Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (publ)

Nokia Corporation

Nokia Solutions and Networks Oy

Other

Nokia Siemens Networks Gmbh & Co Kg

Ivo Sedlacek

Ralf Keller

Peter Hedman

Noamen Ben Henda

Fredrik Lindholm

Monica Wifvesson

Pontus Wallentin

Susana Fernandez Alonso

Vesa Torvinen

Stefan Rommer

Vesa Lehtovirta

Dinand Roeland

Jens Bergqvist

Christine Jost

Magnus Stattin

Janne Peisa

Christofer Lindheimer

Gunnar Mildh

Paul Schliwa-Bertling

Jari Tapio Vikberg

Oumer Teyeb

Qianxi Lu

Mattias Bergström

Niklas Johansson

Magnus Hallenstål

Qian Chen

George Foti

Marco Belleschi

Emre Yavuz

Tomas Hedberg

David Castellanos Zamora

Oscar Ohlsson

Tuomas Tirronen

Nianshan Shi

Filip Mestanov

Alexander Vesely

Magnus Karlsson

Stephen G Rayment

Yu Wang

Cheng Wang

Håkan Palm

Ann-Christine Sander

Samy Touati

Mikael Wass

Adamu Haruna

Kaj Johansson

Jörgen Axell

Zu Qiang

Jan Holm

Hans Rohnert

Vlasios Tsiatsis

Dung Pham Van

Rikard Eriksson

Hans Krister Mikael Sällberg

Håkan Persson

Mattias Tan Bergström

Juying Gan

Joakim Bergström

Mats Buchmayer

Arto Leppisaari

Angel Navas Cornejo

Stefan Runeson

Helena Vahidi Mazinani

Gert Öster

Sumit Singhal

Sandeep Akhouri

Martien Huijsmans

Mattias BERGSTRÖM

Miguel Garcia

Zoltan Ördögh

Brigitte Van Gerven

Darine Zambrano Mercado

Rickard Eriksson

A serving network establishes a connection with a UE via an N3AN using a trusted registration procedure to establish a secure access link between the UE and the serving network via the N3AN. The serving network sends a trust indication message via the N3AN to the UE using the secure access link to identify the N3AN as trusted or untrusted. When the received trust indication message indicates the N3AN is untrusted, the serving network executes an untrusted registration procedure with the UE using the secure access link to establish the connection between the UE and the serving network. When the received trust indication message indicates the N3AN is trusted, the serving network continues execution of the initial registration with the UE using the trusted registration procedure to establish the connection between the UE and the serving network. The UE and serving network exchange messages via the established connection.

Determination of trust relationship of non-3GPP access networks in 5GC

A wireless device and an Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) and methods performed by a wireless device and an AMF, respectively.

Avoiding multiple retransmissions of signalling transported by 5G NAS transport

Methods of operating a user equipment UE are discussed. An access category may be determined from a plurality of access categories and at least one access identity may be determined from a plurality of access identities to be applied for an access attempt. An establishment cause may be determined for the access attempt based on the access category determined from the plurality of access categories and based on the at least one access identity from the plurality of access identities. A connection request message for the access attempt may be transmitted to a wireless communication network, with the connection request message including the establishment cause determined based on the access category and based on the at least one access identity. Related devices are also discussed.

Methods of determining access categories and/or establishment causes and related devices

Enabling the exchange of connection parameters where a user equipment (UE) lacks a secret shared with the network (e.g. a server), such as key materials, and lacks a valid certificate. In some embodiments, the connection parameters may be exchanged via EAP messages. In certain aspects, and particularly with respect to emergency attach, a simplified protocol is used with limited overhead because the UE does not attempt to authenticate the network, and the network does not attempt to authenticate the UE.

Parameter exchange during emergency access using extensible authentication protocol messaging

A method of operating a session management network of a telecommunications network is disclosed. The method includes sending to a management network node an accept of a session establishment request of a wireless device; and receiving a message from the management network node, including a session connectivity rejection message sent by a radio access network node serving the wireless device. The session connectivity rejection message indicates a rejection of the acceptance of the session establishment request of the wireless device The method further includes determining that the radio access network did not send the accept of the session establishment request to the wireless device based on the session connectivity rejection message creating a session establishment rejection message; and transmitting the session establishment rejection message toward the wireless device.

Methods for avoiding transmission of unnecessary messages in wireless communications and related networks and network nodes

A node of a wireless communication network () receives an indication from a user equipment (). The indication indicates that a limitation of volume charged packet data services is required for the user equipment (). Depending on the received indication, the node () prevents transmission of packet data associated with the volume charged packet data services and allows transmission of packet data associated with one or more other packet data services.

