Intel Corporation

Ernie F Brickell

Jiangtao Li

James A Sutton, Ii

Clifford D Hall

Matthew D Wood

David W Grawrock

Joseph Frank Cihula

Mohan J Kumar

Jesse R Walker

Francis X Mckeen

Howard C Herbert

Sham M Datta

Alberto J Martinez

David M Durham

Gilbert A Neiger

Uday R Savagaonkar

Carlos V Rozas

Prashant Dewan

Vincent R Scarlata

John I Garney

Simon P Johnson

Gary L Graunke

Dion Rodgers

Michael A Goldsmith

Stephen R Van Doren

Stalinselvaraj Jeyasingh

Stephen J Tolopka

Asher M Altman

Bernard Lint

Don Alan Van Dyke

Wesley Deklotz

Jiang Tao Li

Ned M Smith

Ram K Krishnamurthy

Sanu K Mathew

Hong Wang

Baiju V Patel

Richard A Uhlig

Quinn Able Jacobson

Ioannis T Schoinas

Nitin V Sarangdhar

Willard M Wiseman

Daniel Nemiroff

Mark J Buxton

Anand Rajan

Marion H Shimoda

Roel Maes

Adeel A Aslam

Rachid El Bansarkhani

Jeff U Glover

Michael R Premi

Shay Gueron

Martin Guy Dixon

Stephen Anthony Fischer

James B Crossland

William A Stevens, Jr

Geoffrey Cooper

Purushottam Goel

David Johnston

Paritosh Saxena

George W Cox

Leena K Puthiyedath

Rachael Jade Parker

James S Coke

Charles E Dike

Thomas J Barnes

Edward V Gamsaragan

Keen W Chan

Donald J Eckardt

Jonathan Trostle

Gunendran Thuraisingham

Greg W Piper

Raju Yasala

Disclosed in some examples are methods, systems, and machine readable mediums that provide for the configuration and provisioning of computing devices. In particular, computing devices with limited user interfaces, such as some IoT devices. The functionality of the IoT devices is thus improved to allow for more efficient, more secure, and faster configuration.

Efficient provisioning of devices

Embodiments are directed to provisioning a general-use basis for authentication of a processor device. During manufacture, a hardware processor stores a secret value and shares a derived value produced based on the secret value with a secure service. These values may be used in a limited-use initial authentication process to authenticate the hardware processor. A general-use basis for authentication not so limited as the initial authentication process is established subsequent to the manufacture of the hardware processor. The general-use basis for authentication may include a public-private key pair, and is established upon successful completion of the initial authentication process. Authentication using the general-use process produces an authentication traceable to the manufacture of the hardware processor.

Provisioning authentication keys in computer processor

A technique to enable secure application and data integrity within a computer system. In one embodiment, one or more secure enclaves are established in which an application and data may be stored and executed.

Method and apparatus to provide secure application execution

A computing device is provisioned to be remotely managed by a current owner. The device has an initial cryptographic basis of trust, and an owner identifier that facilitates establishment of communication with the current owner of the device. The ownership may change one or more times while the device may remain inoperative. Later, the device receives a transfer-of-ownership indication, which it verifies against the initial basis of trust to establish a new current owner. The device may then communicate with a device management service of the new current owner based on the transfer-of-ownership indication.

Device provisioning service

Embodiments are directed to a computing device having execution hardware including at least one processor core, and non-volatile memory that stores verification module and a private symmetric key unique to the computing device. The verification module, when executed on the execution hardware, causes the execution hardware to perform pre-execution local authenticity verification of externally-supplied code in response to a command to launch that code. The local authenticity verification includes computation of a cryptographic message authentication code (MAC) of the externally-supplied code based on the private symmetric key, and verification of the MAC against a stored local authenticity verification value previously written to the non-volatile memory. In response to a positive verification of the of the MAC, execution of the externally-supplied code is permitted.

Local verification of code authentication

A method, apparatus, and computer-readable medium are provided to determine whether to enroll a computing device as a provider of a secure application enclave for an application. The following information is obtained from a second computing device: a device identifier for a first computing device, application information, and data for a shared secret. The first computing device is configured to provide a secure application enclave to support execution of the application associated with the application information, and the shared secret is shared between the secure application enclave and a user of the first computing device. A determination is made whether to enroll the first computing device as a provider of the secure application enclave for the application using the device identifier, the application information, and the data for the shared secret. The secure application enclave may be notified whether the enrollment of the first computing device is successful.

Using a second device to enroll a secure application enclave

A method, apparatus, and computer-readable medium providing instructions to cause a computing device to establish a portion of a memory of the computing device as a trusted execution environment and execute a trusted third party application within the trusted execution environment. The trusted third party application is to receive a signed public key and an identifier for a verifier from a user client attestation application executing on a client platform. The signed public key is signed with an identifiable platform attestation private key for the client platform. The trusted third party application is further to verify the signed public key, determine a policy of the verifier, encode the policy into a trusted third party anonymous certificate for the signed public key, issue the trusted third party anonymous certificate without including identification information of the client platform, and send the trusted third party anonymous certificate to the user client attestation application.

Using a trusted execution environment as a trusted third party providing privacy for attestation

Some implementations disclosed herein provide techniques and arrangements for provisioning keys to integrated circuits/processor. In one embodiments, a key provisioner/tester apparatus may include a memory device to receive a unique hardware key generated by a first logic of a processor. The key provisioner/tester apparatus may further include a cipher device to permanently store an encrypted first key in nonvolatile memory of the processor, detect whether the stored encrypted first key is valid, and to isolate at least one of the first logic and the nonvolatile memory of the processor from all sources that are exterior to the processor in response to detecting that the stored encrypted first key is valid.

Secure key storage

Systems and methods for using an arbitrary base value for EPID calculations are provided herein. A system to use arbitrary base values in enhanced privacy ID (EPID) calculation, where the system includes a microcontroller; and a memory coupled to the microcontroller; wherein the microcontroller is to: obtain an arbitrary value at a member device, the member device being a member of a group of member devices, each member device in the group of member devices having a unique private EPID key assigned from a pool of private keys, where any of the pool of private keys is able to sign content that is verifiable by a single group public key, and the arbitrary value being one of a time-based value or a usage-based value; construct an EPID base using the arbitrary value; and transmit content signed with the private key using the EPID base to a verifier.

Arbitrary base value for EPID calculation

This application is directed to trusted platform module certification and attestation utilizing an anonymous key system. In general, TPM certification and TPM attestation may be supported in a device utilizing integrated TPM through the use of anonymous key system (AKS) certification. An example device may comprise at least combined AKS and TPM resources that load AKS and TPM firmware (FW) into a runtime environment that may further include at least an operating system (OS) encryption module, an AKS service module and a TPM Certification and Attestation (CA) module. For TPM certification, the CA module may interact with the other modules in the runtime environment to generate a TPM certificate, signed by an AKS certificate, that may be transmitted to a certification platform for validation. For TPM attestation, the CA module may cause TPM credentials to be provided to the attestation platform for validation along with the TPM and/or AKS certificates.

Trusted platform module certification and attestation utilizing an anonymous key system

Growing community of inventors

Portland, OR, United States of America

Ernie F Brickell