Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Ganesh Pandey

Parul Manek

Kameshwar Jayaraman

Ayla Kol

Brijesh Bhupendra Desai

Peter W Wong

Yoganand Rajasekaran

Zhanbing Wu

Amanda Nguyen

Alvin Scholten

Eigo Shimizu

Shankaranand Arunachalam

Benjamin Du

Zijun Hao

Raquibur Rahman

Mainul Mizan

Philip Ross Moyer

Anshul Dube

Andrew Burke Ryan

Jason Craig Nelson

Robert Allen Lowe

Steven Mark Silverberg

Xiaoqin Zhu

Dmitri Gavrilov

Qi Cao

Steven Jay Lieberman

Gokay Hurmali

Amit A Bapat

Anuj Dhawan

Roberto C Taboada

Pamela Bhattacharya

Charles Glenn Jeffries

Paul Baecke

Himesh Shah

Stuart Kwan

Priyanshu Kumar Jha

Kartik Tirunelveli Kanakasabesan

Soumit Rahman

Daniel John Carroll, Jr

Curtis Thibault

Shefali Gulati

Ajay Kalidindi

Yeshua Garcia

Methods, systems, and computer programs are presented for protecting restricted actions on encryption keys that control the management of data stored by a service provider. In some implementations, a system of the service provider receives a request to generate a data encryption policy (DEP) for data stored by the system of the service provider for a customer, the request including a reference to a customer key and an availability key. The customer key and the availability key are root keys for encrypting a data encryption key. The data encryption key is used to encrypt the data stored by the service provider for the customer. Further, destructive changes to the availability key require receiving an approval from an account of the service provider. The system of the service provider validates the DEP. The system of the service provider stores the DEP based on the validation.

Protection for restricted actions on critical resources

A secure investigation platform in a sovereign cloud includes a request processing system that receives requests to investigate an incident. A control message processing system creates a workspace, within the sovereign cloud, so that an investigation can be conducted within that workspace. An investigation pack, which includes investigative resources used in the investigation, is identified and the workspace is pre-configured with the identified investigation pack. The control message processing system performs investigation tasks within the workspace using the investigation pack.

Secure incident investigation workspace generation and investigation control

A client application is specified by a target tenant and represented in an OAuth provider, along with a corresponding secret. A source tenant consents to permissions to be executed by the client application on a resource of the source tenant. A target service uses the secret to obtain an access token from an authorization server coupled to the source tenant and uses the access token to obtain access, specified by the permissions, to the resource served by a source service acting on behalf of the source tenant.

Authentication framework for resource access across organizations

A service computing system receives an API call in which an authorization token, that contains an identifier in the content of the authorization token, is included in a header of the API call. The identifier is also included as a parameter passed in with the API call. The service computing system parses the API call to obtain the authorization token, and the identifier included in the authorization token. It also obtains the identifier passed in as a parameter of the API call. The service computing system compares the identifier obtained from the authorization token to the identifier passed in as a parameter of the API call to determine whether they match. If they do not match, the API call is processed as an unauthorized API call. A security system in the service computing system authorizes the API call based on the comparison.

Client-server security enhancement using information accessed from access tokens

A secure investigation platform in a sovereign cloud includes a request processing system that receives requests to investigate an incident. A control message processing system creates a workspace, within the sovereign cloud, so that an investigation can be conducted within that workspace. The control message processing system performs investigation tasks within the workspace. A secure log generation system captures information corresponding to the tasks and generates an event record based on the captured information.

Secure incident investigation event capture

Access to data and resources in a multi-tenant computing system is managed by tagging the data and resources with attributes, as well as by tagging users with attributes. Tenant-specific access policies are configured. When an access request is received from a workload, a policy decision engine processes the attributes that are tagged to the requesting workload (e.g., user, application, etc.) as well as those tagged to the requested data or resource, given a relevant tenant-specific policy. An access decision is provided in response to the access request, and the access decision can be enforced by a tenant-specific enforcement system.

Controlling access to cloud resources in data using cloud-enabled data tagging and a dynamic access control policy engine

Methods, systems, and computer programs are presented for protecting restricted actions on encryption keys that control the management of data stored by a service provider. In some implementations, a of the service provider receives a request to generate a data encryption policy (DEP) for data stored by the of the service provider for a customer, the request including a reference to a customer key and an availability key. The customer key and the availability key are root keys for encrypting a data encryption key. The data encryption key is used to encrypt the data stored by the service provider for the customer. Further, destructive changes to the availability key require receiving an approval from an account of the service provider. The of the service provider validates the DEP. The of the service provider stores the DEP based on the validation.

In a multi-tenant computing system, a cross-tenant user search system receives a user search input from a user using a client of a first tenant. The cross-tenant user search system accesses a policy that identifies one or more related tenants that are related to the first tenant. The policy also identifies directory records of users in the related tenant that can be searched by users of the first tenant. The cross-tenant user search system executes a search against a directory for the first tenant and executes a separate search against the directory records in the related tenants, identified in the policy. The search results from searching the directory for the first tenant and the related search results from searching the directory records in the tenant are aggregated into an aggregated set of search results which are then returned to the client.

Cross-tenant people search in a multi-tenant computing system

A request to perform a command or operation on a computing system is received from a support user. A clearance level needed to perform that requested command or operation is identified, and a data store that has a pool of cleared users is accessed to identify a cleared user that has an adequate clearance level. The secured user is assigned to the request. A risk level, corresponding to the requested command or operation is identified and surfaced for the secured user. The requested command or operation can be automatically executed, after it is authorized by the secured user.

Cleared user facilitation and control system

A secure investigation platform in a sovereign cloud includes a request processing system that is a user-facing system and receives requests to prepare for an incident investigation. A control message processing system creates a workspace, within the sovereign cloud, so that an investigation can be conducted within that workspace. The request processing system does not access the workspace and the control message processing system is not available for external access by a user. Data and functionality are ingested into the workspace. The control message processing system performs investigation preparation tasks within the workspace. The results of the investigation tasks are surfaced for user access.

Secure investigations platform

Service issues predicted by detecting anomalies in an event signal is provided. An application such as a signal analysis application receives an event signal for analysis. The event signal includes events captured during a time period. The event signal is processed to generate a trend line. The trend line includes a best fit line transposed across averages of number of events of each data point across the time period. The number of events of an end data point may be compared to an upper confidence score and a lower confidence score associated with the end data point on the trend line. In response to detecting the number of events of the end data point exceed the upper confidence score, a notification is transmitted to a stakeholder associated with the event signal. The notification may describe a symptom associated with the number of events on the end data point.

Predicting service issues by detecting anomalies in event signal

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Ganesh Pandey