Nuvoton Technology Corporation

Winbond Electronics Corporation

National Semiconductor Corporation

Ilan Margalit

Ziv Hershman

Dan Morav

Ohad Falik

Moshe Alon

Victor Adrian Flachs

Valery Teper

Michal Schramm

Oren Tanami

Einat Luko

Alain Bismuth

Nimrod Peled

Avraham Fishman

Yossef Talmi

Josef Nevo

A security system configured for deployment on a chip which is to be protected, the system comprising fault injection detection subsystem/s configured for deployment on the chip, each fault injection detection subsystem having plural sensitivity levels which are selectable in real time and comprising at least one hardware fault injection detector circuit/s, configured for deployment on the chip, and/or, coupled thereto, sensitivity level control logic which may be configured for deployment on the chip and which may be operative, in real time, to transition the fault injection detection subsystem, from its current sensitivity level from among said plural selectable sensitivity levels, to a next sensitivity level from among said plural selectable sensitivity levels, e.g. by generating sensitivity control signals (aka sensitivity level selections) and/or feeding the sensitivity control signals to at least one hardware fault injection detector in the subsystem.

System and method for detecting fault injection attacks

A self-correcting memory system comprising an integrated circuit including memory and memory content authentication functionality, which is operative to compare content to be authenticated to a standard and to output 'authentic' if the content to be authenticated equals the standard and 'non-authentic' otherwise; and error correction functionality which is operative to apply at least one possible correction to at least one erroneous word entity in said memory, yielding a possibly correct word entity, call said authentication for application to the possibly correct word entity, and if the authentication's output is &#x201c;authentic&#x201d;, to replace said erroneous word entity in said memory, with said possibly correct word entity thereby to yield error correction at a level of confidence derived from the level of confidence associated with the authentication.

System and method for correction of memory errors

A system for verifying integrity of content of an integrated circuit's registers, the system being operative in conjunction with an integrated circuit including at least one memory, at least one processor, and a multiplicity of registers, the system comprising register content verification logic configured, when in a first mode aka 'Study Mode', to read at least some of the registers' content, to compute a first hash on the content, and to store the first hash thereby to provide an up-to-date reference hash, and, at least on occasion, when in a second mode aka 'Verify Mode', to compute at least one second hash on the content, to compare the second hash to the reference hash and, accordingly, to provide a content verification output (aka &#x201c;fault detection&#x201d; output) indicative of whether the reference and second hashes are equal.

Security systems and methods for integrated circuits

System, method and computer program product for prioritizing trial-and-error attempted corrections of bit/s, in a memory, in which logical bit levels are determined by thresholding voltage values using threshold/s, the method comprising ranking bits such that a first bit is ranked before a second bit, which is less likely than said first bit to be erroneous and sequentially attempting to correct the bits in order of the ranking, including attempting to correct the first bit before attempting to correct the second bit.

System and method for prioritization of bit error correction attempts

A chip aka integrated circuit, the chip comprising configuration register/s, typically volatile, and/or at least one on-chip non-volatile memory m typically including at least one reserved memory location, which may be reserved for storing contents of at least one typically volatile configuration register r, from among the configuration registers; and/or apparatus configured for, at least once, storing values which may be indicative of content of at least one typically volatile configuration register r from among the registers, e.g. in the on-chip non-volatile memory m, e.g. at the at least one reserved memory location.

Integrated circuit facilitating subsequent failure analysis and methods useful in conjunction therewith

A security system dynamically, depending on processor core execution flow, controls fault injection countermeasure circuitry protect processor core from fault injection attacks. Includes a processor core which, when in use, executes instructions and concurrently, generates, in real time, output indications of instructions to be executed; a fault injection detector having selectable sensitivity levels; and a sensitivity level control module operative, in real time, to receive the output indications, select a next sensitivity level using sensitivity level selection logic which receives the output indications as inputs, and set the fault injection detector to the next sensitivity level, thereby to provide fault injection countermeasure circuitry which is differentially sensitive, when protecting the processor core from fault injection attacks, depending on the output indications of the instructions, and/or avoids false alarms which would result if processor core protection were provided at a sensitivity level unrelated to the output indications of the instructions.

