International Business Machines Corporation

Apple Inc.

Ginger Marie Myles

Augustin J Farrugia

Hongxia Jin

Julien Lerouge

Tanya Michelle Lattner

Jeffrey Bruce Lotspiech

Gianpaolo Fasoli

Srinivas Vedula

Pierre Betouin

Christopher Arthur Lattner

Disclosed herein are systems, methods, and computer-readable storage media for obfuscating by a common function. A system configured to practice the method identifies a set of functions in source code, generates a transformed set of functions by transforming each function of the set of functions to accept a uniform set of arguments and return a uniform type, and merges the transformed set of functions into a single recursive function. The single recursive function can allocate memory in the heap. The stack can contain a pointer to the allocated memory in the heap. The single recursive function can include instructions for creating and explicitly managing a virtual stack in the heap. The virtual stack can emulate what would happen to the real stack if one of the set of functions was called. The system can further compile the source code including the single recursive function.

System and method for obfuscation by common function and common function prototype

Disclosed herein are methods, systems, and computer-readable storage media for annotation driven integrity program verification. The method includes distributing verification calls configured to verify a function across call paths leading to the function in source code, generating a binary from the source code having placeholders associated with the verification calls, and filling each placeholder in the binary with verification data or reference checksums. Alternatively, the method includes receiving source code having a verification call, replacing the verification call with one or more equivalent verification calls distributed over a call path, replacing each verification call with a checksum function generating placeholders while compiling, generating a binary based on the placeholders, and filling each placeholder in the binary with reference checksums. The system includes a processor and a module controlling the processor to perform the methods. The computer-readable storage medium includes instructions for controlling a computer to perform the methods.

System and method for annotation driven integrity verification

A system, article of manufacture and method is provided for transferring secret information from a first location to a second location. The secret information is encoded and stalls in executable code are located. The executable code is configured to perform a predetermined function when executed on a pipeline processor. The encoded information is inserted into a plurality of instructions and the instructions are inserted into the executable code at the stalls. There is no net effect of all of the inserted instructions on the predetermined function of the executable code. The executable code is transferred to the second location. The location of the stalls in the transferred code is identified. The encoded information is extracted from the instructions located at the stalls. The encoded information may then be decoding information to generate the information at the second location.

Method and system for hiding information in the instruction processing pipeline

Disclosed herein are systems, computer-implemented methods, and computer-readable storage media for call path enforcement. The method includes tracking, during run-time, a run-time call order for a series of function calls in a software program, and when executing a protected function call during run-time, allowing or causing proper execution of a protected function call only if the run-time call order matches a predetermined order. The predetermined order can be an expected run-time call order based on a programmed order of function calls in the software program. The method can include maintaining an evolving value associated with the run-time call order and calling the protected function by passing the evolving value and function parameters corrupted based on the evolving value. The protected function uncorrupts the corrupted parameters based on the passed evolving value and an expected predetermined call order. A buffer containing the uncorrupted parameters can replace the corrupted parameters.

System and method for call path enforcement

According to one embodiment of the present invention, a method for evaluating a software system includes defining a rating of the tamper resistance of a software system and breaking down the rating into a plurality of metrics relevant to the tamper resistance of the software system. A score may then be calculated for each metric and the scores may be combined into a composite score for the rating.

Evaluation of tamper resistant software system implementations

A piracy protection system incorporates tamper detection capabilities into a protected copy of an application by disassembling a statically linked binary of the application, modifying some of the instructions in the application, and then rewriting all of the modified and unmodified instructions to a new executable file, a protected copy. The piracy protection system comprises an offline tamper detection technique in which the software itself detects the tampering and causes the program to fail, therefore protecting itself from malicious attacks. The system further comprises a dynamic software-watermarking process that incorporates code obfuscation to prevent reverse engineering.

System, method, and service for detecting improper manipulation of an application

A system, method, and computer program product for preventing a malicious user from analyzing and modifying software content. The one-way functions used in prior art systems using dynamically evolving audit logs or self-modifying applications are replaced with a one-way function based on group theory. With this modification, untampered key evolution will occur inside a defined mathematical group such that all valid key values form a subgroup. However, if the program is altered, the key will evolve incorrectly and will no longer be a member of the subgroup. Once the key value is outside of the subgroup, it is not possible to return it to the subgroup. The present invention provides a limited total number of valid keys. The key evolution points are not restricted to locations along the deterministic path, so the key can be used in various novel ways to regulate the program's behavior, including in non-deterministic execution paths.

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San Jose, CA, United States of America

Ginger Marie Myles