Abb Schweiz Ag

Florian Kohnhaeuser

Soeren Finster

Nicolas Coppik

Piotr Powroznik

A computer-implemented method for providing vetting and/or functional validation of software components, comprising: providing a software component and software component data indicating the software component; writing the software component data in a distributed ledger; functional validating and/or vetting the software component and providing functional validation and/or vetting data of the software component; writing the functional validation and/or vetting data in the distributed ledger; providing the data written in the distributed ledger to a software component consumer.

Vetting and/or functional validation of software components

A method for protecting the integrity of measurement data acquired by a sensor includes: in response to the measurement data being acquired, determining, by the sensor, whether an aggregate value has already been generated, and: if the aggregate value has not yet been obtained, mapping, by a predetermined aggregation function that takes the measurement data as a mandatory argument and a previously generated aggregate value as an optional argument, the measurement data to the aggregate value; whereas if the aggregate value has already been obtained, mapping, by the predetermined aggregation function, the combination of the aggregate value and the measurement data to a new aggregate value; and in response to a predetermined condition being met, computing, using a secret key of the sensor, a signature of the aggregate value; and outputting the signature via a communication interface of the sensor, and/or storing the signature in a memory.

Protecting the integrity of measurement data acquired by a sensor device

An industrial automation system device includes: a secure communication processing unit for communicating securely with a further trusted industrial automation system device; and a pre-shared secret module including a pre-shared secret, the pre-shared secret including shared asymmetric key pair generation data. The secure communication processing unit: derives a shared asymmetric key pair including a shared secret key and a shared public key from the shared asymmetric key pair generation data, derives a shared certificate including the shared public key, signs the shared certificate with the derived shared secret key, and generates a device asymmetric key pair including a device secret key and a device public key.

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Riedstadt, Germany

Florian Kohnhaeuser