Nxp B.v.

Florian Boehl

Joppe Willem Bos

Thierry G C Walrant

Jan René Brands

Simon Johann Friedberger

Christian Steger

Clemens Orthacker

Klaus Martin Potzmader

Andreas Daniel Sinnhofer

A system and method of producing a key for a digital signature method, including: providing a plurality of initial hardware security modules (HSM) with global public key parameters; running key generation to produce sub-public keys for respective sub-trees associated with the plurality of initial HSMs based upon the global public key parameters; picking a random seed and generating a sub-public key and a sub-tree based upon the random seed for a plurality of virtual HSMs; sending the sub-public keys of the plurality of initial HSMs to a root HSM; computing an overall public key of a tree structure associated with the root HSM; distributing the sub-public keys for the initial HSMs to the plurality of initial HSMs; splitting the random seed of the virtual HSMs into a plurality of key shares; and providing custodians associated with the plurality of virtual HSMs a key share from the plurality of key shares.

Distributed stateful hash-based signatures

A white-box system and method for producing a digital signature of a message m, including: a white-box implementation of a symmetric cipher configured to produce a deterministic nonce value by encrypting the message m using a secret key; and a digital signature algorithm configured to produce a digital signature of the message m based upon the deterministic nonce, the message m, and a secret signing key.

Deterministic digital signature method without using a hash function

A method of computing a message authentication code (MAC) for a message having a common part and an independent part using a constrained processor, including: performing a MAC function on the common part of the message using a first secret key to produce a first output; performing a pseudorandom function on the independent part of the message using a second key to produce a second output, wherein the computation time of the pseudorandom function is significantly less than the computation time of the MAC function; and combining the first output and the second output to produce a computed MAC for the message.

Efficient calculation of message authentication codes for related data

A method of trust provisioning a device, including: receiving, by a hardware security module (HSM), a list of instructions configured to produce trust provisioning information; performing, by the HSM, a constraint check on the list of instructions including performing a symbolic execution of the list of instructions; receiving confidential inputs; executing, by the HSM, the list of instructions on the confidential inputs when the list of instructions passes the constraint check; outputting, by the HSM, trust provisioning information.

Method for symbolic execution on constrained devices

Embodiments utilizing secret keys for authentication and/or encrypted communication are described. In certain embodiments, authentication data is provided from a source network communication device to a target network communication device that allows a computing server to verify that the key migration is authorized by the source network communication device. The authentication data also enables the data provider and the target network communication device to independently determine a temporary key for establishing a secure communication channel between the service provider and the target network communication device and/or determine a new key for the target network communication device. In some implementations, the authentication data may be exchanged between the source and target network communication devices between offline without involvement of the computing server. When the target network communication device later connects to the computing server, the authentication data may be used to verify that the key migration is authorized and/or generate key(s).

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Leuven, Belgium

Florian Boehl