Dell Products Inc.

Eugene David Cho

Mukund Purshottam Khatri

Akkiah Choudary Maddukuri

Marshal F Savage

Timothy Michael Lambert

Chandrasekhar Mugunda

Arun Muthaiyan

Sreeram Veluthakkal

Prashanth Giri

Elie Antoun Jreij

Michael Emery Brown

Paul W Vancil

Jun Gu

Pablo Rafael Arias

Dit Charoen

Milton Olavo Decarvalho Taveira

Mario Alberto Sanchez

Chandrashekar Nelogal

Hasnain Shabbir

Yogesh Prabhakar Kulkarni

Viswanath Ponnuru

Jason Matthew Young

Douglas L Farley

Donald W Gerhart

Srinivas Giri Raju Gowda

Patrick Oliver Boyd

Alaric J Silveira

David Craig Lawson

Brian L Brelsford

Murali Krishna Somarouthu

Huijun Xie

Senthilkumar Ponnuswamy

Trevor Cockrell

Kiran George Vetteth

Piyush Sharma

Techniques are provided for security key integrity verification using inventory certificates. One method comprises receiving a user request to perform an action: obtaining an inventory certificate associated with a device; extracting a security key identifier from a security key corresponding to the device; validating the security key by comparing the extracted security key identifier to a security key identifier in the inventory certificate; and authorizing a performance of the action based on a result of the comparison. A validity of the inventory certificate may be evaluated (e.g., by evaluating a signature associated with the inventory certificate). The inventory certificate may be stored in a secure memory of the device prior to a delivery of the device to a purchaser of the device.

Security key integrity verification using inventory certificates

An LCS trust system includes resource devices including respective resource device pTPMs, and an SCP device including an SCP device pTPM and providing a resource management system with a resource management system vTPM. The resource management system uses the resource management system vTPM to establish a first trust relationship with the SCP device via the SCP device pTPM, and respective second trust relationships with each of the resource devices via their respective resource device pTPMs. The resource management system the uses a subset of the resource devices to provide an LCS that includes an LCS vTPM and that uses the LCS vTPM to establish a respective third trust relationship with each of the subset of the resource devices via their respective resource device pTPMs. As such, a chain of trust is provided for the LCS that is based at least upon the first, respective second, and respective third trust relationships.

LCS trust system

In drift detection for complex IHS platforms comprised of replaceable components an IHS a security processor may present a number of hieratical sets of Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) as Virtualized PCR Engines (VPEs) corresponding to IHS platform hardware, sub-domains, and/or central processing units. An IHS aggregation engine may collect measure(s) of platform components, populate the PCRs of the VPEs, and maintain a platform-level VPE and PCR event log from sub-domains of the platform. The measure(s) may be collected indirectly from component Security Protocols and Data Models (SPDM) and/or directly over Management Component Transport Protocol (MCTP), Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C), Peripheral Component Interconnect Express (PCIe) and/or via Serial Peripheral Interconnect (SPI). The measure(s) may include vendor certificate authority (CA) certificates for feeding into the PCRs. The VPE hierarchy structure enables hardware, firmware, IHS configuration and/or vendor CA certificate drift detection at boot-time and/or component Operating System (OS) measurement during runtime.

Systems and methods to support drift detection in complex information handling system platforms comprised of replaceable components

Techniques are provided for identity-based verification of software code layers. One method comprises obtaining, by a current layer of software code executing on a security processor of a security sub-system, in connection with a boot of the security sub-system, an identity key of the current layer, wherein the identity key of the current layer is based on a value generated during a provisioning of the security sub-system, wherein the value is based on a firmware image of at least one layer of the software code; obtaining an encrypted secure boot public key of a next layer; decrypting the encrypted secure boot public key of the next layer using the obtained identity key of the current layer; verifying the next layer using the decrypted secure boot public key of the next layer; and executing the next layer based at least in part on a result of the verifying.

Identity-based verification of software code layers

Techniques are provided for provisioning multiple platform root of trust (PRoT) entities using role-based identity certificates. One method comprises obtaining a designation of a PRoT entity of a hardware device as a PRoT leader associated with a leader role; recording the leader role as a role attribute in an identity certificate; and providing the identity certificate to the hardware device during a provisioning of the hardware device, wherein the given PRoT entity assumes the leader role of the hardware device and initiates security actions of the PRoT leader upon an initiation of the hardware device. Leader responsibilities can be assigned to the PRoT leader and the one or more leader responsibilities of the PRoT leader may be recorded as a leader responsibility attribute in the identity certificate.

Provisioning multiple platform root of trust entities of a hardware device using role-based identity certificates

An Information Handling System (IHS) includes multiple hardware devices, and a baseboard Management Controller (BMC) in communication with the plurality of hardware devices. The BMC includes instructions for executing a first BMC firmware stack that uses certain data for its operation. The data used by the first BMC firmware stack is stored in a first memory location. The instructions are further configured to halt execution of the first BMC firmware stack, and begin execution of a second BMC firmware stack by copying the data from the first memory location to a second memory location used by the second BMC firmware stack.

