated by encrypting the random key using a secret identification number associated with the particular computing platform (). Only the encrypted key is stored in the platform certificate ().

Run-time firmware authentication

Indirect data protection using random key encryption

A method comprising downloading a boot image onto a mobile communication device and generating a device-bound certificate ('DBC'). The DBC preferably comprises an authentication code generated using a hashed message authentication code algorithm and a key specific to the device. The method may further comprise storing the DBC on the boot image, thus binding the boot image to the mobile communication device.

Growing community of inventors

Villeneuve-Loubet, France

Jerome Laurent Azema