Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

Jean-Pierre Seifert

Xinwen Zhang

Onur Aciicmez

Afshin Latifi

Qingwei Ma

Doreen Cheng

Yu Song

Swaroop S Kalasapur

Liang Xie

Victoria Stavridou-Coleman

Victoria S Coleman

Wookhee Min

Wenjuan Xu

Masoom Alam

In an integrated approach, an integrated application and operating system (IAOS) component integrates at least one computer application program with at least one operating system (OS) function. The IAOS component is an upper level system relative to a lower level system. The lower level system includes an OS operable to perform a reduced set of OS functions. The OS may be optimized for the IAOS component. For example, the OS may be optimized for Web-based and/or Browser-based applications of the IAOS component. In a flat approach, at least one component is an adjacent component in an upper level system, thereby allowing extension of the upper level system to accommodate various needs. An adjacent component can include at least one OS component and/or function not provided by the OS, serve as an interface to another layer and/or the OS, or provide Real-Time Operating System.

Flat or extended architecture using an integrated application and operating system component for computing systems and environments

Embodiments provide a method for maintaining digital assets of a user. The digital assets reside on at least one device and/or at least one cloud. The method further comprises aggregating the digital assets, and obtaining information identifying digital assets available for access by an access device. The digital assets available for access by the access device include a digital asset residing on a cloud or on a device other than the access device.

Managing multiple personal clouds and digital assets over multiple devices

Techniques for representation and verification of data are disclosed. The techniques are especially useful for representation and verification of the integrity of data (integrity verification) in safe computing environments and/or systems (e.g., Trusted Computing (TC) systems and/or environments). Multiple independent representative values can be determined independently and possibly in parallel for respective portions of the data. The independent representative values can, for example, be hash values determined at the same time for respective distinct portions of the data. The integrity of the data can be determined based on the multiple hash values by, for example, processing them to determine a single hash value that can serve as an integrity value.

Representation and verification of data for safe computing environments and systems

Techniques for protecting content to ensure its use in a trusted environment are disclosed. A trusted security component provided for a device can verify the internal integrity of the stored content and the host before it allows the content to come in contact with the host. As a counter part, a trusted security component provided for the host can verify and attest to the integrity of the host and/or specific host computing environment that can be provided for the content stored in the device. The trusted security component provided for a device effectively verify the host integrity based on the information attested to by the trusted security component provided for the host. If the trusted security component trusts the host, it allows the trusted host to provide a trusted host computing environment trusted to be safe for the content stored in the device.

Securing stored content for trusted hosts and safe computing environments

In one embodiment, a multi-stakeholder environment is controlled by first assigning a first domain to a first stakeholder and a second domain to a second stakeholder. Then a first access policy is defined for the first domain and access is restricted to the first domain for the second stakeholder according to the first access policy. In another embodiment, an access request is handled in a multi-stakeholder environment by first receiving parameters forwarded by hooks in system call functions in a kernel of the multi-stakeholder environment, wherein the parameters contain information about a first stakeholder requesting access to a domain corresponding to a second stakeholder. Then it is determined whether to allow the first stakeholder to access the domain based at least partially upon security settings corresponding to the domain.

Trusted multi-stakeholder environment

Techniques for controlling access are disclosed. The techniques can be used for reference monitoring in various computing systems (e.g., computing device) including those that may be relatively more susceptible to threats (e.g., mobile phones). Allowed access can be disallowed. In other words, permission to access a component can be effectively withdrawn even though access may be on-going. After permission to access a component has been allowed, one or more disallow access conditions or events can be effectively monitored in order to determine whether to withdraw the permission to access the component. As a result, allowed access to the component can be disallowed. Access can be disallowed by effectively considering the behavior of a component in the aggregate and/or over a determined amount of time. By way of example, a messaging application can be disallowed access to a communication port if the messaging application sends more messages than an acceptable limit during a session or in 4 hours. Disallow-access policies, rules and/or conditions can be defined and modified, for example, by end-users and system administrators, allowing a customizable and flexible security environment that is more adaptable to change.

Active access monitoring for safer computing environments and systems

Techniques for managing and protecting computing environments are disclosed. A safe computing environment can be provided for ensuring the safety and/or management of a device. The safe computing environment can be secured by a safe component that isolates and protects it from unsafe computing environments which may also be operating. As a result, various security and management activities can be securely performed from a safe computing environment. A safe computing environment can, for example, be provided on a device as a safe virtual computing environment (e.g., a safe virtual machine) protected by a safe virtual computing monitor (e.g., a safe virtual machine monitor) from one or more other virtual computing environments that are not known or not believed to be safe for the device. It will also be appreciated that the safe components can, for example, be provided as trusted components for a device. As such, various trusted components (or agent) can operate in a trusted computing environment secured from interference by components that many not be trusted and perform various security and/or management tasks alone or in connection, for example, with other trusted components (e.g., trusted serves).

