Citicorp Credit Services, Inc. (usa)

Citicorp Development Center, Inc.

Gerry Glindro

Mark Kogen

Warren Yung-Hang Tan

Yosif Smushkovich

Simon Ma

Ronald King-Hang Chu

Ronald Chu

Jeffrey Nicholas

Jeffrey William Coyte Nicholas

Secure user authentication using an OTP involve pre-storing an OTP application on a first computing device for generating a valid OTP value for the user responsive to receiving entry of a valid PIN value of the user, no part of the valid PIN value is stored on the first computing device and pre-storing on a back-end server the valid PIN value and a valid shared secret for the user. Upon receiving entry of a purported PIN value, a purported shared secret is dynamically synthesized by the OTP application based on the purported PIN value of the user and a purported OTP value is generated. Upon receiving entry of the purported OTP value in a login attempt on the back-end server from another device, the server cryptographically calculates a window of OTP values, and login is allowed if the calculated window of OTP values corresponds to the received OTP value.

Methods and systems for secure user authentication

Secure user authentication using a OTP involve pre-storing an application on a first device for generating a valid OTP for the user responsive to receiving entry of a valid PIN, no part of the valid PIN is stored on the first device and pre-storing on a back-end server the valid PIN and a valid shared secret for the user. Upon receiving entry of a purported PIN, a purported shared secret is dynamically synthesized on the first device by the application based on the purported PIN and a purported OTP is generated on the first device. When entry of the purported OTP is received by the server in an attempt to log on the server from a second device, the server cryptographically calculates a window of OTPs, and logs on to the server from the second device is allowed if the calculated window of OTPs corresponds to the received OTP.

Methods and systems for secure user authentication using a OTP involve, for example, pre-storing a OTP application on a first computing device for generating a valid OTP value for the user responsive to receiving entry of a valid PIN value of the user, no part of the valid PIN value is stored on the first computing device and pre-storing on a back-end server the valid PIN value and a valid shared secret for the user. Upon receiving entry of a purported PIN value of the user, a purported shared secret is dynamically synthesized on the first computing device by the OTP application based on the purported PIN value of the user and a purported OTP value is generated on the first computing device. When entry of the purported OTP value is received by the back-end server in an attempt to log on the back-end server from a second computing device, the back-end server cryptographically calculates a window of OTP values, and log on to the back-end server from the second computing device is allowed if the calculated window of OTP values corresponds to the received OTP value.

For secure user authentication using a one-time password (OTP) application is pre-stored on a device for generating a OTP value responsive to entry of a valid PIN, no part of the PIN is stored on the device and pre-storing on a server the PIN and a valid shared secret for the user. Upon receiving entry a purported PIN, a purported shared secret is dynamically synthesized on the device by the OTP application based on the purported PIN of the user and a purported OTP value is generated based on the purported shared secret. When entry of the purported OTP value is received by the server in an attempt to log on the server from another device, the server cryptographically calculates a purported shared secret based on the purported OTP value, and log on to the server from the other device is allowed if the calculated purported shared secret corresponds to the pre-stored shared secret.

Methods and systems for secure user authentication utilizes OTP generation and validation techniques in which the shared secret for generating the OTP is not stored in the user's mobile device but instead is dynamically synthesized based on a PIN that activates the OTP generation and the personalized OTP data. The client software has no knowledge of what the correct PIN should be and always generates a normal looking OTP based on whatever PIN is entered, and the only way to learn whether or not the OTP is correct is to submit it during user login. By limiting the number of failed login attempts before the account is locked, brute-force attacks via the online channel will fail, and further, brute-force attacks to uncover the correct PIN for generating the correct OTP offline will also fail even if a hacker steals the user's mobile device and extracts the data inside for offline hacking, because there is nothing on the client that contains the PIN or encrypted by the PIN.

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Carson, CA, United States of America

Gerry Glindro