Koninklijke Kpn N.v.

Nederlandse Organisatie Voor Toegepast-Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek Tno

Koninklijke Ptt Nederland N.v.

Nokia Corporation

Frank Muller

Jeroen Laarakkers

Frank Fransen

John Gerard Beerends

Willem Rombaut

Michel Marco Drupsteen

Tim Hartog

Gerrit Roelofsen

Robertus Lambertus Van Ravesteijn

Franklin Selgert

Albertus Feiken

Peter Jacobus De Rooij

Jelle Wissenburgh

Johannes Brehler

Martin Klass De Lange

Hendricus Johannes Van De Pavert

Jacobus T Quak

Jean-Paul Boly

Dirk Jan Jacobus Van Bruchem

Rafael Hirschfeld

Frank Franssen

Sharon Christie Lesley Prins

A Method and a system for managing undesired service requests sent from at least one terminal to a network are described, wherein the network comprises a network node for storing trusted service-information. The method comprises the steps of: the network receiving a service request from a terminal, the request comprising service request information; and, sending, preferably via a secure communication channel, a user verification request for requesting the user to verify the service requested by the terminal if at least part of the service request information is not listed in the trusted service-information.

Managing undesired service requests in a network

A system is provided for detecting behaviour of a mobile telecommunications device in a telecommunications network. Malware in mobile devices can cause malicious behaviour in the device, for example sequential attaching and detaching of an infected device relative to a telecommunications network. A telecommunications network is provided which is configured to identify at least one mobile telecommunications device and to receive signals from the mobile telecommunications device and process the signals into data streams. The data streams include data of a first type arranged to cause an event of a first type within the telecommunications network. The network is arranged to monitor an occurrence in the data streams of the data of the first type and to register when the occurrence exceeds a level indicating acceptable behaviour of the mobile telecommunications device in the telecommunications network. A device for detection of mobile device behaviour is also described.

System to detect behaviour in a telecommunications network

At least a method for verifying the authenticity of one or more authentication messages in an authentication procedure between a network and a mobile device is described wherein the method comprises: sending an authentication request through a first radio access node to a said mobile device, said radio access node being associated with first location information; said mobile device generating second location information associated with the location of said mobile device; and, verifying the authenticity of the origin of said authentication request by checking if said second location information comprises said first location information.

Module for authenticity verification of authentication messages

A method and a system for service-based authentication of a terminal to a network is described, wherein the terminal comprises a number of communications interfaces, each communications interface allowing the terminal to set-up a predetermined communication channel with the network. The method comprises the steps of: sending a service request for access to a network service; receiving in response to the service request an authentication request from the network; identifying the communication channel through which the authentication request was received; and, sending an authentication response RES to the network, wherein the authentication response depends on the identified communication channel.

Service-based authentication to a network

A method of protecting a mobile device against malware is described. The mobile device comprises a backup operating system, the backup operating system being stored, preferably in a ROM, in the mobile device separately from the active operating system. The method comprises the steps of: providing a signal indicative of the possible presence of malware in the mobile device; and, replacing in response to the signal the active operating system with the backup operating system.

Protecting a mobile device against a denial of service attack

A method for controlling locking state transitions in a terminal in accordance with one or more state transition rules, the method including the steps of providing at least one writable memory location comprising first state information associated with a first locking state of said terminal, said at least one writable memory being configured for an irreversible transition from said first locking state to a second locking state; receiving a request for a transition to said second locking state, said request comprising second state information associated with said second locking state; on the basis of said first and second state information and said state transition rules, checking whether said requested transition is allowable or not; and storing said second state information in said writable memory if said requested transition is allowable according to said state transition rules.

