International Business Machines Corporation

James W Sweeny

John C Dayka

Tamas Visegrady

Todd Weston Arnold

Messaoud Benantar

Eysha S Powers

Thomas L Gindin

Steven R Hart

Michael J Jordan

Richard Henry Guski

Walter Barlett Farrell

Geoffrey George Jackson

Richard Victor Kisley

Michael Charles Osborne

Elizabeth A Dames

Michael J Miele

Thomas J Szczygielski

John M Thompson

John J Petreshock

Wai F Choi

Aspects of present disclosure relate to random number generator, a method and a computer program product of improving entropy quality of the random number generator. The method may include: receiving, at an input/output interface module of the random number generator, a request to generate a random number having a predetermined number of random bits, and starting a random bit generating loop to generate each of the random bits of the random number to be generated. In certain embodiments, random bit generating loop may include: incorporating a CPU Time as a randomness factor in generating random number to improve entropy quality, including non-deterministic memory-subsystem latencies in entropy extraction, such as those introduced by unpredictable cache movements, generating a Candidate Bit by using a Clock Time, and generating a random bit for random number by using a von Neumann unbiasing analysis module, until every random bits of the random number is generated.

Injecting CPU time jitter to improve entropy quality for random number generator

A method for verifying digital signatures in the presence of root key rollover includes issuing a cross-certificate to a rekeyed root certificate, validating the cross-certificate and the rekeyed root certificate with respect to an original trusted root certificate, and validating a digital media signature using the cross-certificate and the rekeyed root certificate. The method may also include adding the rekeyed root certificate to an end user's trusted root certificate store. The digital media signature validated via the method may correspond to a program signature. Validating the cross-certificate and the rekeyed root certificate may include verifying certificates within a program's certificate chain. A computer program product and a computer system corresponding to the method are also disclosed.

Automatic root key rollover during digital signature verification

A computer-implemented method for encrypting binary data may include encoding raw binary data in Base64 format to generate Base64 binary data. The Base64 binary data may be encrypted, by a computer processor, using format-preserving encryption to generate Base64 ciphertext. The Base64 ciphertext may be validatable by a Base64 validator.

Format-preserving encryption of Base64 encoded data

In one embodiment, a computer-implemented method includes extracting first key derivation data from a first row of data to be stored in a database, where the database includes two or more rows of data. A first encryption subkey is generated, by a computer processor, by combining the first key derivation data with a static key. One or more sensitive fields in each row of the two or more rows of the database are encrypted using a unique corresponding encryption subkey for the row, and the first encryption subkey is unique to the first row among the two or more rows of the database. The one or more sensitive fields in the first row of data are encrypted with format-preserving encryption using the first encryption subkey. The first row of data, including the encrypted one or more sensitive fields, are stored in the database.

Secure format-preserving encryption of data fields

Exemplary embodiments include a method for remapping subsets of host-centric application programming interfaces to commodity service providers, the method including receiving a commodity service providers object, embedding the commodity service providers object with a handle, transforming the handle into a serialized object readable by a hardware security module, generating a virtualized handle from the transformed handle, selecting a target hardware security module based on characteristics of the serialized object and mapping the virtualized handle to the target hardware security module.

Scalable, highly available, dynamically reconfigurable cryptographic provider with quality-of-service control built from commodity backend providers

A system for remapping subsets of host-centric application programming interfaces to commodity service providers includes a processor configured to receive a commodity service providers object, embed the commodity service providers object with a handle, transform the handle into a serialized object readable by a hardware security module, generate a virtualized handle from the transformed handle, select a target hardware security module based on characteristics of the serialized object and map the virtualized handle to the target hardware security module.

