Intel Corporation

Ido Ouziel

Gilbert A Neiger

Ravi L Sahita

Barry E Huntley

Gideon Gerzon

David M Durham

Vedvyas Shanbhogue

Hormuzd M Khosravi

Dror Caspi

Siddhartha Chhabra

Baiju V Patel

Ioannis T Schoinas

Ron Gabor

Lihu Rappoport

Arie Aharon

Carlos V Rozas

Jacob Doweck

Amy L Santoni

Baruch Chaikin

Robert Valentine

Jason W Brandt

Rajesh M Sankaran

Francis X Mckeen

Michael Lemay

Ashok Raj

Sarathy Jayakumar

Beeman C Strong

Rupin H Vakharwala

Larisa Novakovsky

Andreas Kleen

Franck Sala

Gregory Pribush

Jeff Huxel

Assaf Zaltsman

Andrew V Anderson

Stanislav Shwartsman

Michael Mishaeli

Oded Lempel

Chen Koren

Pankaj Raghuvanshi

Lior Libis

Amir Leibovitz

Zeev Sperber

Stephan Jourdan

Raanan Sade

Ittai Anati

Xiaoning Li

Ofer Levy

Jared Warner Stark, Iv

Yuriy Bulygin

Ilhyun Kim

Bob Valentine

Yoav Zach

John M Esper

Yoav Almog

Jonathan Edwards

In one embodiment, an apparatus comprises a processor to execute instruction(s), wherein the instructions comprise a memory access operation associated with a memory location of a memory. The apparatus further comprises a memory encryption controller to: identify the memory access operation; determine that the memory location is associated with a protected domain, wherein the protected domain is associated with a protected memory region of the memory, and wherein the protected domain is identified from a plurality of protected domains associated with a plurality of protected memory regions of the memory; identify an encryption key associated with the protected domain; perform a cryptography operation on data associated with the memory access operation, wherein the cryptography operation is performed based on the encryption key associated with the protected domain; and return a result of the cryptography operation, wherein the result is to be used for the memory access operation.

Multi-key cryptographic memory protection

A processor includes a processor core. A register of the core is to store: a bit range for a number of address bits of physical memory addresses used for key identifiers (IDs), and a first key ID to identify a boundary between non-restricted key IDs and restricted key IDs of the key identifiers. A memory controller is to: determine, via access to bit range and the first key ID in the register, a key ID range of the restricted key IDs within the physical memory addresses; access a processor state that a first logical processor of the processor core executes in an untrusted domain mode; receive a memory transaction, from the first logical processor, including an address associated with a second key ID; and generate a fault in response to a determination that the second key ID is within a key ID range of the restricted key IDs.

Restricting usage of encryption keys by untrusted software

An apparatus and method for processing non-maskable interrupt source information. For example, one embodiment of a processor comprises: a plurality of cores comprising execution circuitry to execute instructions and process data; local interrupt circuitry comprising a plurality of registers to store interrupt-related data including non-maskable interrupt (NMI) data related to a first NMI; and non-maskable interrupt (NMI) processing mode selection circuitry, responsive to a request, to select between at least two NMI processing modes to process the first NMI including: a first NMI processing mode in which the plurality of registers are to store first data related to a first NMI, wherein no NMI source information related to a source of the NMI is included in the first data, and a second NMI processing mode in which the plurality of registers are to store both the first data related to the first NMI and second data comprising NMI source information indicating the NMI source.

Apparatus and method to identify the source of an interrupt

In one embodiment, an apparatus comprises a processor to read a data line from memory in response to a read request from a VM. The data line comprises encrypted memory data. The apparatus also comprises a memory encryption circuit in the processor. The memory encryption circuit is to use an address of the read request to select an entry from a P2K table; obtain a key identifier from the selected entry of the P2K table; use the key identifier to select a key for the read request; and use the selected key to decrypt the encrypted memory data into decrypted memory data. The processor is further to make the decrypted memory data available to the VM. The P2K table comprises multiple entries, each comprising (a) a key identifier for a page of memory and (b) an encrypted address for that page of memory. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

