Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

Apple Inc.

Beijing Samsung Telecom R&d Center

China Academy of Telecommunications Technology

Huarui Liang

Dawei Zhang

Hong Wang

Lixiang Xu

Shu Guo

Yuqin Chen

Fangli Xu

Haijing Hu

Xiangying Yang

Tarik Tabet

Farouk Belghoul

Lijia Zhang

Sudeep Manithara Vamanan

Zhiwei Wang

Mona Agnel

Krisztian Kiss

Sree Ram Kodali

Ralf Rossbach

Lanpeng Chen

Srinivasan Nimmala

Longda Xing

Srirang Ashok Lovlekar

Murtaza A Shikari

Xiaowan Ke

Rafael L Rivera-Barreto

Hao Duo

Zhibin Wu

Li Li

Sethuraman Gurumoorthy

Haris Zisimopoulos

Muthukumaran Dhanapal

Xiaoqiang Li

Yannick L Sierra

Rohan C Malthankar

Samuel David Post

Yaoqi Yan

Teck Yang Lee

David Boettger

Qian Sun

Xiaoyu Qiao

Haining Wang

Wei Zeng

Yushu Zhang

Haitong Sun

Weidong Yang

Chunhai Yao

Vijay Venkataraman

Li Su

Sarma V Vangala

Hao Sun

Chunshan Xiong

Lakshmi N Kavuri

Robert Zaus

Christian W Mucke

Naveen Kumar R Palle Venkata

Samy Khay-Ibbat

Cahya Adiansyah Masputra

Samy Touati

Hui Xu

Ahmed M Soliman

Sergey Sitnikov

Elliot S Briggs

Shangfeng Li

Yihua Jiang

Oleg M Moskalenko

Robert K Kitchens

A user equipment (UE) may attempt to access an edge data network. The UE generates a first credential based on a second credential, the second credential generated for a procedure between the UE and a cellular network, generating an identifier corresponding to the first credential, and generates a multi-access edge computing (MEC) authorization parameter. The UE then transmits an application registration request message to a server associated with an edge data network, the application registration request message including an indication of the first credential, the identifier corresponding to the first credential and the first authorization parameter. The UE then receives an authentication accept message or an authentication reject message from the server associated with the edge data network.

User equipment authentication and authorization procedure for edge data network

A user equipment (UE) includes a first subscriber identification module (SIM) and a second SIM. The UE is configured to establish a first cellular network connection based on, at least, the first SIM and a second cellular network connection based on, at least, the second SIM. The UE sends, by the first SIM, a first registration request to the network, wherein the first registration request comprises an identification indicating the multi-SIM device is a type of multi-SIM device, receives, by the first SIM, a first registration accept message indicating the first registration request has been accepted, wherein the first registration accept message comprises a first temporary identification for the first SIM and sends, by the second SIM, an access network message comprising one of the first temporary identification or a further temporary identification based on, at least, the first temporary identification.

Control plane for multi-SIM devices

An edge enabler server of an edge data network is configured to receive a verification request comprising an edge enabler client identification (EEC ID), wherein the EEC ID uniquely identifies an edge enabler client (EEC), determine whether the EEC ID is an authorized EEC ID and provide a verification response based on whether the EEC ID is authorized.

Edge enabler client identification authentication procedures

The exemplary embodiments relate to a user equipment (UE) providing an indication of user consent to a network for access to UE information. The UE may perform operations including transmitting an indication of user consent to a first network. The user consent corresponds to a network function acquiring UE information. The operations also include transmitting the UE information to the first network and establishing a connection with a second network. The network function performs operations related to establishing the connection between the UE and the second network using the UE information.

Security protection on user consent for edge computing

A user equipment (UE) is configured to join a multicast broadcast service (MBS) session. The UE sends, to a network function, a protocol data unit (PDU) modification request comprising a request to join a multicast broadcast service (MBS) session, generates a first key (K), receives a PDU session modification complete message comprising an encrypted second key (K) and a key identification (KID) corresponding to the Kand decrypts the Kiss using the K.

Multicast broadcast service keys

Apparatuses, systems, and methods for revocation and/or modification of user consent in Edge Computing (MEC). A user equipment device (UE) may determine that user consent needs to be updated. The user consent may be associated with MEC. Additionally, the UE may transmit, via an application layer of the UE, a user consent modification request to an edge application server of a network, e.g., of an edge data network. The user consent modification request may be carried in application data traffic. The user consent modification request may be indicated via an Nnef_ParameterProvision_Update service operation. The user consent modification request is indicated via an Nnef_ParameterProvision_Update service operation.

