Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ)

Francesco Toro

Andrea Senatore

Francesca Marfia

Alessandro Mordacci

Elvira Villani

Giuseppe Amato

Mario Ascione

Dario De Vito

Luciano Orabona

Vincenzo Cuniato

Domenico Raffaele Cione

Michele Maiorino

A lawful interception administrative function (LI ADMF) provides a virtual network function (VNF) implemented (i.e. implemented in a cloud infrastructure) LI intercept access point (IAP) only with one-way encrypted targets instead of clear-text targets while keeping the lawful interception triggering capability of the IAP unaffected. The ADMF, being external to the cloud infrastructure in which the IAP is running, executes hashing of targets before the targets are provided to the IAP. The IAP will never receive targets in clear text and thereby greatly reducing the LI security risks.

Lawful interception security

This disclosure relates to a method Sand a device for correlating in a Lawful Intercept Mediation system, LIMS, received Intercept Related Information, IRI, and, Communications Content, CC, data packets of a 5 targets lawfully intercepted session for deliverance over HI2 and HI3 interfaces, respectively, by means of a session-specific Correlation Identification Number, CIN.

Method and device for correlating in a lawful intercept mediation system

A mediation function receives intercepted signaling and media payload messages from an IP Multimedia Subsystem, IMS. Local correlation numbers () are calculated and a table () comprising correlation numbers () and media payload mapping information () is maintained in order to enable the mediation function to provide a law enforcement agency, LEA, with intercepted media payload together with information that enables the LEA to decode the media payload in real-time.

Lawful interception

The following disclosure relates a method and mediation device () in a Lawful Interception (LI) system for detecting and correlating copies of SIP and RTP flows, from different domains EPS or IMS, said method comprising to determine a unique IMS Communication Identity Number, IMS CIN, and a corresponding correlation set of identifiers, storing each unique IMS CIN together with its correlation set for an intercepted communication session, correlating a SIP or RTP flow received from one domain to the same SIP or RTP flows of the same communication session received from the other domain by comparing the flow identity information of the received flow to the stored correlation sets for identifying a matching correlation set and its unique IMS CIN and sending to a LEA requesting for LI of the target said received SIP or RTP flow comprising said identified unique IMS CIN for a matching correlation set.

Methods and devices for detecting and correlating data packet flows in a lawful interception system

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Baronissi, Italy

Francesco Toro