Los Alamos National Security, LLC

Triad National Security, LLC

University of California

The United States of America As Represented by the United States

Traid National Security, LLC

Jane Elizabeth Nordholt

Richard John Hughes

Charles Glen Peterson

Raymond Thorson Newell

Kevin Peter McCabe

Rolando D Somma

Kush T Tyagi

Nicholas Dallmann

Paul G Kwiat

William T Buttler

James Thomas Thrasher

George L Morgan

Danna Rosenberg

Christopher C Wipf

David J McComas

Alexander Rosiewicz

Charles M Simmons

C Glen Peterson

Steve K Lamoreaux

Nicholas Dallman

Jon T Yard

Gabriel G Luther

Raymond T Newell

Message authenticators for quantum-secured communications facilitate low-latency authentication with assurances of security. Low-latency message authenticators are especially valuable in infrastructure systems where security and latency constraints are difficult to satisfy with conventional non-quantum cryptography. For example, a message transmitter receives a message and derives an authentication tag for the message based at least in part on an authenticator that uses one or more quantum keys. The message transmitter outputs the message and its authentication tag. A message receiver receives a message and authentication tag for the message. The message receiver derives a comparison tag for the message based at least in part on an authenticator that uses one or more quantum keys. The message receiver checks whether the message is authentic based on a comparison of the authentication tag and the comparison tag. In example implementations, the authenticator uses stream-wise cyclic redundancy code operations.

Streaming authentication and multi-level security for communications networks using quantum cryptography

Random number generators include a thermal optical source and detector configured to produce random numbers based on quantum-optical intensity fluctuations. An optical flux is detected, and signals proportional to optical intensity and a delayed optical intensity are combined. The combined signals can be electrical signals or optical signals, and the optical source is selected so as to have low coherence over a predetermined range of delay times. Balanced optical detectors can be used to reduce common mode noise, and in some examples, the optical flux is directed to only one of a pair of balanced detectors.

Quantum random number generators

Multiple bit values can be encoded on a single photon in a quantum key distribution (QKD) system using a plurality of sidebands of an optical carrier frequency. Computational and conjugate bases can be defined, and photons decoded based on a selected state from either basis. If n sidebands are available, as many as logn bits can be encoded on a single photon. Errors in detected bit values due to selection of an incorrect basis state or other errors can be at least partially corrected by bit distillation to identity bit strings for which a transmitter and a receiver record the same values, without insecure transmission of these values.

Long-haul high rate quantum key distribution

Quantum secure communication systems communicate quantum signals for quantum key distribution and classical signals with encrypted data and commands via a single optical fiber. In some systems, the single fiber carries classical data in both directions along with quantum communications. For example, quantum keys can be used to encrypt packets for bidirectional communication between two parties. In other systems, a single fiber is used for one way classical communications and quantum communications. The communication systems are secured using a security parameter based on the quantum and classical communications across the optical fiber.

Quantum-secured communications overlay for optical fiber communications networks

Multi-factor authentication using quantum communication ('QC') includes stages for enrollment and identification. For example, a user enrolls for multi-factor authentication that uses QC with a trusted authority. The trusted authority transmits device factor information associated with a user device (such as a hash function) and user factor information associated with the user (such as an encrypted version of a user password). The user device receives and stores the device factor information and user factor information. For multi-factor authentication that uses QC, the user device retrieves its stored device factor information and user factor information, then transmits the user factor information to the trusted authority, which also retrieves its stored device factor information. The user device and trusted authority use the device factor information and user factor information (more specifically, information such as a user password that is the basis of the user factor information) in multi-factor authentication that uses QC.

Multi-factor authentication using quantum communication

Quantum communication transmitters include beacon lasers that transmit a beacon optical signal in a predetermined state of polarization such as one of the states of polarization of a quantum communication basis. Changes in the beacon polarization are detected at a receiver, and a retarder is adjusted so that the states of polarization in a received quantum communication optical signal are matched to basis polarizations. The beacon and QC signals can be at different wavelengths so that the beacon does not interfere with detection and decoding of the QC optical signal.

Polarization tracking system for free-space optical communication, including quantum communication

Security is increased in quantum communication (QC) systems lacking a true single-photon laser source by encoding a transmitted optical signal with two or more decoy-states. A variable attenuator or amplitude modulator randomly imposes average photon values onto the optical signal based on data input and the predetermined decoy-states. By measuring and comparing photon distributions for a received QC signal, a single-photon transmittance is estimated. Fiber birefringence is compensated by applying polarization modulation. A transmitter can be configured to transmit in conjugate polarization bases whose states of polarization (SOPs) can be represented as equidistant points on a great circle on the Poincar&#xe9; sphere so that the received SOPs are mapped to equidistant points on a great circle and routed to corresponding detectors. Transmitters are implemented in quantum communication cards and can be assembled from micro-optical components, or transmitter components can be fabricated as part of a monolithic or hybrid chip-scale circuit.

Quantum communications system with integrated photonic devices

Techniques and tools for quantum key distribution ('QKD') between a quantum communication ('QC') card, base station and trusted authority are described herein. In example implementations, a QC card contains a miniaturized QC transmitter and couples with a base station. The base station provides a network connection with the trusted authority and can also provide electric power to the QC card. When coupled to the base station, after authentication by the trusted authority, the QC card acquires keys through QKD with a trust authority. The keys can be used to set up secure communication, for authentication, for access control, or for other purposes. The QC card can be implemented as part of a smart phone or other mobile computing device, or the QC card can be used as a fillgun for distribution of the keys.

Quantum key distribution using card, base station and trusted authority

Techniques and tools for implementing protocols for secure multi-party communication after quantum key distribution ('QKD') are described herein. In example implementations, a trusted authority facilitates secure communication between multiple user devices. The trusted authority distributes different quantum keys by QKD under trust relationships with different users. The trusted authority determines combination keys using the quantum keys and makes the combination keys available for distribution (e.g., for non-secret distribution over a public channel). The combination keys facilitate secure communication between two user devices even in the absence of QKD between the two user devices. With the protocols, benefits of QKD are extended to multi-party communication scenarios. In addition, the protocols can retain benefit of QKD even when a trusted authority is offline or a large group seeks to establish secure communication within the group.

Secure multi-party communication with quantum key distribution managed by trusted authority

Innovations for quantum key management harness quantum communications to form a cryptography system within a public key infrastructure framework. In example implementations, the quantum key management innovations combine quantum key distribution and a quantum identification protocol with a Merkle signature scheme (using Winternitz one-time digital signatures or other one-time digital signatures, and Merkle hash trees) to constitute a cryptography system. More generally, the quantum key management innovations combine quantum key distribution and a quantum identification protocol with a hash-based signature scheme. This provides a secure way to identify, authenticate, verify, and exchange secret cryptographic keys. Features of the quantum key management innovations further include secure enrollment of users with a registration authority, as well as credential checking and revocation with a certificate authority, where the registration authority and/or certificate authority can be part of the same system as a trusted authority for quantum key distribution.

Growing community of inventors

Los Alamos, NM, United States of America

Jane Elizabeth Nordholt