Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Jeffrey M Cooperstein

Travis Muhlestein

Corina Eva Feuerstein

Raja Krishnaswamy

Jonathan C Hawkins

Erik B Christensen

Anders Hejlsberg

Gopala Krishna R Kakivaya

Christopher Wellington Brumme

Michael M Magruder

David Bau

Brian LaMacchia

Gregory Darrell Fee

Lance Olson

Henry L Sanders

David S Ebbo

Julie D Bennett

James S Miller

Sean Edwin Trowbridge

Krzysztof J Cwalina

Seth Mitchell Demsey

Brian M Grunkemeyer

Christopher L Anderson

Shawn Patrick Burke

Stefan Harrington Pharies

Yung-Shin Lin

Loren Kohnfelder

Anthony J Moore

Erik B Olson

Yann Christensen

Fabio A Yeon

James H Hogg

Craig T Sinclair

Adam Wade Smith

David S Mortenson

Caleb L Doise

Alan Geoffrey Boshier

Shajan Dasan

Manish S Prabhu

Radu Rares Palanca

Joseph L Roxe

Suzanne Maurine Cook

John I McConnell

Tarun Anand

Ramasamy Krishnaswamy

Hany E Ramadan

Jesus Ruiz-Scougall

Joe Dennis Long

Jayanth V Rajan

Daniel Takacs

David Owen Driver

Charles W Kaufman

Manu Vasandani

Scott Field

Michael Todd Kramer

Amit Gupta

Adrian Mihail Marinescu

Yan Valerie Leshinsky

Stephen James Millet

Giovanni Moises Della-Libera

Nikhil Kothari

Suraj T Poozhiyil

Scott David Guthrie

Marc E Seinfeld

Akhilesh Kaza

Niels Thomas Ferguson

Mark A Alcazar

Luca Bolognese

Venkatraman V Kudallur

Keith W Ballinger

Brian Keith Pepin

Mark T Anders

Jun Fang

Benjamin M Westbrook

Arthur Charles Leonard

John M Hawkins

Susan M Warren

Nicholas M Kramer

Aaron Ross Goldfeder

Robert Michael Howard

Chad W Royal

Ramesh Chinta

Daniel M Cheung

Mohamed Rouatbi

Mark W Fussell

Mark A Boulter

Sreeram Nivarthi

Omri Gazitt

Julian Federico Gonzalez

Matthew C Pohle

Nithyalakshmi Sampathkumar

Neetu Rajpal

Karen Elizabeth Corby

Daniel Dedu-Constantin

Blaine J Dockter

Bryan J Reich

Mariya Tikunova

William A Adams

Patrick J Smith

Matthew G Ellis

Security risks associated with scanning a computer are at least mitigated by performing the scanning off node. State data of a target node, or computer, can be acquired in various ways. The acquired state data can be subsequently employed to generate a virtual replica of the target computer or portion thereof on a second computer isolated from the target computer. The virtual replica of the target computer provides a scanner access to the data needed to perform a scan on the second computer without accessing or being able to impact the target computer.

Off node scanning

A resilient hashing system leverages a fast, non-cryptographic hash/checksum function that has good diffusion properties while remaining reasonably efficient on modern central processing units (CPUs). The hash function uses random secret data so that hash keys for particular data are difficult to predict. Due to its internal structure, well-chosen random secret data is difficult for an attacker to counter without having access to the direct output of the hash function. At every stage of the block function, there are at least two operations that can be performed in parallel, increasing performance on modern superscalar CPUs. Thus, the resilient hashing system provides a hash table and checksum that can be used in Internet-facing or other vulnerable sources of input data to manage performance in the face of malicious attacks.

Checksum and hashing operations resilient to malicious input data

Various embodiments are disclosed relating to performing a trusted copy and paste operations between a source application and a target application. For example, a trust system may receive a paste request for pasting copied source content, and may compare a source trust level associated with the source content to a target trust level associated with a target application. In this way, for example, harmful or disruptive code may be prevented from being pasted into the target application.

Copy-paste trust system

Assertions for elevated privilege associated with transparent code may be ignored, prohibited, or modified.

Transparent code

Embodiments are directed to securing mixed-mode applications in a semi-trusted environment. In an embodiment, a computer system securely loads native data files associated with a mixed-mode application. The secure loading ensures that the native components upon which the managed component depends are authentic. The computer system implements a securely stored handle associated with the loaded native data files to provide secure communications between the managed component and the loaded native data files. The handle provides a trusted function pointer to an associated mixed-mode application function. The computer system also initiates a security permission request for each resource that is passed to the native components during execution of the mixed-mode application, so that each resource is verified before execution.

Securing mixed-mode applications

Access to a resource by sandboxed code is dynamically authorized by a client security system based on a resource based policy. A sandboxed application running on a client is granted access to a resource based on a resource based policy despite denial of the access based on a static policy associated with the client security system. The granting of access coincides with the determination that the threat to a user or the user's information is not increased should the access be granted.

Resource based dynamic security authorization

Generating a digital signature of an entire embedded code project is provided while maintaining certain exclusion areas so that a productivity application can incorporate application-specific information into the embedded code project without hampering the digital signature. A tree structure of data may be serialized into a data stream. The tree structure may include multiple branches and one or more elements identified as an exclusion area. A digital signature of the data stream may be created and included in a document associated with the tree structure.

Digital signatures for embedded code

A computer-implemented method for exposing instrumentation data available from within a managed code environment to an instrumentation data source executing outside of said managed code environment is presented. The method comprises each of the following. An indication is received that said instrumentation data should be exposed to said instrumentation data source. In response to receiving said indication, a decoupled provider is loaded. The decoupled provider facilitates communication between said managed code environment and said instrumentation data source. A determination is made as to whether schema describing said instrumentation data has been previously registered with said instrumentation data source. In response to determining that said schema has not been previously registered with said instrumentation data source, said schema is registered with said instrumentation data source through said decoupled provider.

Providing instrumentation data to an instrumentation data source from within a managed code

In accordance with the present invention, a system, method, and computer-readable medium for identifying malware in a request to a Web service is provided. One aspect of the present invention is a computer-implemented method for protecting a computer that provides a Web service from malware made in a Web request. When a request is received, an on-demand compilation system compiles high-level code associated with the request into binary code that may be executed. However, before the code is executed, antivirus software designed to identify malware scans the binary code for malware. If malware is identified, the antivirus software prevents the binary code associated with the request from being executed.

Protecting a computer that provides a Web service from malware

An application program interface (API) provides a set of functions for application developers who build Web applications on Microsoft Corporation's .NET&#x2122; platform.

Computing system and method for allowing plurality of applications written in different programming languages to communicate and request resources or services via a common language runtime layer

An application program interface (API) provides a set of functions, including a set of base classes and types that are used in substantially all applications accessing the API, for application developers who build Web applications on Microsoft Corporation's .NET&#x2122; platform.

Application program interface for network software platform

A method and apparatus for providing instrumentation data to an instrumentation data source from within a managed code environment is provided. A decoupled provider is provided that executes partially in managed code and partially in unmanaged code. The decoupled provider facilitates communication with an instrumentation data source. The decoupled provider also dynamically registers schema for managed code objects to be instrumented at run-time. The decoupled provider also receives and processes requests from the instrumentation data source to retrieve instance data for managed code objects, to write properties on managed code objects, and to execute methods on managed code objects.

Method and apparatus for providing instrumentation data to an instrumentation data source from within a managed code environment

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Bellevue, WA, United States of America

Jeffrey M Cooperstein