Panasonic Corporation

Hiroki Shizuya

Yuichi Futa

Shingo Hasegawa

Shuji Isobe

Natsume Matsuzaki

Eisuke Koizumi

Yuji Unagami

Masao Sakai

Manabu Maeda

Masao Nonaka

Kaoru Yokota

Motoji Ohmori

Marika Minagawa

Masaki Yoshida

Makoto Carlos Miyauchi

Junya Iwazaki

Atsushi Umeta

To aim provide a software update apparatus including an install module group composed of a plurality of install modules. Each of the install modules has a function of receiving, from an external server, a replacement protection control module to be used for updating a protection control module having a function of verifying whether a predetermined application has been tampered with. Each of the install modules simultaneously running is verified by at least another one of the install modules simultaneously running, as to whether the install module has a possibility of performing malicious operations. If any of the install modules is verified as having the possibility of performing the malicious operations, any another one of the install modules that is verified as not having the possibility revokes the any install module verified as having the possibility.

Software updating apparatus, software updating system, invalidation method, and invalidation program

A management devicecomprises: a key share generation unitgenerating a plurality of key shares by decomposing a decryption key, the decryption key being for decrypting an encrypted application program generated as a result of encryption of the application program; and an output unitoutputting each of the key shares to a different one of a plurality of detection modules. The detection modules acquire and store therein the key shares. The protection control modulecomprises: an acquisition unitacquiring the key shares from the detection modules; a reconstruction unitreconstructing the decryption key by composing the key shares; a decryption unitdecrypting the encrypted application program with use of the decryption key; and a deletion unitdeleting the decryption key, after the decryption by the decryption unit is completed.

Tampering monitoring system, management device, protection control module, and detection module

A distributing device for generating private information correctly even if shared information is destroyed or tampered with. A shared information distributing device for use in a system for managing private information by a secret sharing method, including: segmenting unit that segments private information into a first through an npieces of shared information; first distribution unit that distributes the n pieces of shared information to n holding devices on a one-to-one basis; and second distribution unit that distributes the n pieces of shared information to the n holding devices so that each holding device holds an ipiece of shared information distributed by the first distribution unit, as well as a pieces of shared information being different from the ipiece of shared information in ordinal position among n pieces of shared information, 'i' being an integer in a range from 1 to n.

Shared information distributing device, holding device, certificate authority device, and system

Provided is a tampering monitoring system that can identify a monitoring module that has been tampered with among a plurality of monitoring modules. A management apparatus is provided with an acquisition unit that acquires a new monitoring module that has not been tampered with, a generation unit that generates a decoy monitoring module by modifying the acquired monitoring module, a transmission unit that transmits the decoy monitoring module to the information security device and causes the information security device to install the decoy monitoring module therein, a reception unit that receives from the information security device, after the decoy monitoring module has been installed, monitoring results generated by the monitoring modules monitoring other monitoring modules, and a determination unit that identifies, by referring to the received monitoring results, a monitoring module that determines the decoy monitoring module to be valid and determines the identified monitoring module to be invalid.

Tampering monitoring system, control device, and tampering control method

Tampering monitoring system can detect whether protection control module is tampered with even if some of detection modules are tampered with. Tampering monitoring system includes protection control module detection modules, and management device. Protection control module includes: generation unit generating d pieces of distribution data from computer program, n and d being positive integers, d smaller than n; selection unit selecting d detection modules; and distribution unit distributing d pieces of distribution data to d detection modules. Each detection module judges whether received piece of distribution data is authentic to detect whether protection control module is tampered with, and transmits judgment result indicating whether protection control module is tampered with. Management device receives judgment results from d detection modules and manages protection control module with regard to tampering by using received judgment results.

Tampering monitoring system, protection control module, and detection module

To aim to provide a monitoring system and a program execution apparatus that are capable of maintaining the security intensity even in the case where an unauthentic install module is invalidated. Install modules included in an apparatus each monitor an install module, which is a monitoring target indicated by a monitoring pattern included therein, as to whether the install module performs malicious operations. An install module that performs malicious operations is invalidated in accordance with an instruction from an update server. The monitoring patterns are restructured by the update server such that the install modules except the invalidated install module are each monitored by at least another one of the install modules. The restructured monitoring patterns are distributed to the install modules except the invalidated install module.