System, apparatus and method for page granular, software controlled multiple key memory encryption

Implementations describe providing isolation in virtualized systems using trust domains. In one implementation, a processing device includes a memory ownership table (MOT) that is access-controlled against software access. The processing device further includes a processing core to execute a trust domain resource manager (TDRM) to manage a trust domain (TD), maintain a trust domain control structure (TDCS) for managing global metadata for each TD, maintain an execution state of the TD in at least one trust domain thread control structure (TD-TCS) that is access-controlled against software accesses, and reference the MOT to obtain at least one key identifier (key ID) corresponding to an encryption key assigned to the TD, the key ID to allow the processing device to decrypt memory pages assigned to the TD responsive to the processing device executing in the context of the TD, the memory pages assigned to the TD encrypted with the encryption key.

Providing isolation in virtualized systems using trust domains

Implementations described provide hardware support for the co-existence of restricted and non-restricted encryption keys on a computing system. Such hardware support may comprise a processor having a core, a hardware register to store a bit range to identify a number of bits, of physical memory addresses, that define key identifiers (IDs) and a partition key ID identifying a boundary between non-restricted and restricted key IDs. The core may allocate at least one of the non-restricted key IDs to a software program, such as a hypervisor. The core may further allocate a restricted key ID to a trust domain whose trust computing base does not comprise the software program. A memory controller coupled to the core may allocate a physical page of a memory to the trust domain, wherein data of the physical page of the memory is to be encrypted with an encryption key associated with the restricted key ID.

Co-existence of trust domain architecture with multi-key total memory encryption technology in servers

A processor includes a global register to store a value of an interrupted block count. A processor core, communicably coupled to the global register, may, upon execution of an instruction to flush blocks of a cache that are associated with a security domain: flush the blocks of the cache sequentially according to a flush loop of the cache; and in response to detection of a system interrupt: store a value of a current cache block count to the global register as the interrupted block count; and stop execution of the instruction to pause the flush of the blocks of the cache. After handling of the interrupt, the instruction may be called again to restart the flush of the cache.

Restartable cache write-back and invalidation

System, apparatus and method for page granular,software controlled multiple key memory encryption

Disclosed embodiments relate to the usage of a branch prediction unit in service of performance sensitive microcode flows. In one example, a processor includes a branch prediction unit (BPU) and a pipeline including a fetch stage to fetch an instruction specifying an opcode, an operand, and a loop condition based on the operand, wherein the BPU is to generate a hint reflecting a predicted result of the loop condition, a decode stage to generate either a first or a second micro-operation flow as per the hint, the pipeline to begin executing the generated micro-operation flow; a read stage to read the operand and resolve the loop condition; and execution circuitry to continue the generated micro-operation flow if the prediction was correct, and, otherwise, to flush the pipeline, update the prediction, and switch from the generated micro-operation flow to the other of the first and second micro-operation flows.

Branch prediction unit in service of short microcode flows

Technologies are provided in embodiments including a memory element to store a payload indicating an action to be performed associated with a remote action request (RAR) and a remote action handler circuit to identify the action to be performed, where the action includes invalidating one or more entries of a translation lookaside buffer (TLB), determine that the logical processor entered an enclave mode during a prior epoch, perform one or more condition checks on control and state pages of the enclave mode, and based on results of the one or more condition checks, adjust one or more variables associated with the logical processor to simulate the logical processor re-entering the enclave mode. Specific embodiments include the remote action handler circuit to invalidate an entry of the TLB based, at least in part, on the results of the one or more condition checks.

Avoiding asynchronous enclave exits based on requests to invalidate translation lookaside buffer entries

In one embodiment, a cryptographic circuit is adapted to receive a data line including at least an encrypted portion from a memory in response to a read request having a memory address from a first agent, obtain a key identifier for a key of the first agent from the data line, obtain the key using the key identifier, decrypt the at least encrypted portion of the data line using the key and send decrypted data of the at least encrypted portion of the data line to the first agent. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Growing community of inventors

Ein Carmel, Israel

Ido Ouziel