Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Giridhar Viswanathan

Hari R Pulapaka

Benjamin M Schultz

Frederick Justus Smith

Balaji Balasubramanyan

Ankit Srivastava

Margarit Simeonov Chenchev

Matthew David Kurjanowicz

Gerardo Diaz Cuellar

Ivan Dimitrov Pashov

Charles Glenn Jeffries

Peter David Waxman

Lars Reuther

Amber Tianqi Guo

Mehmet Iyigun

Ling Tony Chen

Ravinder S Thind

Scott Randall Shell

John Andrew Starks

Peter J Kaufman

Scott Daniel Anderson

Himanshu Soni

Yuhang Zhu

Jonathan D Schwartz

David John Linsley

Poornananda R Gaddehosur

David Bradley Probert, Jr

Ronald Aigner

Daniel Vasquez Lopez

Kinshumann Kinshumann

Navin Narayan Pai

Tushar Suresh Sugandhi

Deepu Chandy Thomas

Ahmed Saruhan Karademir

Narasimhan Ramasubramanian

Michael Trevor Pashniak

Maxwell Christopher Renke

David Guy Weston

Sudeep Kumar Ghosh

Taylor James Stark

Nived Kalappuraikal Sivadas

Raphael Gianotti Serrano Dos Santo

Prabu Raju

Kinshuman Kinshumann

Michael Bishop Ebersol

Stephen E Bensley

Janani Vasudevan

Kinshumann

Abhinav Mishra

Yanan Zhang

Justin Alexander Hou

Cristian Stefan Salvan

Bryan R Born

JianMing M Zhou

Christopher Edward Fenner

Ian James McCarty

Kam Kouladjie

Prakhar Srivastava

Gabriel Fortunato Stocco

David Kimler Altobelli

Dan Ma

Peteris Ledins

Vikram Mangalore Rao

Joshua David Ebersol

Alvin Morales Caro

Andrea Allievi

Jianming Zhou

Charles G Jeffries

Distributed security key management for protecting roaming data via a trusted platform module is performed by systems that include first and second processors, and first and second respective hardware security modules. The first security module encrypts a security key using a public key from the second security module, and the encrypted security key is provided to the second security module. A virtual machine (VM) executed by the first processor has a first virtual security module instance having state data that includes a storage key encrypting VM virtual disk data and that is encrypted with the security key. When a transfer condition is determined, the VM is transferred and executed by the second processor, using a second virtual security module instance, based on decrypting the security key by the second security module using a private key and decrypting the state data for the second virtual security module using the security key.

Distributed trusted platform module key management protection for roaming data

Memory is partitioned and isolated in container-based memory enclaves. The container-based memory enclaves have attestable security guarantees. During provisioning of the container-based memory enclaves from a container image, a purported link in the container to a memory address of the enclave is modified to verifiably link to an actual memory address of the host, such as partitioned memory enclave. In some instances, enclave attestation reports can be validated without transmitting corresponding attestation requests to remote attestation services, based on previous attestation of one or more previous container attestation reports from a similar container and without requiring end-to-end attestation between the container and remote attestation service for each new attestation request.

Using secure memory enclaves from the context of process containers

Techniques for secure sharing of data in computing systems are disclosed herein. In one embodiment, a method includes when exchanging data between the host operating system and the guest operating system, encrypting, at a trusted platform module (TPM) of the host, data to be exchanged with a first key to generate encrypted data. The method also includes transmitting the encrypted data from the host operating system to the guest operating system and decrypting, at the guest operating system, the transmitted encrypted data using a second key previously exchanged between the TPM of the host and a virtual TPM of the guest operating system.

Secure sharing of license data in computing systems

Technologies are described for selective persistence of data utilized by software containers. A configuration policy is defined that includes data that specifies one or more data stores for which data is not to be persisted following accesses to a software container and one or more data stores for which data is to be persisted following accesses to the software container. When the software container is first accessed, the data stores identified in the configuration policy are attached to the software container. Upon a subsequent access to the container, such as at the conclusion of a user session or upon destruction of the container, the data in the attached data stores is persisted or deleted based upon the configuration policy. When the software container is once again accessed, the data store containing the persisted data can be re-attached to the software container.

Selective persistence of data utilized by software containers

Securely performing file operations. A method includes determining a licensing characteristic assigned to a file. When the licensing characteristic assigned to the file meets or exceeds a predetermined licensing condition, then the method includes performing a file operation on the file in a host operating system while preventing the file operation from being performed in the guest operating system. When the licensing characteristic assigned to the file does not meet or exceed the predetermined licensing condition, then the method includes performing the file operation on the file in the guest operating system while preventing the file operation from being performed directly in the host operating system.

