Cisco Technology, Inc.

Frederic R P Detienne

Pratima Pramod Sethi

Michael Lee Sullenberger

Ijsbrand Wijnands

Brian Eliot Weis

Jan Vilhuber

Manikchand Roopchand Bafna

The present disclosure provides protection of customer data traveling across a network. A reverse cryptographic map (also referred to herein as a reverse crypto map) can be defined for a customer, where the reverse crypto map indicates how customer data should be protected. A reverse crypto map for a customer is applied to an interface of an edge device that is coupled to that customer's private subnet (or customer-facing interface). A reverse crypto map can be configured by a network administrator on a provider edge device, or can be pushed from a key server as part of group policy. A provider edge device can protect customer data by encrypting and decrypting the customer data according to the reverse crypto map. A provider edge device can also be configured with virtual routing and forwarding (VRF) tables that can be used to forward the VPN traffic flow across a provider network.

Simplified mechanism for multi-tenant encrypted virtual networks

Upon detection of a new traffic flow, a registration node can dynamically register the new traffic flow with a key server policy manager by sending a registration request on behalf of the new traffic flow. A registration request indicates the new traffic flow should be protected by a security group. A registration request may also include a request to dynamically generate a new security group to protect the traffic flow. The registration request is received by a key server policy manager, which performs authentication and authorization checks of the requesting registration node, and determines whether to accept or reject the registration request. If accepted, the key server policy manager registers the new traffic flow by including a description of the traffic flow in a group policy of an existing security group or a newly created security group, depending on the registration request.

Dynamic group creation and traffic flow registration under a group in a group key infrastructure

A system receives a request at a hub. The request is received from a first spoke regarding a packet to be transmitted from the first spoke to a second spoke. The system identifies, at the time of the request, a preferred route from the first spoke to the second spoke. The system sends a redirect message to the first spoke, the redirect message directing the packet along the preferred route. The system transmits, from a first spoke to a hub, a first request associated with a packet. In response, the system receives, at the first spoke, a redirect message from the hub. The redirect message identifies a preferred route by which the first spoke transmits the packet to a second spoke. The system creates, at the first spoke, a second request containing a destination address of the second spoke, and transmits the second request along the preferred route.

Methods and apparatus for providing shortcut switching for a virtual private network

Example embodiments herein include a verification process that provides a safe and efficient mechanism for recovering security associations between network devices. More specifically, the verification process transmits a secured message from a first network device to a second network device across a network. Furthermore, the security association includes a parent process and a corresponding child process. The verification process detects, at the first network device, an incompatibility in the security association between the first network device and the second network device. Next, the verification process transmits a status query from the first network device to the second network device in order to determine the status of the security association between the first network device and the second network device. In response, the verification process receives a verifiable reply message that is indicative of the status of the security association between the first network device and the second network device.

Security association verification and recovery

A packet forwarding process, on a data communications device, forwards a packet to a plurality of destinations within a network from that data communications device using an 'encrypt, then replicate' method. The packet forwarding process receives a packet that is to be transmitted to the plurality of destinations, and applies a security association to the packet using security information shared between the data communications device, and the plurality of destinations, to create a secured packet. The secured packet contains a header that has a source address and a destination address. The source address is inserted into the header, and then the packet forwarding process replicates the secured packet, once for each of the plurality of destinations. After replication, the destination address is inserted into the header, and the packet forwarding process transmits each replicated secured packet to each of the plurality of destinations authorized to maintain the security association.

Method and apparatus for distributing group data in a tunneled encrypted virtual private network

Network devices can detect whether a tunnel is available (e.g., usable to convey traffic in both directions) by implementing a tunnel detection protocol that uses a combination of idle timers and multiple types of probes. In this protocol, the device at one end of the tunnel is configured as an active device, while the device at the other end of the tunnel is configured as a passive device. The tunnel detection protocol is asymmetric; the active device sends probes to the passive device, but the passive device does not send probes to the active device. By using at least two types of probes, the active device can inform the passive device about the availability of the path from the passive device to the active device. Since the passive device does not need to send probes or process probe replies, control plane processing on the passive device can be reduced.

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Harze, Belgium

Frederic R P Detienne