Siemens Aktiengesellschaft

Siemens Mobility Gmbh

Giesecke+devrient Mobile Security Gmbh

Hans Aschauer

Rainer Falk

Steffen Fries

Markus Heintel

Daniel Schneider

Michael Baldischweiler

Axel Pfau

Christian Peter Feist

Wolfgang Klasen

Kai Fischer

Thomas Zeschg

Hermann Seuschek

Johannes Zwanzger

Fabrizio De Santis

Dominik Merli

Aliza Maftun

Georg Trummer

Martin Wimmer

Alexander Bornschlegl

Franz Sperl

Anton Sebastian Huber

Stefan Pyka

Andreas Furch

Stefan Seltzsam

Joachim Koppers

Bernhard Quendt

Omar Belhachemi

Gökçe Aydos

Achim Knebel

Jan Herrmann

Malek Safieh

Florian Wilde

Manuela GRUNDWÜRMER

Various embodiments of the teachings herein include a method for onboarding an IoT device () of a manufacturer, in a manner secure against quantum computer attacks, in an infrastructure of a customer by means of a first server () of a manufacturer domain of the manufacturer and a second server () of a customer domain of the customer. In some embodiments, three authenticated and encrypted communication channels and a key encapsulation method are used to provide a device certificate of the customer domain for the IoT device on the IoT device.

Method and system for onboarding an IoT device

A method for securely transmitting time-critical data within a communication system that includes local networks each having a switch and a plurality of terminals, a controller that controls functions of switches and terminals, and having a control network assigned to the controller and separate from the local networks, where communication within the local networks is implicitly authorized based on an assignment of respective terminals to the same local network, each terminal is assigned a zero trust adapter that captures status information, transfers the status information via the control network to the controller for evaluation and authenticates the terminal to the controller to communication partners, and where the controller determines a trust index for each of the terminals based on the status information and applies rules dependent on the trust index for configuration or permissible communication relationships of the terminals.

Communication system, adapter for a terminal and method for securely transmitting time-critical data within the communication system

Incoming and outgoing communication of a hardware-application component is monitored and controlled at runtime of the hardware-application component. In this way, a kind of firewall is provided for ensuring secure and un-altered operation of a hardware-application performing security-critical functionalities on a field-programmable gate array. The hardware-application component may interact with other components directly and/or via an on-chip bus. The monitoring of incoming and/or outgoing communication is particularly advantageous when using third party hardware-applications or software applications, i.e., applications developed by untrusted parties. Another advantage is the possibility of monitoring and controlling all the communication between hardware-applications, hardware- and software applications, hardware-applications and peripherals, IO controllers, etc. It is beneficial especially in case a hardware-application is compromised and tries to compromise the rest of the embedded device, or in case a corrupted software application tries to compromise the associated hardware-application at runtime.

Method and configurable hardware module for monitoring a hardware-application

A method for key management in a field-programmable integrated part of an integrated circuit is disclosed herein. According to the method, a hardware configuration for the field-programmable integrated part is loaded into the field-programmable integrated part. The hardware configuration includes a key derivation functionality. Further, using the key derivation functionality, a cryptographic key is derived based on information provided in the field-programmable integrated part.

Key management in an integrated circuit

Methods and devices are provided for establishing secure communication between the devices without relying on local time information. According to the methods, a client device, which is going to establish the secure communication to a server device, is provided by the server device with a proof of its integrity. The proof of integrity of the server device is issued by a trusted third party (TTP) to which both devices have a trust relation.

Establishing secure communication without local time information

Provided is a device unit, including a module, which can configure the device unit with an operating state from among different operating states during the start-up process and/or during ongoing operation of the device unit, wherein a first protected operating state of the different operating states is designed to allow the execution of at least one operating process which can be predefined and to optionally protect the operating process by means of defined cryptographic means, wherein at least one second operating state of the different operating states is designed to deactivate the first protected operating state and to allow at least one other changeable operating process and to optionally protect the operating process by means of specifiable cryptographic means.

Device unit suitable for operation in a protected and/or open operating state and associated method

An issuing device is configured to: respond to a challenge request by transmitting a challenge; and respond to a certification request including a public key and ownership information thereof by issuing a digital certificate certifying the ownership information. The ownership information includes counterparty identity information relating to a ledger of a distributed database. The digital certificate is issued if it is successfully verified that a valid response to the challenge has been posted to the ledger of the distributed database and is associated therein with the counterparty identity information of the certification request. The digital certificate facilitates proofing that an owner of a public key is a given counterparty to a blockchain ledger. Also, a corresponding requesting device and corresponding methods and computer program products for issuing and requesting a digital certificate are disclosed.

