Intel Corporation

Cisco Technology, Inc.

Elad Peer

Reuven Elbaum

Uri Bear

Chaim Shen-Orr

Yonatan Shlomovich

Gyora M Benedek

Rami Sudai

Elena Sidorov

Yaacov Belenky

Jacob Doweck

Baruch Chaikin

Steve J Brown

David Novick

Dimitry Kloper

The disclosure generally provides methods, systems and apparatus to construct a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) value for an electronic package based on the package's internal components and their interconnects. In one embodiment, the package is a System-On-Chip (SOC) having a plurality of dielets and a plurality of interconnect connecting the dielets. Each of the dielets and each of the interconnects (at one or more locations) may define an entropy source. each entropy source may have an entropy value. Each entropy source communicates an initial entropy value to a PUF aggregator. The PUF aggregator receives and/or aggregates the various entropies from the various entropy sources to construct the native SOC PUF value. The native SOC PUF value defines the authentic PUF value of the SOC at SOC release. Any deviation from the native SOC PUF value may be deemed a security breach of the SOC.

Method, system and apparatus for protection of multi-die structures

In one embodiment, memory cell includes a control gate, a floating gate, a substrate comprising a source region and a drain region, a first isolator between the control gate and floating gate, and a second isolator between the floating gate and the substrate. The memory cell is configured to have a retention time that is within a statistical window around a selected lifespan. The selected lifespan may be less than ten years, such as, for example, less than one year, less than one month, or less than one week.

Memory structure for self-erasing secret storage

The present disclosure is directed to systems and methods to protect against SCA and fault injection attacks through the use of a temporary or ephemeral key to cryptographically alter input data portions. Universal resistant block (URB) circuitry receives a seed data value and a at least one secret key data value and generates an ephemeral key output data value. Cryptographic circuitry uses the ephemeral key data value to transform an input data portion to produce an transformed output data portion. The use of an SCA or fault injection attack on the transformed output data portion will reveal only the ephemeral key data value and not the at least one secret key data value. Further, where a unique ephemeral key data value is used to transform each input data portion, an attacker cannot discover the ephemeral key in a piecemeal manner and must instead discover the complete ephemeral key data value&#x2014;significantly increasing the difficulty of performing a successful SCA or fault injection attack.

Circuits supporting improved side channel and fault injection attack resistance

Various systems and methods for detecting and preventing side-channel attacks, including attacks aimed at discovering the location of KASLR-randomized privileged code sections in virtual memory address space, are described. In an example, a computing system includes electronic operations for detecting unauthorized attempts to access kernel virtual memory pages via trap entry detection, with operations including: generating a trap page with a physical memory address; assigning a phantom page at an open location in the privileged portion of the virtual memory address space; generating a plurality of phantom page table entries corresponding to an otherwise-unmapped privileged virtual memory region; placing the trap page in physical memory and placing the phantom page table entry in a page table map; and detecting an access to the trap page via the phantom page table entry, to trigger a response to a potential attack.

Mitigating attacks on kernel address space layout randomization

In one embodiment, a semiconductor device comprises one or more defense layers, the one or more defense layers each characterized by at least two lattice constants that are mismatched, wherein a mismatch in the lattice constants causes a destabilizing force that comprises at least one of a tensile force or a compressive force; and a plurality of other layers, wherein at least a sufficient part of the destabilizing force is restrained for the one or more defense layers to remain intact unless reduction in thickness of at least a section of one or more of the plurality of other layers, causes at least some of the destabilizing force that was restrained to no longer be restrained, and consequently at least part of at least one of the one or more defense layers to break.

Defense layer against semiconductor device thinning

In one embodiment, a semiconductor device comprises: a bulk comprising a bulk material characterized by a potential designated as a ground, and a bulk thinning detector being a section of the bulk that includes one or more conducting materials. The bulk thinning detector is adapted to be connected to the ground when a part of the bulk material is underneath and contiguous with a portion of the one or more conducting materials in the section. The semiconductor device further comprises: one more electronic components in at least one active layer of the semiconductor device, the one or more electronic components and the bulk thinning detector being included in a circuit for detecting whether there is backside thinning of the semiconductor device by detecting whether at least one of: the bulk thinning detector is disconnected from the ground, or there is a change in resistance of the bulk thinning detector.

Growing community of inventors

Yokneam Ilit, Israel

Elad Peer