Controlling locking state transitions in a terminal

Authenticity verification of authentication messages

For cryptographically processing data, data (X) and a key (K) are fed to a cryptographic process (P), which may be a known process. In order to veil the nature of the process (P), auxiliary values as fed to the process, such as a supplementary key (K*), using which a supplementary process (P*) generates the key proper (K). The combination of the original process (P) and the supplementary process (P*) provides an unknown process, hence, the relationship between the supplementary key (K*) and the processed data (Y) is unknown. As a result, improved cryptographic security results.

Method and device for cryptographically processing data

A method for protecting a portable card, provided with at least a crypto algorithm for enciphering data and/or authenticating the card, against deriving the secret key through statistical analysis of its information leaking away to the outside world in the event of cryptographic operations, such as power-consumption data, electromagnetic radiation and the like. The card is provided with at least a shift register having a linear and a non-linear feedback function for creating cryptographic algorithms. An algorithm is applied to the card, which is constructed in such a manner that the collection of values of recorded leak-information signals is resistant to deriving the secret key from statistical analysis of those values. Advantageously, after the key has been loaded into the shift register, the shift register clocks on, using at least the linear-feedback function. A suitable alternative is loading only the key into the shift register in the event of a fixed content of the shift register.

Method for protecting a portable card

In a smart card (1) electronic tickets (20) are securely stored. Ticket data is written into the fields (21, 22, 23) of a ticket (20) in a protected manner using a special code. Tickets (20) may comprise several fields, such as an entitlement field (21), a validation field (22), and a verification field (23). Different keys (K1, K2, K3) are used for each type of field at issuing, validation, and verification terminals (81, 82, 83). A further protection of the integrity of the tickets (20) is obtained by using a first storage command (UPDATE) to prepare a field when issuing the ticket (20) at the issuing terminal (81), and, a different, second storage command (WRITE) when validating the ticket (20) at the validation terminal (82). Thus, the fraudulent modification of an issued ticket (20) is prevented.

Method and system for storing tickets on smart cards

A method of loading commands (C1, C2, . . . ) in a security module (2) of a terminal (1) is disclosed. The method comprises the steps of: a station (4) transferring the commands (C1-Cn) to the terminal (1), the terminal (1) transferring the commands (C1-Cn) to the security module (2), the security module (2) executing the commands (C1-Cn), the terminal (1) selectively recording actual results (R1'-Rm') of the executed commands (C1-Cn), and the transfer means (3) transferring the results (R1'-Rm') back to the station (4). The commands may have associated expected results (e.g. R1), which the terminal (1) may compare with the actual results (e.g. R1' ). This allows both a flexible loading of data in the security module (2) by means of commands and a remote check of the functioning of the security module.

Method of loading commands in the security module of a terminal

A payment system for use with electronic payment devices. Electronic payment cards (e.g. 'Smart Cards'), may be used with one or more payment stations (e.g. electronic cash registers). The payment stations are designed for receiving, during a payment transaction, a monetary value by crediting, in the payment station, a first value, and debiting, in the payment means, a second value corresponding to the first value. The first and second values may be expressed in different calculation units, such as currencies of different countries. The system furthermore offers a payment device for application in such a system, and a method for effecting a payment transaction with an electronic payment means.

Electronic payment method and system having several calculation units

The invention relates to a method for protected transactions involving a so-called smart card and a terminal, such as a cash register. In order to prevent the smart card from simultaneously carrying out transactions with several terminals, the invention provides an authentication value which is used in the data exchange between the smart card and the terminal to uniquely identify subsequent steps of the transaction.

Method for protectedly debiting an electronic payment means

A method of securely transferring data, such as program data, to a smart card (1) is disclosed. In order to be applicable in non-secure environments, the method of the invention involves a one-way authentication mechanism, comprising the use of a series of interrelated authentication values (R0, R1, R2, . . . ). Further security is achieved by using commands (INIT, TRAN) which are each provided with an authentication code (MAC0, MAC1, . . . ). In order to transfer data only to selected cards, the card may accept transfer commands only if a card profile (CP) matches a distribution profile (DP).

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Delft, Netherlands

Frank Muller