Vmware, Inc.

Google Inc.

Geoffrey Roeder Pike

Edward Nolan Leake

Osten Kit Colbert

Luigi Semenzato

Xinliang David Li

Cary Allen Coutant

Úlfar Erlingsson

Lawrence Alan Crowl

Sriraman Tallam

Caroline Tice

Kenneth Buchanan

Aspects of this disclosure are directed to establishing a telephonic communication between a first computing device and a second device and receiving, with the first computing device, a command that defines a function to be performed. When the command comprises a voice command, the function defined in the voice command may be performed. When the command does not comprise the voice command, it may be determined that the command comprises an instruction to perform the function after an occurrence of a future condition. The function defined by the command may be performed after the occurrence of the future condition.

Performing functions based on commands in context of telephonic communication

Methods, systems, and apparatus, including computer programs encoded on a computer storage medium, for providing time series information with search results. In one aspect, a method includes determining that a first query is indicative of a request for time series information; generating a cost estimate that quantifies one or more costs of including the time series information with one or more search results, each search result including a resource locator that references a corresponding resource determined to be responsive to the query; generating a benefit estimate; determining to generate the time series information when the benefit estimate is greater than the cost estimate and generating the time series information in response to the determination, wherein generating the time series information includes collecting responsive time series information from one or more resources; and determining to not generate the time series information when the cost estimate is greater than the benefit estimate.

Providing time series information with search results

Systems, methods, and computer storage mediums are provided for mitigating damage to data caused by a computer process having a corrupted pointer. An exemplary method includes receiving a pointer to a memory address. The pointer is received in conjunction with a command of the computer process to access data stored at the memory address, where the data is intended to be stored in a memory segment that allows for read-only access. The memory segment that includes the memory address is analyzed to determine a modification state for the memory segment, where the modification state indicates the type of access that the memory segment allows. The computer process is halted when the modification state indicates that the memory segment allows for other than read-only access.

Safer mechanism for using pointers to code

A system that includes a memory and processor is provided. The processor is programmed to receive input data, determine that the input data is tainted, store the tainted input data in a location in the memory, and based on storing the tainted input data in the location, label the location as a tainted location. The processor is further programmed to assign a triggering event to the tainted location such that an action is initiated when the triggering event has occurred.

Taint tracking mechanism for computer security

Mechanisms have been developed for securing computational systems against certain forms of attack. In particular, it has been discovered that, by scanning an input string for subsequences contained therein and configuring the computational system to generate a fault (or other triggered event) coincident with access to a memory location corresponding to one or more possible interpretations of data contained in the input string, it is possible to detect and/or interdict many forms of attack. For example, some realizations may scan for subsequences susceptible to interpretation as valid, canonical addresses, or as addresses in ranges that contain code, the stack, the heap, and/or system data structures such as the global offset table. Some realizations may scan for subsequences susceptible to interpretation as format strings or as machine code or code (source or otherwise) that could be executed in an execution environment (such as a Java&#x2122; virtual machine) or compiled for execution.

Security method for detecting intrusions that exploit misinterpretation of supplied data

One embodiment is a method for tracking data correspondences in a computer system including a host hardware platform, virtualization software running on the host hardware platform, and a virtual machine running on the virtualization software, the method including: (a) monitoring one or more data movement operations of the computer system; and (b) storing information regarding the one or more data movement operations in a data correspondence structure, which information provides a correspondence between data before one of the one or more data movement operations and data after the one of the one or more data movement operations. The 'monitoring' may comprise monitoring data movement at one or more of an interface between the host hardware platform and the virtualization software, and an interface between the virtual machine and the virtualization software.

Method and system for tracking data correspondences

A system and method is disclosed for providing security in virtual function calling. During a build process a program code is analyzed to identify one or more call sites used to facilitate a call to a subroutine associated with a declared object type. One or more trusted vtable pointers to a respective subroutine is determined, and the program is configured, via the build process, to detect, at an execution time, an initiation of a virtual call at a call site, verify whether a vtable pointer used in connection with the call site is associated with at least one of the trusted vtable pointers, and, if verified, facilitate the virtual call using the call site. If the vtable pointer cannot be verified then the virtual call is aborted.

Detecting and handling vtable pointer corruption

Mechanisms have been developed for securing computational systems against certain forms of attack. Taint status for data accessible by processes is selectively maintained and propagated in correspondence with information flows of instructions executed by a computing system, so that a security (or other appropriate) response can be provided if and when a control transfer (or other restricted use) is attempted based on tainted data. One response that may be triggered is a change in the privilege level (root and guest) that is used to process code executing in a virtual environment, so as to allow remediation to be performed. The triggering events may be specified in a control block.

Computational system including mechanisms for tracking taint

Mechanisms have been developed for securing computational systems against certain forms of attack. In particular, it has been discovered that, by maintaining and propagating taint status for memory locations in correspondence with information flows of instructions executed by a computing system, it is possible to provide a security response if and when a control transfer (or other restricted use) is attempted based on tainted data. In some embodiments, memory management facilities and related exception handlers can be exploited to facilitate taint status propagation and/or security responses. Taint tracking through registers of a processor (or through other storage for which access is not conveniently mediated using a memory management facility) may be provided using an instrumented execution mode of operation. For example, the instrumented mode may be triggered by an attempt to propagate tainted information to a register. In some embodiments, an instrumented mode of operation may be more generally employed. For example, data received from an untrusted source or via an untrusted path is often transferred into a memory buffer for processing by a particular service, routine, process, thread or other computational unit. Code that implements the computational unit may be selectively executed in an instrumented mode that facilitates taint tracking. In general, instrumented execution modes may be supported using a variety of techniques including a binary translation (or rewriting) mode, just-in-time (JIT) compilation/re-compilation, interpreted mode execution, etc. Using an instrumented execution mode and/or exception handler techniques, modifications to CPU hardware can be avoided if desirable.

One embodiment is a method for tracking data correspondences in a computer system including a host hardware platform, virtualization software running on the host hardware platform, and a virtual machine running on the virtualization software, the method including: (a) monitoring one or more data movement operations of the computer system; and (b) storing information regarding the one or more data movement operations in a data correspondence structure, which information provides a correspondence between data before one of the one or more data movement operations and data after the one of the one or more data movement operations.

In a system where an indirect control flow instruction requires a CPU to consult a first memory address, in addition to what is encoded in the instruction itself, for program execution, a method is provided to determine if the first memory address contains a valid or plausible value. The first memory address is compared to an expected or predicted memory address. A difference between the expected or predicted memory address and the first memory address causes an evaluation of any program code about to be executed. The evaluation of code determines whether or not a malicious attack is occurring, or being attempted, that might affect proper operation of the system or program.

Malicious code detection

Mechanisms have been developed for securing computational systems against certain forms of attack. In particular, it has been discovered that, by maintaining and selectively propagating taint status for storage locations in correspondence with information flows of instructions executed by a computing system, it is possible to provide a security (or other appropriate) response if and when a control transfer (or other restricted use) is attempted based on tainted data. By employing aging in decisions to propagate, it is possible limit overheads associated with such tracking. In some embodiments, a decay oriented metric is applied and further propagation of taints is interrupted once aging reaches a predetermined decay threshold. In some embodiments, more generalized labels may be maintained and selectively propagated based on an aging metric. For example, in some embodiments, labels may be employed to code source designation or classification, aging, popularity/frequency of access or taint.

Growing community of inventors

San Francisco, CA, United States of America

Geoffrey Roeder Pike