Biocatch Ltd.

Itai Novick

Avi Turgeman

Yaron Lehmann

Lev Kadyshevitch

Yaron Azizi

Oren Kedem

Uri Rivner

Edo Dekel

Ron Uriel Maor

Leonid Karabchevsky

Alexander Basil Zaloum

Shira Mintz

Gad Mazor

Iris Eidelsztein

Method, device, and system of detecting a mule bank account, or a bank account used for terror funding or money laundering. A method includes: monitoring interactions of a user with a computing device during online access with a bank account; and based on the monitoring, determining that the bank account is utilized as a mule bank account to illegally receive and transfer money, or is used for money laundering or terror funding. The method takes into account one or more indicators, such as, utilization of a remote access channel, utilization of a virtual machine or a proxy server, unique behavior across multiple different accounts, temporal correlation among operations, detection of a set of operations that follow a pre-defined mule account playbook, detection of multiple incoming fund transfers from multiple countries that are followed by a single outgoing fund transfer to a different country, and other indicators.

Method, device, and system of detecting mule accounts and accounts used for money laundering

Cross-channel user authentication is provided, to increase resilience of a computerized system to cyber-attacks and to fraudulent transactions. In a demonstrative scenario, a user utilizes his web browser on his laptop computer to log-in to a web server; which in turn extracts the IP address of the laptop computer. The web server triggers an application server to send a Push Notification to a Mobile App that had been installed on a smartphone of that user who just logged in; and that Push Notification causes that smartphone to respond to the application server with the IP address of the smartphone. If the IP address of the computer is not identical to the IP address of the smartphone, then the servers determine that the log-in attempt on the computer was possibly fraudulent, and fraud mitigation operations are initiated. Optionally, geo-location data, device orientation data, device motion data, or other parameters are used as part of the cross-channel authentication process.

System, device, and method of cross-channel user authentication

Devices, systems, and methods of detecting a vishing attack, in which an attacker provides to a victim step-by-step over-the-phone instructions that command the victim to log-in to his bank account and to perform a dictated banking transaction. The system monitors transactions, online operations, user interactions, gestures performed via input units, speed and timing of data entry, and user engagement with User Interface elements. The system detects that the operations performed by the victim, follow a pre-defined playbook of a vishing attack. The system detects that the victim operates under duress or under dictated instructions, as exhibited in irregular doodling activity, data entry rhythm, typographical error introduction rhythm, unique posture of the user, alternating pattern of listening to phone instructions and performing online operations via a computer, and device orientation changes or spatial changes that characterize a device being used to perform an online transaction while also talking on the phone.

Device, system, and method of detecting vishing attacks

Devices, systems, and methods of detecting whether an electronic device or computerized device or computer, is communicating with a computerized service or a trusted server directly and without an intermediary web-proxy, or indirectly by utilizing a proxy server or web-proxy. The system searches for particular characteristics or attributes, that characterize a proxy-based communication session or channel and that do not characterize a direct non-proxy-based communication session or channel; or conversely, the system searches for particular characteristics or attributes, that characterize a direct non-proxy-based communication session or channel and that do not characterize a proxy-based communication session or channel; and based on these characteristics, determines whether or not a proxy server exists and operates.

System, device, and method for detection of proxy server

Method, device, and system of detecting a mule bank account, or a bank account used for terror funding or money laundering. A method includes: monitoring interactions of a user with a computing device during online access with a banking account; and based on the monitoring, determining that the online banking account is utilized as a mule bank account to illegally receive and transfer money. The method takes into account one or more indicators, such as, utilization of a remote access channel, utilization of a virtual machine or a proxy server, unique behavior across multiple different account, temporal correlation among operations, detection of a set of operations that follow a pre-defined mule account playbook, detection of multiple incoming fund transfers from multiple countries that are followed by a single outgoing fund transfer to a different country, and other suitable indicators.

Devices, systems, and methods of detecting user identity, differentiating between users of a computerized service, detecting a possible attacker, and flagging a particular financial transaction or a particular retail transaction as being possibly-fraudulent. The methods include monitoring of user-side input-unit interactions, in general and in response to an interference introduced to user-interface elements. The monitored interactions are analyzed, and enable extraction of hardware-specific features of a computer mouse, a touchpad, a touch-screen, a keyboard, or other input unit. In some methods, detection of different mouse polling rates or different mouse DPI values, across two different usage sessions in the same financial account, enables the method to detect a possibly-fraudulent transaction.

Device, system, and method of differentiating among users based on detection of hardware components

System, device, and method for detecting a proxy server

Systems, devices, and methods for detecting identity of a user of a computerized service; for determining whether or not an electronic device is being used by a legitimate user; for detecting identity of a user based on navigation sequences; and for differentiating among users. The system monitors user interactions with a financial service or a retailer service, via input units, computer-mouse, keyboard, touch-screen; the system determines a unique sequence in which each users visits multiple pages, or interacts with multiple interface elements; and the system differentiates among users and flags a transaction as possibly-fraudulent.

System, device, and method of differentiating among users based on user-specific page navigation sequence

Devices, systems, and methods of detecting whether an electronic device or computerized device or computer, is being controlled by a legitimate human user, or by an automated cyber-attack unit or malware or automatic script. The system monitors interactions performed via one or more input units of the electronic device. The system searches for abnormal input-user interactions; or for an abnormal discrepancy between: the input-unit gestures that were actually registered by the input unit, and the content that the electronic device reports as allegedly entered via such input units. A discrepancy or abnormality indicates that more-possibly, or necessarily or certainly, a malware or automated script is controlling the electronic device, rather than a legitimate human user. Optionally, an input-output aberration or interference is injected, in order to check for manual corrective actions that only a human user, and not an automated script, is able to perform.

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Rehovot, Israel

Itai Novick