Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Innokentiy Basmov

Octavian Tony Ureche

Alex Mark Semenko

Peter Novotney

Yogesh A Mehta

Magnus Bo Gustaf Nyström

Scott Randall Shell

Preston Derek Adam

Narendra Shripati Acharya

Michael J Grass

Christopher Leonard Walstad

Douglas M MacIver

Donghui Li

Cristian Marius Ilac

Niels Thomas Ferguson

Benjamin E Nick

Saurav Sinha

Charles Glenn Jeffries

Grigory Borisovich Lyakhovitskiy

Magnus Nystrom

Nils Dussart

Stefan Thom

Dustin Lyle Green

David Abzarian

Karan Mehra

Scott Chao-Chueh Lee

Nathan T Lewis

Darren Glen Moss

Emily Nicole Wilson

Scott Daniel Anderson

David John Linsley

Alain Franck Gefflaut

Nathan Jeffrey Ide

Vijay G Bharadwaj

Richard Allen Pletcher

Jeffrey J Johnson

Kirsten Valery Stark

Gopinathan Kannan

Michael A Halcrow

Kinshuman Kinshumann

Malcolm James Smith

Kevin A Chin

Karanbir Singh

Christopher R Macaulay

Son VoBa

Alex Bendetov

James Aaron Holmes

Andrey Shedel

Troy Alan Funk

Salil Bhagurkar

Troy E Shaw

Aaron M Farmer

Mugdha Lakhani

Stefen Thom

Magnus Bo Gustaf NYSTRÖM

Salil Arun Bhagurkar

Peter J Novotney

Narendra S Acharya

Jeffrey Jay Johnson

Charles G Jeffries

Son Voba

Douglas M Maciver

A computing device can perform operations to unlock encrypted volumes of the computing device while the computing device is in a recovery environment. In some examples, the computing device can work in conjunction with a test computing device to unlock the encrypted volumes using an unlock token and a PIN. In other examples, the computing device can perform operations without a test computing device. For example, the computing device can, while in the recovery environment, use credentials associated with a user of the computing device to obtain a recovery password to unlock keys for interpreting the encrypted volumes. In some examples, the computing device can use a shortened recovery password in conjunction with anti-hammering capabilities of a Trusted Platform Module in order to unlock keys for interpreting the encrypted volumes. These and other operations can facilitate secure unlock of volumes of encrypted data on a consumer device.

Unlock and recovery for encrypted devices

In one embodiment, an encryption system may protect user login metadata from hammering attacks. A data storage may store an integrity protected data set for an operating system in a storage location. A processor may register a counter reading from a remote counter in a secure location separate from the storage location. The processor may determine a lockout state of the integrity protected data set based on the counter reading.

Rollback protection for login security policy

A computing device uses a data encryption and decryption system that includes a trusted runtime and an inline cryptographic processor. The trusted runtime provides a trusted execution environment, and the inline cryptographic processor provides decryption and encryption of data in-line with storage device read and write operations. When a portion (e.g., partition) of a storage device is defined, the trusted runtime generates an encryption key and provides the encryption key to the inline cryptographic processor, which uses the encryption key to encrypt data written to the portion and decrypt data read from the portion. Access to the portion can be subsequently protected by associating the key with authentication credentials of a user or other entity. The trusted runtime protects the encryption key based on an authentication key associated with the authentication credentials, allowing subsequent access to the encryption key only in response to the proper authentication credentials being provided.

Rapid data protection for storage devices

In one embodiment, an encryption system may protect user login metadata from hammering attacks. A data storagemay store an integrity protected data setfor an operating system in a storage location. A processormay register a counter reading from a remote counterin a secure locationseparate from the storage location. The processormay determine a lockout state of the integrity protected data setbased on the counter reading.