Monitoring system, program-executing device, monitoring program, recording medium and integrated circuit

A management device detects whether any normal monitoring module that has not been tampered with exists by referring to monitoring results received from an information security device and selects, when existence is detected, one of the monitoring modules and assumes that the selected monitoring module has been tampered with. The monitoring device then successively applies a procedure to monitoring modules other than the selected monitoring module by referring to the monitoring results, starting from the selected monitoring module, the procedure being to assume that any monitoring module determining that a monitoring module assumed to have been tampered with is normal has also been tampered with. As a result of the procedure, when all of the monitoring modules are assumed to have been tampered with the management device determines the selected monitoring module to be a normal monitoring module that has not been tampered with.

An information security apparatus includes a plurality of monitoring modules that monitor for tampering. A management apparatus includes a reception unit that receives a plurality of monitoring results each generated by a source monitoring module monitoring a target monitoring module; a detection unit that detects an abnormality by referring to fewer than all of the received monitoring results; and an identification unit that identifies, when an abnormality is detected, a monitoring module that has been tampered with from among (i) a monitoring module that generates a monitoring result related to the abnormality, and (ii) one or more monitoring modules identified by tracing back through a chain of monitoring modules consecutively from the target of monitoring to the source of monitoring, starting from the monitoring module that generates the monitoring result related to the abnormality.

Tampering monitoring system, management apparatus, and management method

The present invention aims to perform tamper detection on a protection control module without having detection modules come to know the key data and functions thereof. The detection modules of the present invention perform tamper detection by verifying whether or not the correspondence between the input and output data of the application decryption process performed by the protection control module is correct. Furthermore, the present invention offers improved security against leaks of the application output data by the detection modules by having a plurality of detection modules verify different data blocks.

Method and device that verifies application program modules

To aim provide a software update apparatus including an install module group () composed of a plurality of install modules. Each of the install modules has a function of receiving, from an external server (), a replacement protection control module () to be used for updating a protection control module () having a function of verifying whether a predetermined application has been tampered with. Each of the install modules simultaneously running is verified by at least another one of the install modules simultaneously running, as to whether the install module has a possibility of performing malicious operations. If any of the install modules is verified as having the possibility of performing the malicious operations, any another one of the install modules that is verified as not having the possibility revokes the any install module verified as having the possibility.

A malicious-module identification device identifies and deactivates a malicious module operating in an information processing device connected thereto via a network. The malicious-module identification device is provided with a reception unit for receiving results of tampering detection from a plurality of modules for detecting tampering, and a determination unit for assuming that a module among the plurality of modules is a normal module, determining, based on the assumption, whether a contradiction occurs in the received results of tampering detection and identifying the module assumed to be a normal module as a malicious module when determining that a contradiction occurs. A deactivation unit outputs an instruction to deactivate the module identified as the malicious module.

Illegal module identifying device, information processing device, illegal module identifying method, illegal module identifying program, integrated circuit, illegal module disabling system, and illegal module disabling method

An update server acquires, from an apparatus, a result of verifications relating to tampering of a protection control module and each of install modules included in an install module group. The update server determines a processing procedure of the apparatus depending on the acquired result of the verifications. Specifically, if it is judged that the protection control module and each of the install modules is unauthentic, then the update server transmits, to the apparatus, an instruction to perform updating of the unauthentic protection control module in preference to a revocation of the unauthentic install module.

Software update system, management apparatus, recording medium, and integrated circuit

Provided is a software update apparatus including an install module group () composed of a plurality of install modules. Each of the install modules receives, from an external server (), a replacement protection control module () for updating a protection control module () having a function of verifying whether a predetermined application has been tampered with. Each of the install modules simultaneously running is verified, by at least another one of the install modules simultaneously running, as to whether the install module has a possibility of performing malicious operations.

Software updating apparatus, software updating system, alteration verification method and alteration verification program

The present invention provides a signature generation device and a signature verification device capable of countering a transcript attack that seeks a private key by analyzing a plurality of signed documents (pairs of a message and a signature) signed using the NTRUSign signature scheme. The signature generation device calculates a hash value vector H of message data, adds a vector based on a private distribution to the hash value vector H to calculate a converted hash value vector H', and seeks, as a signature vector S, the closest lattice point to the converted hash value vector H&#x2032; in a lattice defined by private key basis vectors. The signature verification device determines whether the distance between the hash value vector H of the message data and the signature vector S is equal to or less than L&#x2032; and, if so, recognizes the message data as valid.

Growing community of inventors

Miyagi, Japan

Hiroki Shizuya