Robert Bosch

Denso Corporation

Jamshid Shokrollahi

Robert Szerwinski

Matthew Lewis

Markus Ihle

Paulius Duplys

Jan Zibuschka

Jan Hayek

Oliver Bubeck

Axel Aue

Simon Kramer

Hans Loehr

Gerhard Kottschlag

Nik Scharmann

Benjamin Glas

Hamit Hacioglu

Christopher Martin

David Foerster

Hanne Beck

Johanna Konrad-Mausser

Jens Frauenschlaeger

A method and a device for manipulation protection, including receiving a first data packet sent from a first device by a second device, the first data packet including a first time-variant parameter; signing a concatenation of a first hash value with the first time-variant parameter and an identification of the second device with the aid of a private key of an asymmetric encryption method which is assigned to the second device, program instructions or data, which are stored on the second device and provided to be carried out during the operation of the second device, being used to determine the hash value; generating a second data packet including the signature and the concatenation; and sending the second data packet from the second device to the first device.

Method for manipulation protection

For communication of a first participant with at least one additional participant in a communication system via multiple protocols, the protocols using at least two different certificate formats, the first participant uses different certificates with the respective certificate formats for the communication via the different protocols, the different certificates being based on a shared public key. The first participant holds a shared associated private key for the different certificates. Provision of the certificates for the first participant includes generating the public key and the associated private key, signing the public key for provision of the first certificate, and signing the public key for provision of the second certificate.

Reduction of memory requirement for cryptographic keys

A method for generating a challenge-response pair in an electric machine as a basis for an identification or authentication is described, the electric machine having a stator and a rotor, a first alternating voltage between two points of a first defined point pair of the electric machine being applied as a challenge, which causes an induction in the electric machine, a variable dependent on the caused induction being determined as a response. The first alternating voltage has a frequency which is higher than the working frequency of the electric machine.

Method and device for identifying an electric machine

A device for processing data, the device having an input interface for receiving input data and a processing module for processing data, characterized in that an encoding unit is provided, which is configured to encode data words received at the input interface as input data, in order to obtain encoded data words; measured values characterizing the encoded data words and/or their processing by the device being ascertainable for encoded data words as a function of at least one physical variable of the device; the encoding unit being configured to encode the data words in such a manner, that a specifiable proportion of all measured values, which may be at least approximately 50% of all measured values, exhibit a difference from the setpoint value, which is less than or equal to a specifiable threshold value; and the processing module is configured to process the encoded data words.

Device and method for processing data

An electronic device for processing data includes: an input interface for receiving input data; a processing module for processing data; and an encoding unit configured to encode data words received at the input interface as input data, in order to obtain encoded data words. The encoding unit is configured to encode the data words in such a manner that a specified proportion of all encoded data words have a specified Hamming distance and/or a specified Hamming weight. The processing module is configured to process the encoded data words.

Device and method for encoding input data based on hamming distance and/or weight

A method for data transmission between a sensor and an electronic control and/or regulating unit (ECU), the transmitted sensor data (x, . . . , x) and the sensor being secured against a manipulation. The system provides a particularly simple, but very secure method for manipulation protection, the sensor data (x, . . . , x) being transmitted via a first logical data transmission channel at a first data transmission rate, and security data (MAC; CMAC) for securing the transmitted sensor data and/or the sensor being transmitted via a second logical data transmission channel at a second data transmission rate from the sensor to the ECU. At least once at the beginning of a data transmission session, a session key is transmitted from the ECU to the sensor via a third logical data transmission channel and received by the latter, the session key being used at least for the ongoing session to generate the security data.

Method for recognizing a manipulation of a sensor and/or sensor data of the sensor

A memory module has at least one secure and at least one insecure memory area, separate write/read electronic units for each of the memory areas and at least one shared analog circuit part such as a voltage supply circuit for supplying the write/read electronic units and/or the memory areas.

Memory module for simultaneously providing at least one secure and at least one insecure memory area

A method for operating a security device includes a microcontroller, a protected memory area, in which at least one item of protection-worthy information is stored, and a unit, the microcontroller being connected to the protected memory area via the unit, the at least one item of protection-worthy information being accessed by the microcontroller via the unit when the method is carried out.

Method for operating a security device

In a method for authenticating a charge-coupled device (CCD), e.g., in a digital camera including the charge-coupled device, a physical unclonable function is utilized for the authentication. In the method, a response to be measured of pixels in the charge-coupled device to a defined incident light is used as the physical unclonable function.

Method for authenticating a charge-coupled device (CCD)

A method is described for generating a challenge-response pair in an electric machine as the basis for an authentication. The electric machine has at least one stator and at least one rotor. A voltage signal or current signal which causes induction between the rotor and the stator is generated as the challenge, and a variable which is a function of the caused induction is determined as the response.

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Ludwigsburg, Germany

Jamshid Shokrollahi