Rubicon Labs, Inc.

Gerald E Woodcock, Iii

William Vincent Oxford

Roderick Schultz

Alexander Usach

Marcos Portnoi

Stephen E Smith

Keith Mark Evans

Stuart W Juengst

Charles T Schad

Michael K Eneboe

Embodiments of systems and methods disclosed herein include an embedded secret provisioning system that is based on a shared-derivative mechanism. Embodiments of this mechanism use a trusted third-party topology, but only a single instance of a public-private key exchange is required for initialization. Embodiments of the system and methods are secure and any of the derived secret keys are completely renewable in untrusted environments without any reliance on asymmetric cryptography. The derived secrets exhibit zero knowledge attributes and the associated zero knowledge proofs are open and available for review. Embodiments of systems and methods can be implemented in a wide range of previously-deployed devices as well as integrated into a variety of new designs using minimal roots-of-trust.

Method and system for an efficient shared-derived secret provisioning mechanism

Embodiments as described herein provide systems and methods for sharing secrets between a device and another entity. The shared secret may be generated on the device as a derivative of a secret value contained on the device itself in a manner that will not expose the secret key on the device and may be sent to the entity. The shared secret may also be stored on the device such that it can be used in future secure operations on the device. In this manner, a device may be registered with an external service such that a variety of functionality may be securely accomplished, including, for example, the generation of authorization codes for the device by the external service based on the shared secret or the symmetric encryption of data between the external service and the device using the shared secret.

System and method for initializing a shared secret system

Systems and methods in which multiple key servers operate cooperatively to securely provide authorization codes to requesting devices. In one embodiment, a server cloud receives a device authorization code request and selects an 'A server'. The 'A server' requests authorization from one or more &#x201c;B servers&#x201d; and authorizes the &#x201c;B servers&#x201d; to respond. The &#x201c;B servers&#x201d; provide authorization to the &#x201c;A server&#x201d;, and may provide threshold key inputs to enable decryption of device authorization codes. The &#x201c;A server&#x201d; cannot provide the requested device authorization code without authorization from the &#x201c;B server(s)&#x201d;, and the &#x201c;B server(s)&#x201d; cannot provide the requested server authorization code and threshold inputs without a valid request from the &#x201c;A server&#x201d;. After the &#x201c;A server&#x201d; receives authorization from the &#x201c;B server(s)&#x201d;, it can provide the initially requested device authorization code to the requesting device.

Systems and methods for establishing and using distributed key servers

Growing community of inventors

Austin, TX, United States of America

Gerald E Woodcock, Iii