Visa International Service Association

Gaven James Watson

Kim R Wagner

Sivanarayana Gaddam

Sunpreet Singh Arora

Srinivasan Raghuraman

Pratyay Mukherjee

Saikrishna Badrinarayanan

Atul Luykx

Shashank Agrawal

Rohit Sinha

Mihai Christodorescu

Yilei Chen

Hao Ngo

Payman Mohassel

Brian Sullivan

Minghua Xu

Vinjith Nagaraja

Dinah Sloan

Dmitri Bannikov

Jose Rios Trevino

Sergey Smirnoff

Daniel Masny

Jason Lightman

Estuardo Alpirez Bock

Selvaganesh Vasudevan

Sikhar Patranabis

Systems, methods, and computer readable media are provided for improving the usability of a cryptogram generated in a first cryptographic protocol such as triple-DES. The methods may generate a first cryptogram using a first identifier in a first cryptographic protocol, stored in a key store within an insecure memory of the mobile communication device, generate, within a secure memory of the mobile communication device, a second cryptogram using a second identifier in a second cryptographic protocol, stored in the secure memory, combining, the first cryptogram and a number of characters of the second cryptogram equal to the length of the first cryptogram to generate a third cryptogram and transmitting the third cryptogram to an payment processing network to validate a transaction. A transaction associated with the third cryptogram may be validated by an authorization entity or an issue entity.

Mobile payments using multiple cryptographic protocols

Methods and systems for gateway agnostic tokenization are disclosed. Gateway agnostic tokenization enables a resource provider to quickly, safely, and efficiently route a token for authorization via any appropriate gateway computer. As part of an interaction with a user, a resource provider can transmit a token to an edge computer. The edge computer can then forward the token to a gateway computer. The gateway computer can identify a data item comprising two ciphertexts associated with the token. The edge computer and gateway computer can collectively decrypt the two ciphertexts to obtain a credential. The gateway computer can then forward the credential to an authorizing entity computer. The authorizing entity computer can then determine whether or not to authorize the interaction.

Gateway agnostic tokenization

Embodiments are directed to methods and systems for crypto-agile encryption and decryption. A computer system can possess a protocol file that identifies one or more cryptographic software modules. Using these cryptographic software modules, the computer system can generate a plurality of shared secrets and a session key, then use the session key to encrypt a message. The message can be sent to a server computer that can subsequently decrypt the message. At a later time, the protocol file can be updated to identify a different set of cryptographic software modules, which can be used to encrypt messages. Further, the server computer can transmit additional cryptographic software modules to the computer system, enabling the computer system to use those cryptographic software modules to generate cryptographic keys. As such, the cryptographic protocol file can be changed in response to changes in the cryptographic needs of the computer system.

Agile cryptographic deployment service

A method includes receiving a first encrypted first identity attribute. A first doubly encrypted first identity attribute is formed by encrypting the first encrypted first identity attribute. A second doubly encrypted first identity attribute is formed by encrypting the first encrypted first identity attribute. They are transmitted to a user device, which removes a user layer of encryption on each to form a second encrypted first identity attribute and a third encrypted first identity attribute. Layers of encryption are added to the second encrypted first identity attribute to form a third doubly encrypted first identity attribute and the third encrypted first identity attribute to form a fourth doubly encrypted first identity attribute. The server computer receives them and transmits, to the second identity provider computer, the fourth doubly encrypted first identity attribute. The second identity provider computer obtains a first identity attribute and compares it to a second identity attribute.

Secure data exchange matching across identity providers

A method includes a server computer receiving, from a first data provider computer, encrypted data derived from first identity data and a cryptographic key or derivative thereof stored at the first data provider computer. The server computer transmits, to a second data provider computer, the encrypted data and/or the cryptographic key or derivative thereof. The server computer receives, from the second data provider computer, intermediate data derived from second identity data stored at the second data provider computer. The server computer determines if the first identity data and the second identity data are duplicates while the first identity data and the second identity data are encrypted. The server computer removes one of encrypted first identity data, derived from the first identity data, and encrypted second identity data, derived from the second identity data, from a memory in the server computer.

Privacy-preserving data deduplication

A method is disclosed. The method includes receiving, by a processing network computer from a relying party computer associated with a relying party, a request for data associated with a user operating a user device. The processing network computer may retrieve first encrypted data of the user having a user-layer of encryption. The processing computer can then generate a second symmetric key to add a relying party-layer of encryption to the first encrypted data using a stream cipher. The doubly encrypted data may be transmitted to a user device that removes the user-layer of encryption on the first doubly encrypted data, and then adds a second relying party-layer of encryption to form second doubly encrypted data. The second doubly encrypted data may be transmitted to the relying party computer, which can remove both relying party-layers of encryption to gain access to the data associated with the user.

