International Business Machines Corporation

Hyen Vui Chung

Ching-Yun Chao

Peter Daniel Birk

Vishwanath Venkataramappa

Carlton Keith Mason

John Y Chang

Ching Yun Chao

Kenichiro Ueno

Ajaykumar Karkala Reddy

Ajay Reddy

David Yu Chang

James Lee Lentz

Leigh Allen Williamson

Gregory Louis Truty

Masayoshi Teraguchi

Takahide Nogayama

Satoshi Makino

Keys Dylan Botzum

Mickella Ann Rosiles

Alaine DeMyers

Ut Van Lee

Markup language security messages are processed. A template corresponding to a markup language security message is identified. The markup language security message is parsed for variable values using the template. A transition sequence is generated that represents the entire markup language security message. Each transition in the transition sequence is associated with a portion of the markup language security message. A lightweight data model of the markup language security message is populated using the transition sequence. The lightweight data model includes nodes for the variable values and a set of selected constant values.

Processing extensible markup language security messages using delta parsing technology

A method for providing security for a business application including receiving a request from a server including a server public key and a security token, deploying a virtual node implementing the business application in response to the request, using the security token in a bootstrap process by the virtual node to provide authentication to the server, and authenticating a message from the server using a server public key.

Managing security for computer services

A system or computer usable program product for providing security for a business application including receiving a request from a server including a server public key and a security token, deploying a virtual node implementing the business application in response to the request, using the security token in a bootstrap process by the virtual node to provide authentication to the server, and authenticating a message from the server using a server public key.

An XML digital signature mechanism for providing message integrity. A sending party serializes a source XML document into a serialized byte array, calculates the source offset and length of the array of the signed part in the serialized byte array, and calculates a source hash value using the serialized array and the source offset and length. The serialized byte array is a non-canonicalized array. The array and source hash value used to sign a part or the whole of the serialized byte array is sent to a receiving party. The receiving party calculates the target offset and length of the signed part in the serialized byte array and calculates a target hash value of the signed part by using the array and the target offset and length. The receiving party compares the target hash value and the source hash value to verify the integrity of the target XML document.

Optimization of signing soap body element

A method and apparatus for preventing rogue implementations of a security-sensitive class interface are provided. With the method and apparatus, a unique identifier (UID) is created by a server process when the server process is started. Anytime the server process, i.e. a server runtime environment, instantiates a new credential object following start-up of the server process, the encrypted UID is placed into a private field within the new credential object. In addition, the UID is encrypted and stored in a private class of the server runtime environment. A verification class is provided within the server runtime environment which includes one or more methods that receive the credential object as a parameter and return true or false as to the validity of the credential object. These one or more methods determine the validity of the credential object by retrieving the encrypted UID from the private class stored in the server runtime environment, decrypting the UID and comparing it to the decrypted UID stored in the private field of the credential object. If the two UIDs match, a determination is made that the credential object was created by the server runtime environment rather than a rogue application. If the two UIDs do not match, or if there is no UID in the credential object, then a false result will be returned by the verification class.

Method and apparatus for preventing rogue implementations of a security-sensitive class interface

Systems, methods and media for managing and generating encryption keys are disclosed. In one embodiment, a processor executes encryption key processing computer code to receive requests for keys from an application program. The processor determines whether the requesting application program executes on a node or server that is within the scope of machines authorized to receive the requested keys. If authorized, the processor produces a key map and sends the key map to the application program, enabling the application program to access one or more keys in the key map. The keys are updated automatically according to a specifiable schedule.

Systems and methods for management and auto-generation of encryption keys

Objects on application servers are distributed to one or more application servers; a user is allowed to declare in a list which objects residing on each application server are to be protected; the list is read by an interceptor; responsive to exportation of a Common Object Request Broker Architecture ('CORBA') compliant Interoperable Object Reference ('IOR') for a listed object, the interceptor associates one or more application server security flags with interfaces to the listed objects by tagging components of the IOR with one or more security flags; and one or more security operations are performed by an application server according to the security flags tagged to the IOR when a client accesses an application server-stored object, the security operations including an operation besides establishing secure communications between the client process and the server-stored object.

Application server object-level security for distributed computing domains

Run-as credentials delegation using identity assertion is presented. A server receives a request from a client that includes the client's user identifier and password. The server authenticates the client and stores the client's user identifier without the corresponding password in a client credential storage area. The server determines if a run-as command is specified to communicate with a downstream server. If a run-as command is specified, the server retrieves a corresponding run-as identity which identifies whether a client credential type, a server credential type, or a specific identifier credential type should be used in the run-as command. The server retrieves an identified credential corresponding to the identified credential type, and sends the identified credential in an identity assertion token to a downstream server.

Credential delegation using identity assertion

A system and method for tracking user security credentials in a distributed computing environment. The security credentials of an authenticated user includes not just his unique user identifier, but also a set of security attributes such as the time of authentication, the location where the user is authenticated (i.e., intranet user v. internet user), the authentication strength, and so on. The security attributes are used in access control decisions. The same user can be given different authorization if he has a different security attribute value. Security credentials may be generated either by WebSphere security code or by third party security provider code. This invention stores the user credentials in a distributed cache and provides a system and method to compute the unique key based on the dynamic security credentials for cache lookup.

Dynamic cache lookup based on dynamic data

Preventing rogue implementations of a security-sensitive class interface

An extensible token framework is provided for identifying purpose and behavior of run time security objects. The framework includes a set of marker token interfaces, which extends from a default token interface. A service provider may implement one or more marker token interfaces for a Subject or a thread of execution. A service provider may also implement its own custom marker tokens to perform custom operations. The security infrastructure runtime recognizes behavior and purpose of run time security objects based on the marker or custom marker token interfaces the token implements and handles the security objects accordingly.

Method and apparatus for identifying purpose and behavior of run time security objects using an extensible token framework

System and method for credential delegation using identity assertion

A system and method for tracking user security credentials in a distributed computing environment. The security credentials of an authenticated user includes not just his unique user identifier, but also a set of security attributes such as the time of authentication, the location where the user is authenticated (i.e., intranet user v. internet user), the authentication strength, and so on. The security attributes are used in access control decisions. The same user can be given different authorization if he has a different security attribute value. Security credentials may be generated either by WebSphere security code or by third party security provider code. This invention stores the user credentials in a distributed cache and provides a system and method to compute the unique key based on the dynamic security credentials for cache lookup

Objects on application servers may be defined into classes which receive different levels of security protection, such as definition of user objects and administrative objects. Domain-wide security may be enforced on administrative objects, which user object security may be configured separately for each application server in a domain. In a CORBA architecture, IOR's for shared objects which are to be secured on a domain-wide basis, such as administrative objects, are provided with tagged components during IOR creation and exporting to a name server. Later, when the IOR is used by a client, the client invokes necessary security measures such as authentication, authorization and transport protection according to the tagged components.

Growing community of inventors

Round Rock, TX, United States of America

Hyen Vui Chung