Infineon Technologies Ag

Siemens Aktiengesellschaft

Continental Automotive Gmbh

Erwin Hess

Bernd Meyer

Steffen Sonnekalb

Rainer Goettfert

Steffen Lamparter

Wolfgang Pockrandt

Thomas Grill

Markus Dichtl

Michael Braun

Anton Kargl

Gerhard Rombach

Markus Gail

Jean Georgiades

Horst Plankenhorn

Armin Wedel

Rainer Krebs

Enrique Gaxiola

Dietmar Zaig

Raphael Lo Conte

Detlef Böhler

Alla Heidenreich

Peter Soehne

The invention relates to an RFID tag, which comprises a receiving means, a first and a second verification means, and a transmitting means. The receiving means is designed to receive a challenge message sent by an RFID reading device. Said challenge message comprises a challenge data set, which has a digital certificate issued for the RFID reading device by a certification authority and signed by means of a private key of the certification authority and which has a request message, and a digital signature at least of the request message, which digital signature is generated by means of a private key of the RFID reading device. The first verification means is designed to verify the digital certificate by means of a public key of the certification authority. The second verification means is designed to verify the digital signature by means of a public key of the RFID reading device. The transmitting means transmits a response message to the REID reading device if the certificate and the digital signature are verified. By verifying the challenge message, the RFID tag can ensure that the RFID tag transmits a response message only to such a requesting REID reading device that is actually authorized to communicate with said RFID tag.

RFID tag and method for operating an RFID tag

A tachograph and a toll onboard unit as communication partners, which each have a data interface for a data communication via a vehicle data bus to which the communication partners are coupled. The tachograph and/or the toll onboard unit are implemented as a transmitter of data to ascertain a cryptographic check value as a function of user data, which are to be transmitted to the communication partner, and to transmit the cryptographic check value in addition to the user data to the communication partner. The toll onboard unit or the tachograph, respectively, as a receiver of data, is implemented to receive user data and the cryptographic check value associated with the user data from the communication partner and to check the received user data for corruption as a function of the received cryptographic check value.

Tachograph, toll onboard unit, display instrument, and system

A method for verifying an electronic signature is described including determining a residue class given by the signature; determining an integer having the residue class; determining a field element of a finite field such that the field element corresponds to the integer according to a predetermined mapping of the finite field to the set of integers; determining whether the field element fulfills a predetermined criterion and deciding whether the signature is valid based on whether the field element fulfills the predetermined criterion.

Method for verifying an electronic signature and data processing device

In a data transmission method for a tachograph system, digital messages are transmitted between a speed transmitter (MS) and a recording unit (RU). The digital messages contain a pair of keys including a public key (KMP, KRP) and a private key (KMS, KRS), as well as a certificate (ZM, ZR) derived from the respective pair of keys. The public keys (KMP, KRP) and the certificates (ZM, ZR) are mutually verified between the recording unit (RU) and the speed transmitter (MS). If the verification is positive, the speed transmitter (MS) detects sensor data, and a digital message is generated therefrom. In addition, the speed transmitter (MS) generates authentication data for the message in accordance with the pair of keys (KMP, KMS) thereof. The message and the authentication data are transmitted to the recording unit and are processed there in accordance with a validity of the authentication data verified by the recording unit (RU).

Data transmission method, and tachograph system

An authentication method authenticates between subscribers of a communications system using an asymmetric elliptic curve encryption algorithm. The method involves providing a first and at least one second subscriber having a first or second secret key known only to the respective subscriber and a public key; authenticating an inquiry transmitted by the first subscriber with respect to the validity of the first certificate contained therein and associated with the first subscriber; calculating the response of the second subscriber associated with the inquiry; randomized encryption of the calculated response and a second certificate associated with the second subscriber using the public key; decryption and authentication of the response transmitted by the second subscriber with respect to the validity of the second certificate contained therein.

Authentication method and communications system used for authentication

An encryption part or a decryption part of an encryption/decryption apparatus or a part common to both parts is used both for encryption and decryption of a datum to be stored and the encrypted memory content and for the generation of the address-individual key and the address-dependent key, respectively.

Decryption and encryption during write accesses to a memory

A method and a configuration are described for mutual authentication of two data processing units. The mutual authentication of two data processing units is normally carried out in two separate authentication processes, which are carried out successively. A challenge and response method is normally used. For this purpose, a first challenge is sent from a first data processing unit to a second data processing unit, which transmits a first response back. A second response is produced by the first data processing unit, and is transmitted to the second data processing unit.

Method and configuration for mutual authentication of two data processing units

A method for authentication and identification uses different keys for the prover and the verifier, but on the other hand dispenses with the utilization of long number modulo arithmetic by the use of simple basic components such as, for example, arithmetic operations in finite bodies GF(2). A private key is stored in the prover, so that the latter can receive, in encrypted form, data elements generated as random elements and can itself utilize them again as key for an authentication method of a data set to be transmitted. The verifier receives the authenticator thus formed and checks it. If the data set is generated by the verifier and transmitted to the prover, then this method can serve for the identification of the prover. The method is particularly advantageous in the area of smart cards, since there the required space in the hardware implementation can be considerably reduced.

Method for authentication

In the case of cryptographic processing with the aid of an elliptic curve, parameters of the elliptic curve are stored in a memory of a computer. These parameters are each of substantial length. The elliptic curve is transformed in order to shorten at least one parameter significantly in length and to ensure that the high security level is unchanged in the process. One parameter is preferably shortened to 1, &#x2212;1, 2 or &#x2212;2 with the aid of an algorithm, whereas the other parameters have a length of several 100 bits. The shortening of even one parameter is clearly reflected in the case of devices which have little memory space.

Method and device for cryptographic processing with the aid of an elliptic curve on a computer

A circuit configuration includes at least one nonvolatile, electrically erasable and writable memory area. Each memory area is assigned a nonvolatile, electrically writable and erasable flag memory, which is connected through an address line, a programming line and an authentication line to the assigned memory area, a programming voltage source and a data verification circuit. In the event of an alteration in the content of a memory area, the state of the associated flag memory is changed and, after verification of the programmed memory area content, the flag memory is returned to its basic state.

Growing community of inventors

Ottobrunn, Germany

Erwin Hess