Revocation and modification of user consent

The present application discloses a method for synchronizing encryption information between a SCell and UE, which includes that: the SCell transmits a COUNT value of RB established for the UE to a PCell; the PCell transmits the COUNT value received from the SCell to the UE; and the PCell receives a COUNT value of RB established on the SCell that is saved by the UE from the UE. Or, the SCell and the UE may directly exchange the COUNT value of RB. By the present application, the security and correctness of data can be ensured.

Method for synchronizing encryption information between SCell and UE

The present application relates to devices and components including apparatus, systems, and methods for security enhancement with respect to reselection of relay user equipment.

Technologies for relay user equipment reselection

An approach is described for a base station to generate a first message and a second message. The base station transmits the first message and the second message to a user equipment (UE). The first message is associated with a cell supported by the base station and includes a first public land mobile network (PLMN) identity index and a first list of one or more network slices supported by a first PLMN associated with the first PLMN identity index. The second message is associated with one or more neighboring cells, and includes the first PLMN identity index and a second list of one or more network slice data associated the first PLMN as supported by the one or more neighboring cells. In addition, at least one of the one or more network slice data in the second list includes a sub-list of one or more neighboring cell data.

Network slicing with radio access network (RAN) sharing

Embodiments are presented herein of apparatuses, systems, and methods for a user equipment device (UE) and/or cellular network to resume a connection. To resume the connection, the UE may transmit a fully protected connection resume message, e.g., which may include protection for a resume cause field.

Use of a fully protected connection resume message by a base station (BS) and user equipment device (UE)

An example technique for security key derivation in a wireless system includes: sending a radio resource control (RRC) suspend message from a first node, to a first user device, the RRC suspend message including a first next hop (NH) chaining counter (NCC) value; releasing access stratum (AS) resources associated with the first user device; deriving a first node key based on the first NCC value; receiving a first uplink message from the first user device without allocating AS resources to the first user device; and unscrambling the first uplink message based on the first NCC value.

Security key generation for handling data transmissions from user devices in an inactive state

Systems and methods provide packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) user plane (UP) integrity protection (IP) for a user equipments (UE) and radio access network (RAN) nodes operating in Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access-New Radio dual connectivity (EN-DC). In an attach procedure, a UE may indicate a UE security capability for support of relay node (RN) PDCP UP IP used in LTE. Based on the LIE security capability, a master e Node B (MeNB) security capability, and a secondary g Node B (SgNB) security capability, the MeNB may determine whether to use UP IP between the UE and the MeNB, the UE and the SgNB, and/or in a split bearer between the MeNB and the SgNB.

User plane integrity protection configuration in EN-DC

Disclosed are embodiments of a user equipment (UE) configured to communicate in a 5G network and to perform authentication between an edge enabler client (EEC) of the UE and an edge configuration server (ECS) or an edge enabler server (EES) based on an architecture for authentication and key management for applications (AKMA). The techniques include performing primary authentication with the 5G network to obtain a K; generating a Kand an A-KID; providing to the EEC the Kand an EEC identifier (ID) for the EEC to generate a K, the Kand the EEC ID being used by the EEC to compute a MAC; and sending to the ECS or the EES an application registration request, the application registration request including the EEC ID, the MAC, and the A-KID.

MEC authentication between edge enabler client and edge configuration or enabler server based on AKMA

Apparatuses, systems, and methods for application function (AF) key generation and AF key renewal. A user equipment device (UE) may communicate with an application function (AF) via a radio access network (RAN) using a first AF key and determine that the first AF key has expired. The UE may derive a second AF key based on at least an Architecture for Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) anchor key (KAKMA) and a counter parameter and communicate with the AF via the RAN using the second AF key. At least one of the UE, the AF, and/or an AKMA Anchor Function (AAnF) may be configured to monitor expiration of the first AF key based on an associated lifetime of the first AF key. The first and second AF keys may be derived using a key derivation function that includes at least one variable parameter.

Application function key derivation and refresh

Apparatuses, systems, and methods for enhancement of network slicing for a UE. A UE may receive, from an AMF of a network, application related information associated with network slice data routing for data associated with an application. The information may be provided to the network by network slice customers. The UE may, in response to application initiation, determine traffic routing for data associated with the application. Traffic routing may be based on the application related information and a UE configuration associated with user privacy (e.g., user privacy setting) associated with the application. When the user UE configuration is enabled, the data may be routed via a default network slice and when the UE configuration is disabled, the data may be routed via a network slice indicated by the application related information. The UE configuration may be indicated by the application via a Boolean flag and/or via a user interface setting.

Network slicing enhancements

Growing community of inventors

Beijing, China

Huarui Liang