Hewlett-packard Development Company, L.p.

Compaq Computer Corporation, Inc.

Jeffrey Kevin Jeansonne

Valiuddin Y Ali

Richard A Bramley, Jr

David Plaquin

Rahul V Lakdawala

Lan Wang

Boris Balacheff

Wei Ze Liu

Roger D Benson

Dallas M Barlow

Earl W Moore

Isaac Lagnado

Tim L Zhang

Maugan Villatel

Rosilet Retnamoni Braduke

James M Mann

Ronald E Deluga

Joshua Serratelli Schiffman

Vali Ali

Walter G Fry

L Joy Griebenow

Leonard E Russo

Patrick L Gibbons

Brian D Ryder

Steven S Homer

Syed S Azam

Chris I Dalton

Thomas P Sawyers

Adrian John Baldwin

Christopher H Stewart

James Luke Mondshine

Baraneedharan Anbazhagan

Thong Thai

Mike Provencher

Jayne E Scott

Jon G Lloyd

Steven Petit

Stanley Hyojun Park

Mason Andrew Gunyuzlu

Robert C Hurbanis, Jr

Ann N Alejandro

Justin C Prindle

Mark S Tracy

Jeffrey A Lev

Robert C Brooks

Kent E Biggs

Mark H Ruch

Harold Merkel

Richard S Lin

Kimon Berlin

Paul N Walker

Richard Bramley

Christopher Charles Mohrman

Jeffrey C Parker

Timothy Neill

Richard E Hodges

Tevin Richards

Rick Bramley

Duane J Gatlin

Robert Stephen Craig

Richard H Hodge

Dan V Forlenza

Kenneth D Reddix

Srinath Balaraman

Khoa Dang Huynh

Ho-Sup Chung

Karthick Periyakulam Tharakraj

Frederick L Lathrop

Lee E Leppo

Marat Nersisyan

Adam G Sanderson

Darrell L Brokmeyer

Gregory L Hubbard

Terri L Dunlap

Jung Suk Lee

Giridhar Busam

Rahul V Lakadwala

Achyutram Bhamidipaty

Richard Alden Bramley Jr

Duane Gatlin

In example implementations, a computing device is provided. The computing device includes a processor, a multiplexer, a first memory, a second memory, and a controller. The processor is to execute an operating system (OS). The multiplexer is coupled to the processor. The first memory is coupled to the multiplexer to store current basic input/output system (BIOS) instructions. The second memory is coupled to the multiplexer. The controller is coupled to the multiplexer to control connections of the multiplexer to allow the processor to store updated BIOS instructions in the second memory in a background while the OS is executed by processor.

BIOS updates

In some examples, a computing device includes memory including system memory, and a processor in electronic communication with the memory. In some examples, the processor receives a system management interrupt. In some examples, the processor identifies trigger code that triggered the system management interrupt. In some examples, the processor executes code from the system memory when the trigger code is a virtualization program.

Execution of code in system memory

An example computing device incudes a main processor, a management firmware subsystem, and a controller to control operation of the management firmware subsystem. The controller is separate from a main processor. A memory stores subsystem data that is useable by the controller. The computing device further includes a set of instructions that determines a manufacturing mode of the computing device. The manufacturing mode is enabled when the computing device is under manufacture or maintenance. The manufacturing mode is disabled when the computing device is under normal operation. The set of instructions further determines a manufacturing state of the subsystem data. The manufacturing state indicates whether the subsystem data is complete. In response to determining that the manufacturing mode is disabled and that the manufacturing state of the subsystem data is incomplete, the set of instructions initiates a restoration of the subsystem data from a backup of the subsystem data.

Restoration of firmware subsystems based on manufacturing states

An example storage medium includes instructions that, when executed, cause a processor of a computing device to read, during start-up of the computing device, first configuration data from a first storage device of the computing device; read second configuration data from a second storage device of the computing device; determine that there is an inconsistency between the first configuration data and the second configuration data; check a tamper status of the computing device; based on the tamper status and the determination that there is an inconsistency between the first configuration data and the second configuration data: (i) clear a secure storage location of the computing device, the secure storage location storing data to access protected data; or (ii) replace the first configuration data on the first storage device of the computing device based on second data and continue the start-up of the computing device.

Configuration data deletion based on tamper status

An example computing device includes a user interface, a network interface, a non-volatile memory, a processor coupled to the user interface, the network interface, and the non-volatile memory, and a set of instructions stored in the non-volatile memory. The set of instructions, when executed by the processor, is to perform a hardware initialization of the computing device according to a setting, establish a local trust domain and a remote trust domain, use a local-access public key to issue a challenge via the user interface to grant local access to the setting, and use a remote-access public key to grant remote access via the network interface to remote access to the setting.

