Honeywell International Inc.

Edwin David Cruzado

William John Dalzell, Jr

Brian R Bernier

Keith A Souders

Kenneth Henry Heffner

A system may include an integrated circuit and a coating at least partially encapsulating the integrated circuit. The coating may include an electrically insulating material at least partially encapsulating an analog circuit. The integrated circuit may be electrically connected to the analog circuit. Additionally, the integrated circuit may be configured to generate an analog electrical signal, transmit the analog electrical signal through the analog circuit to generate a modified analog electrical signal, receive the modified analog electrical signal, and in response to determining that the modified analog electrical signal is sufficiently similar to an expected analog electrical signal, use the modified analog electrical signal as an input to an algorithm performed by the integrated circuit.

Tamper-resistant coating for an integrated circuit

A package includes a chassis, a plurality of components arranged within the chassis, a plurality of RFID devices, and at least one processing device. The RFID devices are arranged at a plurality of locations to form an array configured to authenticate compliance of the actual configuration of the package with a model configuration. The processing device is configured to communicate with the RFID devices, determine if the actual configuration of the package is in compliance with the model configuration based on communications with the RFID devices, and set an operational mode of one or more of the components of the package in response to determining if the actual configuration of the package is in compliance with the model configuration.

Protecting packages from tampering

In one embodiment, a system comprises application-specific functionality, anti-tamper functionality to detect an unauthorized attempt to interact with the application-specific functionality; and a hardware key interface to communicatively couple the system to a hardware key. An attempt to interact with the application-specific functionality is considered unauthorized if an authorized hardware key is not communicatively coupled to the hardware key interface when the attempt occurs.

Hardware encryption key for use in anti-tamper system

In one embodiment, a system comprises JTAG functionality that implements at least a portion of a JTAG protocol. The JTAG functionality supports a test data in (TDI) line, a test data out (TDO) line, a test rest (TR) line, a test mode state (TMS) line, and a test clock (TCLK) line. The system further comprises a debug interface to communicatively couple the system to a debug device external to the system. The debug interface comprises a transmit (TX) line, receive (RX) line, and a clock (CLK) line. The system transmits data output by the JTAG functionality on the TDI input on the RX line of the debug interface and receives data from the debug device on the TX line of the debug interface and provides the received data to the JTAG functionality on the TDO line, TR line and the TMS line.

Encrypted JTAG interface

In one embodiment, a system comprises application-specific functionality, debug functionality, and a debug interface communicatively coupled to the debug functionality to communicatively couple the system to a debug device. The debug functionality encrypts data transmitted by the system over the debug interface.

Encrypted debug interface

In one embodiment, a system comprises an enclosure, at least one item enclosed within the enclosure, and at least one optical medium disposed between the enclosure and the at least one item. The at least one optical medium is arranged in a pattern such that the at least one optical medium substantially encloses the at least one item. The system further comprises a generator communicatively coupled to a first portion of the optical medium. The generator generates a pseudo-random sequence of bits. The pseudo-random sequence of bits is optically transmitted over the optical medium. The system further comprises a detector communicatively coupled to a second portion of the optical medium. The detector detects any portion of the pseudo-random sequence of bits received at the second portion of the optical medium.

Intrusion detection using pseudo-random binary sequences

In one embodiment, a system comprises debug functionality, a debug interface communicatively coupled to the debug functionality, and a hardware key interface. Communication with the debug functionality over the debug interface is not permitted if an authorized hardware key is not communicatively coupled to the hardware key interface.

Hardware key control of debug interface

An improved system and method for protecting sensitive electronic equipment or components against unauthorized access, by detecting and also reacting to unauthorized intrusions into the enclosures for the sensitive electronic equipment or components is disclosed. For example, a protective system for protecting sensitive electronic equipment or components against unauthorized access is disclosed that includes a fiber optic cable mesh or network attached to, or embedded in, the walls of the enclosure for the electronic equipment or components. A continuous signal or burst is applied to the fiber optic cable, which is coupled to an optical signal detection device. Thus, any attempt to remove or penetrate the walls of the enclosure interrupts the signal in the fiber optic cable, and the interruption of the signal is detected by the optical signal detection device. In response to the detection of the interruption of the signal in the fiber optic cable, a process can be initiated to erase, destroy or alter sensitive data contained within the electronic equipment or components. Also, a power source for the protective system is disclosed, which can be self-sustaining and contained within the protected enclosure for the sensitive electronic equipment or components.

Growing community of inventors

Plant City, FL, United States of America

Edwin David Cruzado