Data sharing system and method for a multi-boot baseboard management controller (BMC)

Systems and methods for factory management of regional cryptographic algorithms in an Information Handling System (IHS) are described. In an embodiment, an IHS may include: a host processor; a security processor coupled to the host processor; and a memory coupled to the security processor, the memory having program instructions stored thereon that, upon execution, cause the security processor to: generate a Cryptographic Algorithm Identity (CAI) key pair comprising a CAI public key and a CAI private key; issue a CAI Certificate Signing Request (CSR) to a factory IHS, where the CAI CSR comprises the CAI public key; receive a signed CAI certificate from the factory IHS, where the signed CAI certificate is usable to activate a selected set of regional cryptographic algorithms among a superset of regional cryptographic algorithms stored, during manufacturing of the IHS, in a firmware of the security processor; and store the signed CAI certificate.

Factory management of regional cryptographic algorithms in an information handling system

Systems and methods provide validation of hardware components of an IHS (Information Handling System). An attestation certificate stored to the IHS specifies authenticated instructions for operation of a hardware component of the IHS. This attestation certificate is endorsed by a self-signed root attestation certificate. An identity certificate, also stored to the IHS, specifies an identity of the hardware component and is endorsed using an embedded keypair of the hardware component. The root attestation certificate is validated to ensure it corresponds to the hardware component specified in the identity certificate, where this validation confirms that a public key included in the identity certificate is identical to a public key included in the attestation certificate. Through use of the same public key by both certificates, the attestation certificate can be validated as corresponding to the identity certificate without accessing the embedded keypair of the hardware component used to sign the identity certificate.

Split chain of digital certificates for supply chain integrity

Embodiments of systems and methods for indicating a type of secure boot to endpoint devices by a security processor are described. In some embodiments, a security processor may include: a core and a memory coupled to the core, the memory having program instructions stored thereon that, upon execution by the core, cause the security processor to: identify a type of secure boot last performed to bootstrap an Information Handling System (IHS); and make an indication of the type of secure boot available to a host processor or Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) of the IHS.

Indicating a type of secure boot to endpoint devices by a security processor

A system for controlling power settings is provided that includes a plurality of components, each component configured to implement a power control algorithm. A controller is coupled to each component and configured to control a power state of each component as a function of the power control algorithm for each component. The controller comprises a state machine having a plurality of states, wherein the power control algorithm of each component is controlled by the controller as a function of a state of the state machine.

System and method to maintain optimal system performance within user defined system level power cap in a changing workload environment

Systems and methods are provided for validating components of an Information Handling System (IHS). During factory provisioning of the IHS, an owner certificate is stored that specifies an identity of a motherboard installed during manufacture of the IHS. The owner certificate is signed by a certificate authority of an owner of the IHS that retains capabilities for specifying the use of boot code provided by successive renters of the IHS. A renter certificate is also stored that specifies an identity of a chassis to which the motherboard is installed during manufacture of the IHS. Upon a transfer of control or ownership of the IHS, boot code operations by the security processor identify a motherboard and chassis in use by the IHS and utilize the motherboard and chassis certificates to validate that the identified motherboard and chassis are the same motherboard and chassis installed during manufacture of the IHS.

Systems and methods for authenticating the identity of an information handling system

An Information Handling System (IHS) includes multiple hardware devices, and a baseboard Management Controller (BMC) in communication with the plurality of hardware devices. The BMC includes a first processor configured to execute a custom BMC firmware stack, and a second processor including executable instructions for receiving a request to perform a test on the first processor in which the request is received through a secure communication session established with a remote IHS. The instructions further perform the acts of controlling the first processor to perform the test according to the request, the first processor generating test results associated with the test, and transmitting the test results to the remote IHS through the secure communication session.

Baseboard management controller (BMC) test system and method

A method for dynamic immutable security personalization for enterprise products. Specifically, the disclosed method describes how a computer processor (e.g., baseboard management controller) of an enterprise product can personalize security requirements in trusted facilities, along the supply chain route of the enterprise product, so that trusted assumptions concerning the enterprise product can be made. Further, through dynamic immutable security personalization, these trusted assumptions are allowed to change over time (e.g., from being less restrictive to more restrictive) as changing enterprise product configuration states are captured while the enterprise product traverses the supply chain route.

Dynamic immutable security personalization for enterprise products

As part of a factory provisioning of an Information Handling System (IHS), a signed replaceable hardware certificate is stored that identifies any replaceable hardware components coupled to the IHS during the factory provisioning. Upon a transfer of control or ownership of the IHS, replaceable hardware components that are coupled to the IHS are detected, and the replaceable hardware certificate is utilized to validate that the identified replaceable hardware components detected as coupled to the IHS are the same replaceable hardware components coupled to the IHS during the factory provisioning. A security processor of the IHS may support boot code operations for generating additional replaceable hardware certificates that can be used to validate the integrity of any changes the replaceable hardware of the IHS, such as upon its next power cycle.

Systems and methods for authenticating hardware of an information handling system

An Information Handling System (IHS) includes multiple hardware devices, and a baseboard Management Controller (BMC) in communication with the plurality of hardware devices. The BMC includes executable instructions for beginning execution of a first BMC firmware stack, and during execution of the first BMC firmware stack, halt execution of the first BMC firmware stack, and begin execution of a second BMC firmware stack. At least a portion of the executable instructions used to generate the first BMC firmware stack are different than the executable instructions used to generate the second BMC firmware stack.

Growing community of inventors

Austin, TX, United States of America

Eugene David Cho