Access to firmware settings with asymmetric cryptography

In one example in accordance with the present disclosure, an electronic device is described. The example electronic device includes a NAND flash device to store a static data component of a variable. The example electronic device also includes a NOR flash device to store a dynamic data component of the variable. The electronic device further includes a controller to write the static data component of the variable to the NAND flash device. This controller is also to write the dynamic data component of the variable to the NOR flash device.

Bios variables storage

An example of a first computing device may include firmware, a controller, and a processor. The processor may be to generate a trust state message, to be sent to the controller, indicating the firmware of the first computing device is operating a trusted environment and utilize the firmware to validate an update within the trusted environment. The controller may be to assert, responsive to receiving the trust state message, a trust state signal to a second computing device indicating the firmware of the first computing device is operating the trusted environment The assertion of the trust state signal may be to enable the second computing device to install the validated update.

Update signals

An example computing device includes a memory accessible at startup of the computing device, a buffer, and a set of instructions. The memory stores a configuration setting that is configurable by the application of a change request. The memory also stores a first public key and a second public key. The buffer stores change requests submitted by a remote entity, including a first change request to make a first setting change and a second change request to make a second setting change. The first change request is signed by a first private key corresponding to the first public key, and the second change request is signed by a second private key corresponding to the second public key. The set of instructions retrieves a change request from the buffer, determines whether the change request is authenticated by a public key, and if authenticated, applies the change request.

Signed change requests to remotely configure settings

An example computing device includes a controller to control operation of a firmware subsystem of the computing device. The controller is separate from a main processor of the computing device. A memory stores subsystem data that is useable by the controller. The subsystem data includes recovery information executable by the controller to initiate recovery of the subsystem. The computing device further includes recovery coordination instructions. The recovery coordination instructions determine integrity of the recovery information as stored on the memory and. In response to determining that the recovery information lacks integrity, the recovery coordination instructions initiate recovery of the firmware subsystem using a backup of the recovery information and perform recovery of the firmware subsystem using an update to the firmware subsystem.

Recovery via backups of recovery information

In some examples, a device includes a processor, a core hardware logic to execute instructions to perform a task in the device, and a controller separate from the processor. The controller detects corruption of the instructions, and in response to detecting the corruption, load a recovery code to the core hardware logic to trigger recovery of the core hardware logic from the corruption of the instructions.

Recovery from corruption

A controller that is separate from a processor of the system verifies controller code for execution on the controller. In response to verifying the controller code, the controller verifies system boot code.

Verifying controller code

An example system with a pre-OS (Operating System) environment, the pre-OS environment includes a private memory that is isolated from a processor of the system. The pre-OS environment also includes an embedded controller (EC) coupled to the private memory, where the EC includes an embedded key. The EC is to execute instructions to generate an encryption key based on the embedded key; generate a signature key; obtain data; produce an integrity-verification tag based on a hash of the obtained data, where the hash employs the signature key; encrypt the obtained data based on the encryption key; store the encrypted data in the private memory; and store the integrity-verification tag in the private memory in association with the stored encrypted data.

Data protection in a pre-operation system environment based on an embedded key of an embedded controller

A technique includes, on an electronic device that includes a plurality of display panels that are mounted to allow physically positioning of the display panels to create a plurality of potential display configurations for the electronic device, sensing the display configuration associated with current positions of the display panels. A camera is mounted on a given display panel of the plurality of display panels, and the technique includes selecting a camera mode for the electronic device based at least in part on the sensed display configuration.

Electing camera modes for electronic devices having multiple display panels

An apparatus includes a solid-state a solid-state non-volatile computer memory; and a controller coupled to the memory. The controller to: generate a data set including a tag that indicates that the data set is valid; write the data set into a block of the memory, wherein the block includes multiple addressable locations set to a common first binary value before the write; generate a subsequent data set including a tag that indicates that the subsequent data set is valid; update the tag of the written data set to indicate that the written data set is invalid, wherein the update includes setting an addressable location corresponding to the tag to second binary value different from the first binary value; write the subsequent data set to addressable locations in the block of memory other than the addressable locations of the invalid data set.

Validity of data sets stored in memory

A computer program product for providing notifications to a user of an intrusion into firmware includes, in one example, non-transitory computer readable medium including computer usable program code embodied therewith to, when executed by a processor, detect intrusion to the firmware of a computing system during runtime in a system management mode.

Notice of intrusion into firmware

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Houston, TX, United States of America

Jeffrey Kevin Jeansonne