A data protection policy is implemented on a computing device, the data protection policy indicating how organization data on the computing device is to be protected. Protection of the organization data includes encrypting the organization data, and allowing the organization data to be decrypted only by particular programs and/or under particular circumstances (as indicated by the data protection policy). When implementing a data protection policy, files already stored on the computing device are encrypted using a passive encryption technique. The passive encryption technique can include one or more of an encrypt on close technique, an encrypt on open technique, an encrypt without exclusive access technique, and an encrypt location technique.

Passive encryption of organization data

Content on a device is encrypted and protected based on a data protection key corresponding to a particular identity of the user of the device. The protected content can then be stored to cloud storage, and from the cloud storage the protected content can be transferred to various other ones of the user's devices. A data protection key that is used to retrieve the plaintext content from the protected content is maintained by the user's device. This data protection key can be securely transferred to other of the user's devices, allowing any of the user's devices to access the protected content.

Secure key management for roaming protected content

Data files are encrypted based on a key associated with an entity that sets a data protection policy controlling access to the data files. The data protection policy identifies various restrictions on how the plaintext data of the encrypted data in the data files can be used. The data files have corresponding metadata identifying the entity that sets the data protection policy, and processes that are running instances of applications that are allowed to access the plaintext data are also associated with the identifier of the entity. These identifiers of the entity, as well as the data protection policy, are used by an operating system of a computing device to protect the data in accordance with the data protection policy, including having the protection be transferred to other devices with the protected data, or preventing the protected data from being transferred to other devices.

Preserving data protection with policy

To comply with a policy for a computing device indicating that data written by the computing device to the storage volume after activation of the policy be encrypted, a sector map is accessed. The sector map identifies one or more sectors of a storage volume and also identifies, for each of the one or more sectors of the storage volume, a signature of the content of the sector. In response to a request to read the content of a sector, the content of the sector is returned without decrypting the content if the sector is one of the one or more sectors and the signature of the content of the sector matches the signature of the sector identified in the sector map. Otherwise, the content of the sector is decrypted and the decrypted content is returned.

Map-based rapid data encryption policy compliance

Embodiments of the disclosure provide access to data in a compressed container through dynamic redirection, without storing decompressed data in persistent memory. The compressed container is stored in a first portion of memory. User data and reference files, with redirect pointers, for accessing corresponding files in the compressed container are stored in a second portion of memory. A command to access data is detected by a computing device. The redirect pointer in the reference file associated with the command redirects access to the corresponding compressed version of data stored in the compressed container. The corresponding accessed compressed version of data is decompressed on the fly and provided in response to the command without storing the decompressed data in persistent memory. Some embodiments provide integrity protection to validate the data coming from the compressed container.

Accessing data in a compressed container through dynamic redirection

Sector map-based rapid data encryption policy compliance

An application on a device can communicate with organization services. The application accesses a protection system on the device, which encrypts data obtained by the application from an organization service using an encryption key, and includes with the data an indication of a decryption key usable to decrypt the encrypted data. The protection system maintains a record of the encryption and decryption keys associated with the organization. The data can be stored in various locations on at least the device, and can be read by various applications on at least the device. If the organization determines that data of the organization stored on a device is to no longer be accessible on the device (e.g., is to be revoked from the device), a command is communicated to the device to revoke data associated with the organization. In response to this command, the protection system deletes the decryption key.

Data protection for organizations on computing devices

One or more techniques and/or systems are provided for securely obtaining memory content after a device malfunction. For example, applications, components, and/or an operating system of a device may maintain information within volatile memory in a secure manner (e.g., using encryption). When the device malfunctions, such information may be useful for diagnosing what caused the malfunction. Accordingly, memory content within volatile memory may be securely retrieved, encrypted, and/or stored before such memory content is flushed/removed from volatile memory. For example, a warm reset is performed to initially reboot the device without removing memory content from volatile memory. The memory content may be retrieved and encrypted to create encrypted memory content that may be stored within nonvolatile memory for later access. After a second reboot, device malfunction information may be obtained by decrypting the encrypted memory content using a private key matching a public key used to encrypt the memory content.

Securely obtaining memory content after device malfunction

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Redmond, WA, United States of America

Innokentiy Basmov