Combined Conditional Access Development and Support, LLC

Arris Enterprises LLC

General Instrument Corporation

Douglas M Petty

Lawrence W Tang

Alexander Medvinsky

Michael T Habrat

Eric J Sprunk

John I Okimoto

Kenneth P Miller

Bridget Diane Kimball

Tat Keung Chan

Xin Qiu

Jason A Pasion

Jinsong Zheng

Madhu Penugonda

Eric Eugene Berry

Michael Ryan Pilquist

Christopher John Bennett

Annie On-yee Chen

Annie O Chen

Tat Keung Chen

A system is provided for distribution of device key sets over a network in a protected software environment (PSE). In the system, a client device includes a connection interface for receiving a crypto hardware (CH) token belonging to a user, untrusted software, a quoting enclave, and a PSE for generating a provisioning request for a device key set. An attestation proxy server (APS) receives the provisioning message using a first network connection, and transmits the provisioning message to an online provisioning server (OPS) using a second network connection. The OPS constructs a provisioning response and an encrypted device key set, and delivers the provisioning response to the untrusted software using the first and second network connections. The PSE decrypts the encrypted device key set to obtain the device key set, re-encrypts the device key set with a local chip-specific key, and stores the re-encrypted device key set.

Secure distribution of device key sets over a network

An external trusted time source is implemented over a network for conditional access system (CAS)/digital rights management (DRM) client devices. A client device includes untrusted software and a trusted execution environment (TEE) for processing an entitlement management message (EMM) that includes an epoch sequence number (ESN) transmitted from an EMM server using a first network connection. A remaining client key set (CKS) lifetime value is stored and updated in the TEE based on the ESN processed.

Entitlement management message epoch as an external trusted time source

An encryption key may be generated based on personalized unit data associated with a software download recipient, for example, a secure processor. In some aspects, the secure processor may generate a decryption key based on its personalized unit data, and a software download may be performed between the software provider and the secure processor using the generated encryption keys. The secure processor may then decrypt and load the software for execution. The encryption and decryption key generation may also be based on a sequence number or other data indicating one or more previous software downloads at the secure processor. Using the sequence number or other data, sequences of multiple encryption and/or decryption keys may be generated to support multiple software downloads to a secure processor.

Downloading of data to secure devices

Methods for system component pairing and authentication are described. A first system component may pair with a second system component in response to receiving a unique identifier from the second system component. The first system component may store the received unique identifier and, thereafter, may authenticate that it is, in fact, communicating with the second system component. The first component may communicate a challenge message directed to the second system component and if the contents of the reply message and the time taken to receive the reply message do not correspond to expected values, the first component may determine that it may not be communicating with the intended second component and may cease communications with the second component.

Device pairing and authentication

Methods, systems, computer-readable media, and apparatuses for providing control word and associated entitlement control message (ECM) functionalities are presented. In some embodiments, a computing device may cache concurrently a first set of control words and a first set of entitlement control messages (ECMs) associated with the first set of control words. The computing device may encrypt a transport stream with a particular control word of the first set of control words. The computing device may insert a particular ECM, of the first set of ECMs, corresponding to the particular control word into the transport stream sent to a device downstream from the computing device. In some embodiments, a computing device may reuse control words and associated ECMs.

Control word and associated entitlement control message caching and reuse

Systems and methods for authenticating data and timeliness are disclosed. A method for authentication can comprise processing a data block to determine a first secret element, generating a second secret element based upon the first secret element, generating a non-secret element based upon the second secret element, and comparing the non-secret element to a nonce associated with the first secret element to determine authentication.

System and method for authenticating data

The present invention discloses an apparatus and method for defining and enforcing rules of transition between two security domains, e.g., a transport domain and a persistent security domain. In turn, a border guard, e.g., a security device, is provided between these two domains that enforce rules for transition between the two security domains. This novel approach of defining a transport domain and a persistent security domain simplifies the classification of the digital content and its movement through the system. Namely, the border guard once established between the two systems can enforce DRM rules associated with how contents are moved between the two domains.

Method and apparatus for providing a border guard between security domains

The present invention discloses a system and method for providing a secured system time reference to a subscriber device, e.g., a set top box or a receiver. In one embodiment, the system time reference is provided in a secure system time message that is broadcasted to a plurality of subscriber devices. Each subscriber device has a security device or software application that is capable of determining whether the received system time reference is legitimate. If the system time reference is determined to be legitimate, a local time reference is synchronized with said received system time reference.

Method and apparatus for providing a secure system time

A system is described for uniquely mating components of a communication network such as a smartcard and a set-top box. When mated, the smartcard and set-top box are tied together and have a single identity. Further, the smartcard operates properly only when inserted into an authorized set-top box. Exchanges of information between both components are secured by encryption and authentication to guard against piracy of the exchanged information. The system provides the same authentication key to the set-top box and the smartcard. This key is used for authenticating communication between the set-top box and the smartcard. First, the authentication key is encrypted by a set-top box mating key. The set-top box employs this mating key to decrypt the authentication key. After it is derived, the authentication key is stored in the set-top box's memory. Further, the same authentication key is encrypted by a smartcard mating key. Thereafter, the smartcard employs the smartcard mating key to extract the authentication key. The clear authentication key is stored in the smartcard's memory as well. In this manner, the authentication key is used for securing all communication between the set-top box and the smart-card. For example, the set-top box may request control words from the smartcard. Only after authenticating the request, are the control words for decrypting digital content provided to the set-top box. If the smartcard authentication key is different from the set-top box key, the request for control words is denied.

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San Diego, CA, United States of America

Douglas M Petty