Oracle International Corporation

Trusted Logic

France Telecom

Gemplus

Oracle Deutschland B.v. & Co. Kg

Eric M Vetillard

Nicolas Ponsini

Sebastian J Hans

Jean-Jacques Vandewalle

Alexandre Frey

Laurent Frerebeau

Jean-Bernard Blanchet

Renaud Marlet

Nicolas Regnault

Cuihtlauac Alvarado

Matthieu Maupetit

Geoffroy Montel

Secure key derivation within a virtualized execution environment may involve a key derivation module executing within a platform layer of the execution environment. An application executing within an application layer of the execution environment may access the key derivation module in order to generate a cryptographic key according to a key derivation function. Instead of being returned to the application, the derived key may be stored within a secure storage area of the execution environment without being stored, even temporarily in the application layer, or other non-secure areas, of the execution environment. The application may receive a reference to the derived key usable by other cryptographic processes. The application may pass the key reference to a method of a cryptographic module and the cryptographic module may use the key reference to access the derived key from the secure storage for use in performing any of various cryptographic processes.

Secure key derivation functions

A method may include receiving, by a hardware token from a client device, a chain of certificates including a server certificate and a first root certificate authority (CA) certificate. The method may further include determining, by the hardware token, to offload validation of one or more certificates in the chain of certificates to the client device, and verifying, by a cryptography application running in a memory of the hardware token, using a trusted root CA certificate stored in the hardware token, each certificate in the chain of certificates. The method may further include authenticating, by the hardware token and based on the verification, a public key of a server certificate, encrypting, by the cryptography application, a secret message using the authenticated public key of the server certificate to obtain an encrypted secret message, and sending, by the hardware token, the encrypted secret message to the client device.

Enforcing server authentication based on a hardware token

A method for enforcing secure processes between a user and a device involves determining that the user has initiated installation of a secure application, installing the RA part of the secure application, triggering a trusted UI session upon realization that the TA part of the secure application is not installed, receiving, via the trusted UI session, user credentials for authenticating the user and enforcing user-specific and device-specific security, cryptographically signing combined user credentials with a cryptographic signature to obtain an authentication object, passing the authentication object to a service provider associated with the secure application for extraction of the user credentials, and generating an authorization token permitting the installation of the TA part of the secure application upon verification of the cryptographically signed authentication object.

Securely operating a process using user-specific and device-specific security constraints

The invention relates to a secure portable object of the smart card type comprising (a) an object body and (b) a micro-module comprising a processor and at least one memory in which a first application executed by a first execution engine in a first execution space is stored. The invention is characterized in that a second application is further stored in the said at least one memory, where the said second application is executed by a second execution engine distinct from the first execution engine, in a second execution space distinct from the first execution space. The invention particularly applies to smart cards.

Secure portable object

A distributed trusted execution environment is provided for a device, where the distributed trusted execution environment is split into two components: a trusted execution environment that is executed on a tamper-resistant secure element, and a trusted execution environment proxy that is executed on the device. The trusted execution environment proxy acts a proxy between the trusted execution environment that is executed on the secure element, and one or more hardware components or software components of the device.

System with a trusted execution environment component executed on a secure element

The invention relates to a user interface-equipped computing device comprising means for implementing a series of applications, said means including two execution spaces. According to the invention, the applications of the second execution space (, P, P) have a level of security specifically higher than that of the applications of the first execution space (, P, P), said two execution spaces being hosted by a physical processing means which is designed such that it cannot be separated into two parts without destroying the physical processing means.

Telecommunication terminal comprising two execution spaces

The inventive method for determining operational characteristics of a program includes a verification procedure involving the following stages: the first stage for expressing the operational characteristics of the program in the form of functions related to events producible during possible executions of the program, a second stage for simultaneously estimating, by program analysis, the program structure, the possible ways of execution and values used at different program points and the third stage for determining said characteristics by calculating associated functions by means of information extracted with the aid of the analysis.

Method for determining operational characteristics of a program

The customization or initialization of the application, for example in a programmable smart card, uses minimum integrated code. A device for preparing customizing or initializing data to be transmitted to the card creates a concatenation of information elements in respective adjacent data blocks in accordance with a convention recognized by a communication device, without explicit field specification. On reception of a data sequence, the card code identifies the information elements according to their size and their position in the flow.

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Valbonne, France

Eric M Vetillard