System and method for coping with fault injection attacks

A security device includes an interface and a processor. The interface is configured for connecting to a bus that serves a host device and a non-volatile memory (NVM) device. The processor is connected to the bus in addition to the host device and the NVM device. The processor is configured to detect on the bus a boot process, in which the host device retrieves boot code from the NVM device, and to ascertain a security of the boot process, based on an authentic copy of at least part of the boot code of the host device.

Secure system boot monitor

A system for improving utilization of a nonvolatile flash memory device which has pages whose guaranteed per-cycle erase time and guaranteed number of cycles are known, the system comprising erase time determination functionality for individual pages; de-facto total erase-time accumulation functionality incrementing, for each erase cycle to which an individual page is subjected, by the individual page's de facto erase time per cycle as provided by the erase time measurement functionality; and flash memory page usage monitoring functionality operative to control usage of pages in flash memory including selecting at least one individual flash memory page depending on a comparison between the individual flash memory page's de facto total erase time and a guaranteed erase time computed as a product of the guaranteed per-cycle erase time and of the guaranteed number of cycles.

System and methods for increasing useful lifetime of a flash memory device

A method of testing an integrated circuit device, which involves receiving, by a processor, a test definition indicating a sequence of acts to be performed by an automated test equipment in testing an integrated circuit device. The test definition includes indications of test cycles and timings of events in the cycles. The method includes scanning the received test definition, by the processor, for switch time points for which a timing of events in a first cycle immediately preceding the switch time point is different from a timing of events in a second cycle immediately following the switch time point, determining problematic switch time points for which the combined rest duration from a specific event in the first cycle to a corresponding specific event in the second cycle is shorter than a minimal switch period of the automated test equipment, changing the received test definition by extending a length of the cycles immediately preceding the determined problematic switch time points and providing the changed test definition for testing the integrated circuit device by the automated test equipment.

Resolving automated test equipment (ATE) timing constraint violations

A method for using a non-timer dedicated resource, such as a communication resource, for performing timing operations is provided. The method is advantageous for use with embedded applications in dedicated devices having limited timing resources, particularly in cases where the existing timing resources have all been allocated to specific tasks and are not available to accommodate further timing requirements.

Apparatus and method for using a communication resource for performing a timing operation

Apparatus for demodulating a train of pulses includes a one-shot device having an asynchronous data input terminal, which is configured to receive the train of pulses, and a one-shot data output terminal. A first clocked logic gate has a first clocked data input terminal, which is coupled to the one-shot data output terminal, and a first clocked data output terminal. A combinatorial logic gate has combinatorial input terminals, which are coupled to the one-shot and first clocked data output terminals, and a combinatorial output terminal. A second clocked logic gate has a second clocked data input terminal, which is coupled to the combinatorial output terminal, and a second clocked data output terminal, which is configured to output a demodulated envelope of the train of pulses.

Low-power digital demodulator

One or more lock words in a non-volatile memory with write ability correspond to lockable features of a protected system including the memory. A lockable feature should be locked when the corresponding lock word has a value equal to one of a limited number of predetermined locking combination(s). The locking combination(s) are selected so as to minimize the probability of the lock word waking up from manufacture with a value equal to one of the locking combination(s). In order to detect whether allowable usage of a lockable feature should be at a predetermined locked or unlocked level, multi-sampling of the corresponding lock word value is performed. If there is variation among the sampled values of the lock word, a malicious attack is identified. In one preferred embodiment, the multi-sampling occurs upon power up reset of the protected system and if a malicious attack is identified, the protected system is kept in reset.

Growing community of inventors

Tel Aviv, Israel

Ilan Margalit