Brycen Co., Ltd.

Other

Novell, Inc.

Senforce Technologies, Inc.

Douglas LaVell Hale

Michael D Wright

Merrill Brooks Smith

Roger R Schell

Jonathan Brett Wood

James P Anderson

David O Cox

Willard Monten Wiseman

Kyle Bryan Seegmiller

Peter Boucher

Anthony Alan Jeffree

The method for roaming in a network environment utilizes a token created by a first bridge device. The token comprises an identity of a context associated with the mobile device. The first bridge device creates the token and securely provides it to the mobile device. When the mobile device roams to a second bridge device in the network, the token is securely provided to the second bridge device. The second bridge device uses the token to establish to the first bridge device that it is a genuine agent of the mobile device. Once the first bridge authenticates the second bridge device's authority, it securely sends the context associated with the mobile device to the second bridge device. The second bridge device uses the context to properly connect the mobile device to the network. In this manner, secure roaming within a bridged network is provided.

Wireless bridge for roaming in network environment

The present invention provides an improved method and system for controlling packet flow through a protocol stack. The system comprises the layer manager which interfaces with each stack layer. The layer manager handles the packet flow to the stack layers. For a new packet path to be supported, only the Layer Manager needs to be modified, not the stack layers. This makes the implementation of the layers in the protocol stack easier. In an alternative embodiment, the layer manager comprises a plurality of protocol descriptor lists for supported services and uses these lists to route a packet to the appropriate stack layer. With this alternative embodiment, new stack layers may be inserted into the protocol stack without the need to modify the existing stack layers.

Layer manager

The present invention provides a method and system for controlling packet flow through a protocol stack. The method includes: receiving a packet by a layer manager, wherein the layer manager may interface with each layer of the protocol stack; determining a service associated with the packet by the layer manager; accessing a list of layers of the protocol stack for the service by the layer manager; and routing the packet to a layer of the protocol stack according to the list. The layer manager comprises a plurality of protocol descriptor lists for supported services and uses these lists to route a packet to the appropriate stack layer. In this manner, the stack layers need not have knowledge of the other layers or of the proper routing of the packet. This makes the implementation of the layers in the protocol stack easier.

Controlling packet flow through a stack using service records

A trusted workstation includes a network interface card (NIC) with trusted computing base (TCB) extensions that provide for securely booting the workstation and performing subsequent receive and transmit packet filtering in support of a network's system architecture requirements. The NIC includes a send address confirm circuit which includes a trusted source address (e.g., a MAC address) uniquely associated with the trusted workstation. For each packet to be transmitted from the trusted workstation over the network, the NIC first checks the source address inserted in the packet by the NIC driver running in the user session to be sure that the driver inserted source address is to equal to the trusted address resident. Thus, if untrusted software on the workstation attempts mischiefly transmit a forged packet with a source address other than the trusted source address, the NIC prohibits transmission of the packet with the forged source address. This prevents the trusted workstation from forging its packets with another client's source address. The NIC also includes a receive address confirmation circuit which ensures that the trusted workstation only receives packets from authorized servers.

Trusted workstation in a networked client/server computing system

A trusted workstation includes a network interface card (NIC) with trusted computing base (TCB) extensions that provide for securely booting the workstation and performing subsequent receive and transmit packet filtering in support of a network's system architecture requirements. The NIC includes a send address confirm circuit which includes a trusted source address (e.g., a MAC address) uniquely associated with the trusted workstation. For each packet to be transmitted from the trusted workstation over the network, the NIC first checks the source address inserted in the packet by the NIC driver running the user session to be sure that the driver inserted source address is equal to the trusted address resident. Thus, if untrusted software on the workstation attempts mischiefly transmit a forged packet with a source address other than the trusted source address, the NIC prohibits transmission of the packet with the forged source address. This prevents the trusted workstation from forging its packets with another client's source address. The NIC also includes a receive address confirmation circuit which ensures that the trusted workstation only receives packets from authorized servers.

Growing community of inventors

Orem, UT, United States of America

Douglas LaVell Hale