Packet data connectivity control with volume charged service limitation

A method implemented in an access and mobility management function, AMF, node that implements at least one congestion control process is provided. A message including a first indication that the message is exempt from the at least one congestion control process is received by a UE. The message is forwarded to the SMF either with the exempt indication or, if this is missing, an indication that the AMF applies a congestion control. The SMF, only when receiving the forwarded message with the additional information inserted by the AMF, carries out a validation of the message of the UE, thus preventing that a UE tags a message to be exempted from congestion control, when it should be not be exempt.

Congestion control in AMF and SMF

According to some embodiments, a method performed by a wireless device comprises: obtaining, from a non-access stratum (NAS) communication layer, an initial NAS protocol data unit (PDU) for potential early data transmission; determining, by an access-stratum (AS) communication layer, whether the initial NAS PDU is intended to be delivered when an associated radio resource control (RRC) connection is resumed successfully; and upon determining that the initial NAS PDU is not intended to be delivered when the associated RRC connection is resumed successfully, transmitting an early data transmission including the initial NAS PDU.

NAS-AS interaction for early data transmission

The AMF re-allocation procedure for an Initiating AMF that has reroute capability via an Access Network (AN) is optimized in scenarios where a wireless device, such as a User Equipment (UE), already shares a 5G security context with-in a Last Serving AMF that is different from the Initiating AMF, and where the Initiating AMF and the Last Serving AMF can communicate with each other via an interface.

Handling of NAS container in registration request at AMF re-allocation

According to some embodiments, a method for early data transmission performed by a wireless device comprises: obtaining, from a non-access stratum (NAS) communication layer, an initial NAS protocol data unit (PDU) for early data transmission; determining, by a radio resource control (RRC) communication layer, to initiate early data transmission based at least in part on a size of the initial NAS PDU; and transmitting an early data transmission including the initial NAS PDU.

A UE having a security context with an Initial AMF is able to accept an unprotected AUTHRQ, under certain circumstances, for a limited time. In one embodiment, a UE considers the security context to be temporary, which invokes rules or exceptions different than a permanent security context, such as the acceptance of an unprotected AUTHRQ from a Target AMF. The network may indicate to the UE the temporary status, or the UE may assume it. Alternatively, the UE may enable exceptions to the defined rules associated with the security context. In one embodiment, the UE receives a plurality of partial registration acceptance messages, each indicating a specific task or aspect of the overall registration has been completed. The UE may mark its security context temporary, or enable exceptions to the rulesassociated with it, until a partial registration acceptance messages indicates AMF re-allocation is complete or is not required. In another embodiment, the UE accepts unprotected authentication messages from the network until the Registration procedure is completed, enabling a Target AMF to successfully send it an unprotected AUTHRQ.

AMF reallocation handling using UE exceptions to security context rules

A method of operating a user equipment ('UE') to handle an internet protocol multimedia subsystem (“IMS”) emergency call can include sending a session initiation protocol (“SIP”) REGISTER request relating to an emergency registration to a proxy call session control function (“P-CSCF”) of an IMS network. The method can further include, responsive to sending the SIP REGISTER request, receiving a response from the P-CSCF. The method can further include, responsive to receiving the response, performing an action based on the response.

Internet protocol multimedia subsystem emergency calls for roaming user equipments

According to certain embodiments, a method by a user equipment (UE) for securing network steering information includes transmitting a registration request to a Visited Public Land Mobile Network (VPLMN). Upon successful authentication b an authentication server function (AUSF), a home network root key is generated. A protected message comprising Network Steering information is received from a first network node. The protected message is protected using a configuration key (Kconf) and a first Message Authentication Code (MAC-1). The configuration key (Kconf) is determined from the home network root key, and the UE verifies the MAC-1. Based on the Kconf and the MAC-1, it is verified that the VPLMN did not alter Network Steering Information. An acknowledgement message, which is protected with a second Message Authentication Code (MAC-2), is transmitted to a Home Public Land Mobile Network (HPLMN).

Securing network steering information

A method of operating a policy and charging rules function ('PCRF') node to handle an internet protocol multimedia subsystem ('IMS') emergency call can include receiving an identity request from a proxy call session control function (&#x201c;P-CSCF&#x201d;) of an IMS network. The identity request can include an internet protocol (&#x201c;IP&#x201d;) address for a user equipment (&#x201c;UE&#x201d;). The method can further include, responsive to receiving the identity request, determining one or more identifiers of the UE based on the IP address. The one or more identifiers are separate from the IP address. The method can further include, responsive to determining the one or more identifiers, transmitting an indication of the one or more identifiers of the UE to the P-CSCF.

Growing community of inventors

Hovorcovice, Czechia

Ivo Sedlacek