Method and system for persisting files

A host operating system running on a computing device monitors resource access by an application running in a container that is isolated from the host operating system. In response to detecting resource access by the application, a security event is generated describing malicious activity that occurs from the accessing the resource. This security event is analyzed to determine a threat level of the malicious activity. If the threat level does not satisfy a threat level threshold, the host operating system allows the application to continue accessing resources and continues to monitor resource access. When the threat level satisfies the threat level threshold, the operating system takes corrective action to prevent the malicious activity from spreading beyond the isolated container. Through the use of security events, the host operating system is protected from even kernel-level attacks without using resources required to run anti-virus software in the isolated container.

Isolated container event monitoring

Securely performing file operations. A method includes determining a trust characteristic assigned to a file. When the trust characteristic assigned to the file meets or exceeds a predetermined trust condition, then the method includes performing a file operation on the file in a host operating system while preventing the file operation from being performed in the container operating system. When the trust characteristic assigned to the file does not meet or exceed the predetermined trust condition, then the method includes performing the file operation on the file in the container operating system while preventing the file operation from being performed directly in the host operating system.

Method and system for persisting untrusted files

A host operating system running on a computing device monitors network communications for the computing device to identify network resources that are requested by the computing device. The host operating system compares requested network resources against security policies to determine if the requested network resources are trusted. When an untrusted network resource is identified, the host operating system accesses the untrusted network resource within a container that is isolated from the host operating system kernel using techniques discussed herein. By restricting access to untrusted network resources to isolated containers, the host operating system is protected from even kernel-level attacks or infections that may result from an untrusted network resource.

Hardware-based virtualized security isolation

A device boots in a secure manner that allows measurements reflecting which components are loaded during booting to be generated. Measurements of such components, as well as of a device management agent and the security state of the device, are also obtained. The device management agent accesses an attestation service for an enterprise, which is a collection of resources managed by a management service. The device management agent provides the obtained measurements to the attestation service, which evaluates the measurements and based on the evaluation determines whether the device is verified for use in the enterprise. The management service uses this verification to ensure that the device management agent is running in a secure manner, is accurately providing indications of the state of the device to the management service, and is implementing policy received from the management service.

Device attestation through security hardened management agent

Techniques for memory assignment for guest operating systems are disclosed herein. In one embodiment, a method includes generating a license blob containing data representing a product key copied from a record of license information in the host storage upon receiving a user request to launch an application in the guest operating system. The method also includes storing the generated license blob in a random memory location accessible by the guest operating system. The guest operating system can then query the license blob for permission to launch the application and launching the application in the guest operating system without having a separate product key for the guest operating system.

Memory assignment for guest operating systems

Providing access control by a first operating system. A method includes receiving at the first operating system, from the second operating system, a request for a bounding reference to a set having at least one resource. A bounding reference for the set is obtained. The bounding reference comprises a reference created from a first operating system resolvable reference to the set. The method further includes providing the obtained bounding reference for the obtained provided bounding reference to the second operating system. A request, including the obtained bounding reference and an identifier identifying the second operating system for the set, is received from the second operating system. The obtained bounding reference and the identifier identifying the second operating system are evaluated. As a result of evaluating the obtained bounding reference and the identifier identifying the second operating system, a resource control action is performed.

Securing shared components

Facilities are provided to secure guest runtime environments (GREs). Security policy specifications may be associated with GREs. A GRE's security policy may be specific to the GRE and may also include security policy inherited from higher levels such as a host operating environment. The security policy of a GRE specifies restrictions and/or permissions for activities that may be performed within the scope of execution of the GRE. A GRE's security policy may limit what the GRE's guest software may do within the GRE. Restrictions/permissions may be applied to objects such as files, configuration data, and the like. Security specifications may be applied to execution initiated within a GRE. A GRE's security specification may restrict/permit executable objects from loading and executing within the GRE. The executability or accessibility of objects may be conditioned on factors such as the health/integrity of the GRE, the host system, requested files, and others.

Securing virtual execution environments

A second operating system accessing resources from an external service. A method includes sending an anonymized request, for an anonymized user corresponding to an authorized user, for resources, through a broker. A request for proof indicating that the anonymized user is authorized to obtain the resources is received from the broker. As a result, a request is send to a first operating system for the proof that the anonymized user is authorized to obtain the resources. Proof is received from the first operating system, based on the anonymized user being associated with the authorized user, that the anonymized user is authorized to obtain the resources. The proof is provided to the broker. As a result, the resources are obtained by the second operating system from the service.

Cross container user model

Anonymous containers are discussed herein. An operating system running on a computing device, also referred to herein as a host operating system running on a host device, prevents an application from accessing personal information (e.g., user information or corporate information) by activating an anonymous container that is isolated from the host operating system. In order to create and activate the anonymous container, a container manager anonymizes the configuration and settings data of the host operating system, and injects the anonymous configuration and settings data into the anonymous container. Such anonymous configuration and settings data may include, by way of example and not limitation, application data, machine configuration data, and user settings data. The host operating system then allows the application to run in the anonymous container.

Anonymous containers

Growing community of inventors

Redmond, WA, United States of America

Giridhar Viswanathan