Micron Technology Incorporated

3com Corporation

James Ruane

Robert W Strong

Tim Markey

Glenn William Connery

Jeffrey Munsil

James S Binder

Robert Pickering

Methods, systems, and devices for detecting information modification in a memory system are described. A system may generate a first value, such as a first hash value, from information stored in storage component. The system may then generate a second value, such as a second hash value, from content stored in the storage component. After generating the second value, the system may compare the second value to the first value. The system may then determine the modification status of the information based on the comparison, and implement one or more operations based on the modification status.

Detecting information modification in a memory system

A processing device receives, from a host system, a key manifest and a digital signature generated based on the key manifest using a private key corresponding to a public/private key pair. The key manifest comprises one or more verification keys. The digital signature is verified using the public key and the processing device stores the key manifest in a persistent storage component in response to successful verification of the digital signature. The one or more verification keys are utilized in one or more verification operations based on the key manifest being stored in the persistent memory component.

Secure replaceable verification key architecture in a memory sub-system

A processing device is configured to process an initial set of command types. A command extension module and a digital signature are received. The digital signature is generated based on the command extension module using a private key of a key pair. The command extension module, once installed by the processing device, enables the processing device to process a new command type that is not included in the initial set of command types. The digital signature is verified using a public key of the key pair. Based on a successful verification of the digital signature, the command extension module is temporarily installed by loading the command extension module in a volatile memory device.

Dynamic command extension for a memory sub-system

A request for password generation is received from a host system. In response to receiving the request, a password derivation key is generated based on a key derivation seed. A password is derived from the password derivation key, and a wrapping key is derived from the password. The wrapping key is used to wrap an authorization state indication, which is stored in local memory. Encrypted data is generated based on an encryption of the key derivation seed using an asymmetric encryption key. The encrypted data is provided in response to the request.

Single-use password generation

A key delegation request is received from a host system. The key delegation request includes a new public key. A challenge is generated based on the new public key and a root public key, and the challenge is provided to the host system responsive to the request. A first and second digital signature are received from the host system. The first digital signature is generated by cryptographically signing the challenge using a new private key corresponding to the new public key and the second digital signature is generated by cryptographically signing the challenge using a root private key corresponding to the root public key. The first digital signature is validated using the new public key and the second digital signature is validated using the root public key. Based on successful validation of both signatures, the new public key is utilized in one or more cryptographic operations.

Delegation of cryptographic key to a memory sub-system

Methods, systems, and devices for double wrapping for verification are described. In some cases, a memory subsystem can receive a firmware image for the memory subsystem where the firmware image is signed with a first signature according to a first signing procedure. The memory subsystem can then verify an integrity of the firmware image based on the first signing procedure. After verifying the integrity of the firmware image, the memory subsystem can then generate a second signature for the firmware image based on a second signing procedure different from the first signing procedure. The memory subsystem can then write the second signature to the firmware image. The memory subsystem can then perform a verification process to verify the integrity of the firmware image based on one or both of the first signing procedure or the second signing procedure. In this case, a first verification time is associated with the first signing procedure and is greater than a second verification time associated with the second signing procedure.

Double wrapping for verification

A method by which a pair of communicating network equipment drivers can determine if the equipment they control such as a network adapter or a switch port are directly connected by a single network cable, is applicable to network protocols which include a link active signaling technique as part of the physical layer specification. The method includes determining whether the link is in a first state in which there is only one device coupled to the link without intervening devices which are members of a particular class, or in a second state in which there may be more than one device coupled to the link without intervening devices which are members of the particular class. If the link is in the first state, then a physical layer test involving the physical layer link active signaling mechanism is executed to ensure that the responding device is coupled to the same link without intervening devices that are not members of the particular class.

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James Ruane