Privacy preserving identity data exchange based on hybrid encryption

A method, system, and computer program product generate, with a payment network, a first value (a) and a second value (g), the second value (g) based on the first value (a) and a generator value (g); generate, with the payment network, a plurality of random merchant numbers (m) for a respective plurality of merchant banks; determine, with the payment network, a merchant product (M) based on a product of the plurality of random merchant numbers (m); generate, with the payment network, a public key (pk) based on the second value (g), the merchant product (M), and the random merchant number (m) and a random key (rk) based on the merchant product (M) and the random merchant number (m) for each respective merchant bank; and communicate, with the payment network, the public key (pk) and the random key (rk) to at least one respective merchant bank.

Method, system, and computer program product for network bound proxy re-encryption and PIN translation

A user device generates an initiate interaction request message comprising a state commitment. The user device provides the initiate interaction request message to a first server computer, which creates a verify state request message comprising an interaction index, an interaction index commitment, and a first commitment signature formed from the state commitment and the interaction index commitment. The user device receives the verify state request message, then generates a modified verify state request message comprising a user device public key, the state commitment, the interaction index commitment, and the first commitment signature. The user device provides the modified verify state request message to a second server computer. The second server computer verifies the state commitment, verifies the first commitment signature, and creates a second commitment signature formed from the state commitment and the interaction index commitment. The user device receives a verify state response message comprising the second commitment signature.

Zero-knowledge interaction processing system and method

A method is disclosed. The method includes receiving, by a user device, an encrypted message from a server computer. The encrypted message is a message encrypted with a master secret key or a key derived from the master secret key. The user device signs the encrypted message with a secure element private key. The user device, using a whitebox, cryptographically recovers a secure element public key from a certified key using a server computer public key. The certified key is certified by the server computer and based on at least the secure element public key. The user device, using the whitebox, cryptographically recovers the encrypted message from the signed encrypted message using the secure element public key. The user device, using the whitebox, decrypts the encrypted message using the master secret key or the key derived from the master secret key in the whitebox to obtain the message.

Systems and methods for whitebox device binding

A method, system, and computer program product generate, with a payment network, a first value (a) and a second value (g), the second value (g) generated based on the first value (a) and a generator value (g); generate, with the payment network, a plurality of random merchant numbers (m) for a respective plurality of merchant banks; determine, with the payment network, a merchant product (M) based on a product of the plurality of random merchant numbers (m); generate, with the payment network, a public key (pk) based on the second value (g), the merchant product (M), and the random merchant number (m) and a random key (rk) based on the merchant product (M) and the random merchant number (m) for each respective merchant bank; and communicate, with the payment network, the public key (pk) and the random key (rk) to at least one respective merchant bank.

Methods and systems for privacy-preserving identity attribute verification are presented. During an interaction between a relying entity and a user, a relying entity computer can transmit a policy token to a user device. The policy token may indicate the information needed by the relying entity in order to perform the interaction. The user device can verify the policy token, then use the policy token in conjunction with an identity token to generate a zero-knowledge proof. The user device may transmit the zero-knowledge proof to an identity service provider computer. The identity service provider computer may verify the zero-knowledge proof, then generate a verification message. The identity service provider computer may sign the verification message and transmit the signed verification message to the relying entity computer. The relying entity computer may verify the verification message and complete the interaction with the user.

Privacy-preserving identity attribute verification using policy tokens

A method is disclosed. The method comprises receiving, by an identity network computer, a query set including a plurality of test identity attributes. After receiving the query set, the identity network computer may retrieve derivatives of identity attributes associated with a user, and an encrypted trapdoor, then compute an obscured query set using the query set, and optionally the derivatives of identity attributes. The identity network computer may transmit the obscured query set (i) and the encrypted trapdoor to a user device associated with the user, which generates and transmits a first modified trapdoor and the obscured query set to a relying party computer, or (ii) and a second modified trapdoor to the relying party computer. The relying party computer may thereafter use the obscured query set, and the first modified trapdoor or the second modified trapdoor, to determine if the identity attributes is a member of the query set.

Growing community of inventors

Palo Alto, CA, United States of America

Gaven James Watson