According to some exemplary embodiments, a computer-implemented timestamp method includes maintaining, at a cryptographic service provider (CSP), one or more timestamp policies specifying when digital timestamps should be issued. A timestamp request is received at the CSP from a timestamp authority that manages timestamping and is accompanied by a corresponding timestamp data structure. With a computer processor, a difference is determined between a first time specified in the timestamp data structure and a second time indicated by an internal clock of the CSP. The timestamp request is rejected if the first timestamp data structure fails to comply with a predetermined timestamp policy, where the predetermined timestamp policy requires that the difference between the first time and the second time be below a predetermined threshold.

Timestamp systems and methods

A method, apparatus and program storage device for program verification in an information handling system in which an application program runs on an operating system having a signature verification function for verifying a digital signature of the application program. Upon loading of the application program, the signature verification function of the operating system verifies the digital signature of the application program and, if the digital signature is verified, initiates execution of the application program. Upon initiation of execution of the application program, a verification testing function associated with the application program tests the signature verification function of the operating system by presenting to it a sequence of test digital signatures in a specified pattern of true and false signatures. If its test of the signature verification function of the operating system is successful, the application program initiates normal execution. Otherwise, the application program terminates without initiating normal execution.

Method and apparatus for transitive program verification

Key creation includes sending a first public key part from a first system to a second system, receiving a second public key part sent by the second system to the first system and establishing a first secret material in the first system using the first and second public key parts, wherein the first secret material is identical to a second secret material established on the second system using the first and second key parts. Key creation also includes binding key control information to the first secret material in the first system, wherein the key control information includes information relating to key type and key management and deriving a first key material from the combination of the key control information and the first secret material, wherein the first key material is identical to a second key material derived by the second system.

Secure key creation

A method for creating a proof of possession confirmation for inclusion by an attribute certificate authority into an attribute certificate, the attribute certificate for use by an end user. The method includes receiving from the attribute certificate authority in response to a request by the end user, a plurality of data fields corresponding to a target system, the identity of the end user, and a proof of identity possession by the end user. The method further includes preparing a data structure corresponding to an authorization attribute of the attribute certificate, the data structure including a target system name, the identity of the end user, and the key identifier of the end user. Using a private key associated with the target system, the method includes signing the data structure resulting in a proof of possession confirmation, and sending the proof of possession confirmation to the attribute certificate authority for inclusion into the attribute certificate.

Method, system, and storage medium for creating a proof of possession confirmation for inclusion into an attribute certificate

A method for creating a proof of possession confirmation for inclusion by a certification authority into a digital certificate, the digital certificate for use by an end user, is disclosed. In an exemplary embodiment of the invention, the method includes receiving from the certification authority, in response to a certificate request by the end user, a plurality of data fields corresponding to a target host system, the end user, and a form of proof of identity possession by the end user. The content of the plurality of data fields is analyzed and the accuracy thereof is verified. If the plurality of data fields is verified as accurate, then a signed object is sent to the certification authority, the signed object comprising the proof of possession confirmation.

Password exposure elimination for digital signature coupling with a host identity

A method of certifying a host-identification mapping extension included in a digital certificate, the digital certificate issued and signed by a specific certification authority. In an exemplary embodiment of the invention, the method includes assigning a trust value for each certification authority included in a set of certification authorities. A digital certificate containing the host-identification mapping extension therein is received, with the host-identification mapping extension further containing a plurality of identification attributes therein. The plurality of identification attributes are evaluated, along with the trust value assigned to the specific certification authority issuing the digital certificate. A determination is then made, based upon the plurality of identification attributes and the trust value, as to whether the host-mapping extension is to be certified.

An identity vectoring method is accomplished by matching a distinguished name or partial distinguished name from a digital certificate with a distinguished name mapping record. A data field in the distinguished name mapping record includes either a variable name or a user ID. The variable name corresponds to any environmental factor. The next mapping record to be considered, the criteria mapping record, is determined by substituting the environmental factor for the variable name in the data field. A data field in the criteria mapping record includes either a variable name or a user ID. The process completes when a mapping record containing only a user ID is encountered or when no matching criteria mapping records are found.

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Millbrook, NY, United States of America

James W Sweeny