Issuing device and method for issuing and requesting device and method for requesting a digital certificate

Keystream generators for secure data transmission, the keystream generators being operated in counter mode, against repeated or improper generation of an already generated keystream and to protect the data transmission against repeated use of a keystream, so-called reuse are provided. The keystream generator is operated, with respect to realization options, selectively in one of two operating modes, an encryption operating mode and a decryption operating mode. In the encryption operating mode, a keystream generated on the basis of a first control data set is used to encrypt data, in particular payload data, to form cipher-data, the product of ciphered data or payload data. In the decryption operating mode, a keystream generated on the basis of a second control data set is used to decrypt the cipher-data. The keystream is output only if the generation of the keystream from the encryption of a counter value of the keystream generator operated in counter mode with a block cipher key is error-free.

Method for operating keystream generators for secure data transmission, the keystream generators being operated in counter mode, keystream generator having counter mode operation for secure data transmission, and computer program product for keystream generation

A method for verifying an execution environment provided by a configurable hardware module, where the execution environment is used for execution of at least one hardware-application, includes receiving a hardware-application. The hardware-application includes configuration data describing an instantiation as a hardware-application component on the configurable hardware module. A received hardware-application is instantiated as the hardware-application component in the execution environment. The execution environment of the configurable hardware module that executes the hardware-application component in the respective execution environment is analyzed by an instantiated hardware-application component. The hardware application component communicates with a characterizing unit providing characterizing parameters for the execution environment of the configurable hardware module. The analyzed execution environment of the configurable hardware module is verified as admissible for execution of the hardware-application component if the analyzed execution environment matches the characterizing parameters provided by the characterizing unit.

Method for verifying an execution environment used for execution of at least one hardware-application provided by a configurable hardware module

The following relates to a hardware security module for usage with manufacturing devices and a method for operating the same is provided. The security module includes: a secure element, which is adapted to detect an operating mode of the hardware security module; a first interface which is adapted to receive commands for controlling the hardware security module; a central processing unit for processing application program code in a secure environment; a second interface which is adapted for receiving configuration data, wherein the second interface is activated and deactivated in dependence of the detected operating mode.

Interface for a hardware security module

A method and to an apparatus for achieving cryptographic protection of a plurality of messages in a message exchange, for example, in particular the cryptographic protection being implemented by means of digital signatures and nonces is provided. The nonces are not transmitted directly, but rather can be reproducibly calculated from preceding messages, wherein a checksum of a previous message is also considered for each nonce. Consideration is implemented in such a way that cryptographical calculations in particular intended for the creation of the digital signature and the nonce may be calculated one single time and not separately for the nonce and the digital signature.

Method and apparatus for exchanging messages

A programmable hardware security module, a method for securing a private key of a cryptographic key pair, and a method for securely providing a private key of a cryptographic key pair on a programmable hardware security module, wherein with the described devices and methods, a decentralised PKI is built, via which device keys and device certificates can be generated and target devices can be provided securely, where in this regard, the key-pair-specific transport key plays a central role in protecting the generated private key that is to be transferred, and where this is linked to the particular key pair intended for a target device via a key derivation from a master key utilizing a key-pair-specific derivation parameter.

Method and programmable hardware security module

A method for producing a cryptographic timestamp for a digital document using multiple time servers is provided. In the method, a nonce value is produced and a current hash value is formed from the nonce value and the digital document. Then, a time server is repeatedly selected, the current hash value is transmitted to the selected time server, a response comprising a digital signature of the current hash value and a time indication is received by the selected time server, and an additional hash value is determined from the received response and used as the current hash value. The cryptographic timestamp for the digital document is formed from the nonce value and the multiple received responses. The method produces a tamperproof timestamp on a majority basis and is suitable for dating and protocolling in the field of automation and IoT.

Method and apparatus for generating a cryptographic time stamp for a digital document on a majority basis

A method for achieving a security function for a security control device for controlling a device or an installation, including: a) providing at least one first partial secret that is stored in a basic control device, b) providing at least one second partial secret that is stored in a security module, c) combining the at least one first and second partial secret to form an overall secret, required to achieve the security function, within the time period in which the basic control device interacts with the security module via the first and second coupling interfaces, and d) disguising the combined overall secret outside the time period.

Methods and apparatuses for achieving a security function, in particular in the environment of a device and/or installation controller

In a method for protecting security-relevant data in a cache memory, a copy of this security-relevant data from a general memory is stored in the cache memory, and the method includes stipulating obfuscation parameters, determining a first cache set address from a memory address of the general memory at which the security-relevant data are stored, generating a first modified cache set address for a first cache set with a generation function using the obfuscation parameters and the first cache set address, and storing the copy of the security-relevant data using the first modified cache set address in a first cache line of the first cache set.

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Munich, Germany

Hans Aschauer