Safety and management of computing environments that may support unsafe components

Techniques for detecting unauthorized use (e.g., malicious attacks) of the computing systems (e.g., computing devices) are disclosed. Unauthorized use can be detected based on patterns of use (e.g., behavioral patterns of use typically associated with a human being) of the computing systems. Acceptable behavioral pattern data can be generated for a computing system by monitoring the use of a support system (e.g., an operating system, a virtual environment) operating on the computing system. For example, a plurality of system support provider components of a support system (e.g., system calls, device drivers) can be monitored in order to generate the acceptable behavioral pattern data in a form which effectively defines an acceptable pattern of use (usage pattern) for the monitored system support provider components, thereby allowing detection of unauthorized use of a computing system by detecting any deviation from the acceptable pattern of use of the monitored system support provider components.

Detecting unauthorized use of computing devices based on behavioral patterns

Improved techniques for controlling access to accessible components of computing environments are disclosed. The techniques, among other things, can be used to provide Mandatory Access Control (MAC) mechanisms for mobile and embedded systems. One or more accessible components (e.g., accessible resources) which a component may attempt to access are determined so that one or more access permissions can be stored in a manner that they can be obtained if the component attempts to access the one or more accessible components, thereby allowing access to the one or more accessible components to be determined based on access permissions that are readily available. Generally, access permissions can be identified and stored in anticipation of need. Access permissions can be identified, for example, based on the likelihood of use, or all possible access permissions can be determined and stored. A safe (e.g., a trusted) access controlling (or monitoring) system (or component) can control access to resources of a computing environment. For example, a trusted access monitoring system can be provided in a secure and trusted operating environment utilizing Mandatory Access Control (MAC) capabilities of a secure operating system (e.g., SELinux Operating System).

Safe and efficient access control mechanisms for computing environments

In a first embodiment of the present invention, a method for managing digital assets of a user over multiple home network-enabled devices is provided. In this method, information is received from a plurality of home network-enabled personal devices within a user's personal cloud. The information includes usage information regarding the user's use of digital assets on those home network-enabled personal devices. Later, digital assets from the personal cloud, including assets located on non-personal devices outside a user's control (but still in the personal cloud) can be accessed using the gathered usage information.

Managing personal digital assets over multiple devices

A method and system for enforcing trusted computing (TC) policies in a security module architecture for a hypervisor. Upon receiving a request from a subject for access to an object, TC-related attribute values are obtained for the subject and the object based on a virtualized trusted platform module (vTPM). Access control decisions are the made based at least on the TC-related attribute values and TC-related policies.

Method and system for enforcing trusted computing policies in a hypervisor security module architecture

In one embodiment, a method for establishing a secure multicast channel between a service provider and a terminal is provided. A request is received from the service provider for a configuration of the terminal. A configuration of the terminal at a first time is sent to the service provider. A security key is obtained, wherein the security is bound to the configuration of the terminal at the first time. Then the security key is decrypted using a configuration of the terminal at a second time, wherein the decryption fails if the configuration of the terminal at the second time is not identical to the configuration of the terminal at the first time. A secure multicast channel is then established with the service provider using the security key.

Secure multicast content delivery

Improved techniques for obtaining authentication identifiers, authentication, and receiving services are disclosed. Multiple devices can be used for receiving service from a servicing entity (e.g., Service Providers). More particularly, a first device can be used to authenticate a first entity (e.g., one or more persons) for receiving services from the servicing entity, but the services can be received by a second device. Generally, the first device can be a device better suited, more preferred and/or more secure for authentication related activates including 'Identity Management.' The second device can be generally more preferred for receiving and/or using the services. In addition, a device can be designated for authentication of an entity. The device releases an authentication identifier only if the entity has effectively authorized its release, thereby allowing 'User Centric' approaches to &#x201c;Identity Management.&#x201d; A device can be designated for obtaining authentication identifiers from an identity assigning entity (e.g., an Identity Provider). The authentication identifiers can be used to authenticate an entity for receiving services from a servicing entity (e.g., a Service Provider) that provides the services to a second device. The same device can also be designated for authentication of the entity. The device can, for example, be a mobile phone allowing a mobile solution and providing a generally more secure computing environment than the device (e.g., a Personal Computer) used to receive and use the services.

Authentication, identity, and service management for computing and communication systems

In an embodiment of the present invention, the ability for a user or process to set or modify affinities is restricted in order to method for control a multi-processor environment. This may be accomplished by using a reference monitor that controls a process' capability to retrieve and set its or another process' affinity. This aids in the prevention of security breaches.

Securing CPU affinity in multiprocessor architectures

Methods and devices for increasing or hardening the security of data stored in a storage device, such as a hard disk drive, are described. A storage device provides for increased or hardened security of data stored in hidden and non-hidden partitions of a storage medium in the device. An algorithm may be utilized for deriving a key that is used to encrypt or decrypt text before it is read from or written to the hard disk. The algorithm accepts as input a specific media location factor, such as an end address or start address of the block where the text is being read from or written to, and a secret key of the storage component. The output of the algorithm is a final key that may be used in the encryption and decryption process. Thus, in this manner, the final key is dependent on the location of the block where the data is being written or read, thereby making it more difficult to tamper with the data, which may be stored in a hidden or non-hidden partition of a hard disk.

Growing community of inventors

Tirol, Austria

Jean-Pierre Seifert