Palo Alto Networks, Inc.

Eran Yanay

Liron Levin

Dima Stopel

Ariel M Zelivansky

Daniel Prizmant

Gilad Astrin

Zero trust network security is provided without modifying the underlying network infrastructure. A first entity at a first node in a network environment obtains an entity identifier and host certificate from a second entity installed on a second node. A determination is made as to whether the host certificate is valid based on a firewall policy and an intermediate certificate that was issued to the first entity. A determination is also made as to whether the entity identifier is valid based on a known infrastructure of the network environment. If the host certificate and entity identifier are valid, communications between the first and second entities can be allowed, while communications are blocked if at least one of the host certificate and the entity identifier is not valid.

Providing zero trust network security without modification of network infrastructure

A service prevents attacks carried out through container escape for silo-based containers. A callback is registered for a function(s) that may be invoked from inside a container and returns an object handle(s). The callback, when triggered by invocation of the function(s), executes for determination of whether requests for access to objects via their handles are issued by suspicious processes. Access to CExecSvc.exe is restricted for processes that request a handle for CExecSvc.exe and are determined to be associated with a container themselves. Processes that escape their container through a technique that evades detection are also blocked from accessing the host system. When a process requests access to an object via invocation of a function that returns a handle, the callback executes for determination of whether the process but not the requested object is associated with a container, in which case the service restricts the process' access to the host system.

Prevention of container escape-based attacks of a host system

Methods and systems for identity-based firewall policy evaluation and for encoding entity identifiers for use in identity-based firewall policy evaluation. A packet from a sender entity to a recipient entity is intercepted. A determination is made whether the sender entity is permitted to communicate with the recipient entity according to a firewall policy, wherein the firewall policy indicates a plurality of entity identifiers, and each entity identifier is unique among the plurality of entity identifiers. Rules for communications among the plurality of entities include a list of pairs of entities which are permitted to communicate with each other. The packet is forwarded to the recipient entity when it is determined that the sender entity is permitted to communicate with the recipient entity. At least one mitigation action is performed when it is determined that the recipient entity is not permitted to communicate with the sender entity.

Distributed identity-based firewall policy evaluation

A system and method for scanning of virtual machine images. The method includes creating a virtual machine instance of a virtual machine based on a virtual machine image of the virtual machine and an application programming interface (API) of an environment in which the virtual machine is to be deployed, wherein the virtual machine image has an entry point such that the virtual machine instance executes the entry point; and replacing the entry point of the virtual machine instance with a lightweight script, wherein the lightweight script is configured to retrieve a static scanner executable, to execute the static scanner executable, and to send results of the scanning.

Growing community of inventors

Modiin, Israel

Eran Yanay