Ares Technologies, Inc.

General Radar Corp.

Other

Ilia Lebedev

Christian T Wentz

Brian Alfred Williams

Anna Lysyanskaya

Jon A Williams

Dmitry Turbiner

Devin Matthews

Barnabas Fung

Sergey Klypin

David Powell

Christian Kurzke

Mira Belenkiy

Anna Iysyanskaya

A radar system includes a transmit front end device including a transmit planar component, and a receive front end device including a receive planar component. Each of the transmit planar component and the receive planar component includes a first end, a second end, a cavity space and a linear array of antennas. The cavity space is bounded by beam ports along a first side of the cavity space and by array ports along a second side of the cavity space. The cavity space is in operative communication with the beam ports and with the array ports to form a Rotman lens. A linear array of antennas is located along the second end of the planar component. The transmit planar component and receive planar component are arranged such that the linear array of antennas of the transmit planar component and the linear array of antennas are perpendicular to one another.

Phased array Rotman lens front end devices

A system for authenticating a requesting device using verified evaluators includes an authenticating device. The authenticating device is designed and configured to receive at least a first digitally signed assertion from a requesting device, the at least a first digitally signed assertion linked to at least a verification datum, evaluate at least a second digitally signed assertion, signed by at least a cryptographic evaluator, conferring a credential to the requesting device, validate the credential, as a function of the at least a second digitally signed assertion, and authenticate the requesting device based on the credential.

Systems and methods authenticating a digitally signed assertion using verified evaluators

A system for implementing mixed protocol certificates, the system includes a subject device designed and configured to receive, from an issuing device, a first digital certificate, wherein the first digital certificate further comprises a first digital signature public and private key pair according to a first digital signature protocol and a second digital signature public key according to a second digital signature protocol, wherein the second digital signature protocol is distinct from the first digital signature protocol, to generate a second digital certificate, wherein generating the second digital certificate comprises generating a subject digital signature signing the certificate, the subject digital signature generated as a function of the second digital signature protocol and to provide the first digital certificate and the second digital certificate to a verifying device.

Methods and systems for implementing mixed protocol certificates

A front end of a radar system is provided with a first front end apparatus and a second front end apparatus. A first transmit planar component and a first receive planar component in the first front end apparatus are arranged to be perpendicular to one another. A second transmit planar component and a second receive planar component in the second front end apparatus are arranged to be perpendicular to one another. A linear array of antennas is located along a second end of each planar component. Polarization of a first set of waves transmitted from the linear array of antennas of the first transmit planar component and polarization of a second set of waves transmitted from the linear array of antennas of the second transmit planar component are perpendicular to one another.

Autonomous vehicle ranging system with polarized antenna

Perpendicular Rotman phased array front end device

A method for testing circuit elements at one or more manufacturing stages comprising receiving, at a circuit verifier a fingerprint of at least a circuit element to be manufactured, wherein the fingerprint further comprises at least an expected output corresponding to at least a test input, transmitting, from the circuit verifier the at least a test input to the at least a circuit element, receiving, at the circuit verifier at least a test output from the at least a circuit element, and comparing, by the circuit verifier the at least a test output to the at least an expected output of the fingerprint of the at least a circuit element.

Apparatus and methods for testing circuit elements at one or more manufacturing stages

A system for a cryptographic agile bootloader for upgradable secure computing environment, the cryptographic agile bootloader comprising a computing device associated with a first bootloader is presented. The computing device includes a secure root of trust, the secure root of trust configured to produce a first secret and a second secret and a processor. The processor is configured to load a second bootloader, wherein the second bootloader is configured to generate a secret-specific public datum as a function of the second secret, wherein the secret-specific public datum further comprises a bootloader measurement, load a first bootloader, wherein the first bootloader is configured to sign the secret-specific public datum as a function of the first secret, and replace the first bootloader with the second bootloader.

Systems and methods for a cryptographic agile bootloader for upgradable secure environment

A method performing anonymous hardware attestation. A local software monitor is loaded at an originating device. The local software monitor may receive at least a command to execute at least a program and execute the at least a program by performing a series of authentications. Originating device activates a secure computing module located within originating device to generate a secure proof a device specific secret of the originating device. The originating device generates a digital signature conferring a credential on the local software module. The originating device deactivates the secure computing module upon generating the digital signature.

Methods and systems for anonymous hardware attestation

A system for implementing an anonymized attestation chain. The system includes a first device having a first hardware-generated secret and a first verification datum linked to the first hardware-generated secret. The first device is designed and configured to receive an originating signature from an originating device and an originating verification datum. The originating signature includes a secure proof of an originating device secret. The originating signature signs a message referencing the first verification datum, and the originating signature is verified by the originating verification datum. First device generates a first anonymized signature set. The first anonymized signature set includes a modified first verification datum, a modified originating signature, and a modified originating verification datum. First devices delegates the at least a credential to a second verification datum.

Growing community of inventors

Cambridge, MA, United States of America

Ilia Lebedev