Motorola Corporation

General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc.

Freescale Semiconductor,inc.

General Dynamics Decision Systems, Inc.

Other

Douglas Allan Hardy

Barry N Altschuler

Steven R Tugenberg

Thomas E Tkacik

Paul Thomas Kitaj

James A Stephens

Joseph Kish, Iii

Leslie K Lewis

Lawrence Loren Case

Michael D Fitzsimmons

Mark D Redman

Darrell L Carder

Francis Gregory Sydnor, Jr

Craig Robert Fossey

Craig R Balogh

Frank Edward Seeker

John E Spittal, Jr

Sherman W Paskett

Jonathan Lutz

Gregory Schmidt

Peter J Armbruster

Steve Robert Tugenberg

Steve Robert Tuggenberg

Steven Tugeberg

Douglas Matthew East

William K Oh

Mary Eleanor Trengove

Edward C Meinelt

George M Barney

Michelle L Tugenberg

A programmable electronic device () stores a number of cipher-text software modules () to which access is granted after evaluating a user's token (), a software-restriction class () for a requested software module (), and/or a currently active access-control model (). Access-control models () span a range from uncontrolled to highly restrictive. Models () become automatically activated and deactivated as users are added to and deleted from the device (). A virtual internal user proxy that does not require users to provide tokens () is used to enable access to modules () classified in a global software-restriction class () or when an uncontrolled-access-control model () is active. Both licensed modules () and unlicensed modules () may be loaded in the device (). However, no keys are provided to enable decryption of unlicensed modules ().

Access-control method for software module and programmable electronic device therefor

A method for managing operability of an on-chip debug capability () in a product () configured to execute software () includes storing () a debug public key () and an operational public key () in product memory (). The software () with either a debug signature () or an operational signature () is saved () in the memory (). When enablement indication is received, the debug signature () is validated () using the debug public key (). The debug capability () is enabled upon validation of the signature () and the software () is allowed to execute. When disablement indication is received, the operational signature () is verified () using the operational public key (). The on-chip debug capability () is disabled upon verification of the signature () and the software () is allowed to execute.

Method for managing operability of on-chip debug capability

A communication network () includes a central node () loaded with a trusted key () and key material () corresponding to an asymmetric key agreement protocol (). The network () further includes vulnerable nodes () loaded with key material () corresponding to the protocol (). Successive secure connections () are established between the central node () and the vulnerable nodes () using the key material () to generate a distinct session key () for each of the secure connections (). The trusted key () and one of the session keys () are utilized to produce a mission key (). The mission key () is transferred from the central node () to each of the vulnerable nodes () via each of the secure connections () using the corresponding current session key (). The mission key () functions for secure communication within the communication network ().

Cryptographic key management in a communication network

A processor, scan controller, and method for protecting sensitive information from electronic hacking is disclosed. To maintain the security of the sensitive data present in a processor, the scan controller denies access to the scan chain until data is cleared from scan-observable portions of the processor, then clears the scan chain again prior to exiting test mode and resuming normal operation. Clearing or otherwise modifying data stored in the scan-observable portions of a processor when transitioning to and/or from a test mode will prevent unauthorized personnel from simply shifting secure data out of the scan chain, and from pre-loading data into the scan chain prior to normal operation in an attempt to set sensitive state information.

Method and apparatus for secure scan testing

Access-control method for software modules and programmable electronic device therefor

A secure memory and processing system is disclosed for use in various types of communication devices. The secure processing system provides for the encryption and storage of sensitive data in a storage medium external to the secure processing system. The encrypted data is decrypted with encryption logic circuitry within the secure memory and transferred to a zeroizable memory for use by a host processor. The secure memory uses a laser-scribed encryption key coupled to encryption logic circuitry within the secure memory for encrypting and decrypting the sensitive information.

Secure memory and processing system having laser-scribed encryption key

A method for purchasing items over a non-secure communication channel uses a secure communication device. The secure communication device includes a host processor, a secure memory that includes a laser-scribed encryption key, and a non-secure memory for storing encrypted data. A user's sensitive data is encrypted within the secure memory using the laser-scribed encryption key and stored as encrypted data in the non-secure memory. An encrypted credit card number and an encrypted secret key is retrieved from the non-secure memory, the encrypted credit card and secret key are decrypted with the laser-scribed encryption key, the credit card number is encrypted with a session key, and the encrypted credit card number is transferred over the network to a destination such as an internet vendor.

Method for purchasing items over a non-secure communication channel

Key escrow is achieved without a key escrow facility. An escrow key pair is generated and stored in the terminal. A key escrow field that includes a traffic key encrypted with the escrow key is provided before encrypted traffic is communicated. When access to the traffic key is authorized, the escrow key is extracted from the terminal and used to decrypt the traffic key. The private portion of the escrow key is covered in the terminal with an escrow key access number. The escrow key access number is preferably generated by the terminal manufacturer with a secret algorithm using the terminal serial number. Alternatively, the escrow key is stored within a user token, rather than the terminal.

Traffic key access method and terminal for secure communication without key escrow facility

An interface between a digital communication system and a PSTN establishes a user configurable secure encrypted link to a digital subscriber unit through the digital communication system, and provides clear (unencrypted) voice to telephone sets through the PSTN. The interface includes a security module for encrypting and decrypting information with user specific algorithms and keys, a transcoder for converting modulated voice to digital voice and a modem for modulating and demodulating data and encrypted voice. Accordingly, the wireline interface allows for user specified security over a digital wireless portion of an end-to-end communication channel. The interface also provides for the communication of unencrypted voice followed by secure voice or secure data.

Radio wireline interface and method for secure communication

A processor (,) of an encryption system (,) receives plain text (,) and operates an encryption algorithm to convert the plain text (,) to cipher text (,). A state monitor (,) confirms a conversion sequence within each of a plurality of conversion cycles performed by the encryption algorithm. The state monitor (,) produces a first enablement signal (,) when the conversion sequence is confirmed. An encryption activity monitor (,) determines a number of blocks of cipher text (,) that are not encrypted. The encryption activity monitor (,) produces a second enablement signal (,) when the number of unencrypted blocks of cipher text (,) is less than a predetermined failure threshold (,). A monitor gate (,) enables output of the cipher text (,) in response to the first and second enablement signals (,).

High assurance encryption system and method

A secure terminal includes a host (105) and slaves (125) which send and receive messages via a peripheral component interconnect (PCI) bus (130). The host allows slaves to receive messages from the host and send messages to the host. The host prevents slave-to-slave communication of messages. The host and each slave include interface logic (120) coupled to the PCI bus and a memory (200) for coupling a processor (110) to the interface logic (120). Each dual-port RAM (200) includes a first memory portion for receiving messages from a sender and a second memory portion for storing messages to be transmitted to a receiver.

Secure terminal and method of communicating messages among processing

Controllable functions (210, 220, 230) and controllable connection managers (212, 222, 216, 226) are used to provide a fail-safe security system implemented on a single processor (200). Red subsystems, black subsystems and clear bypass subsystems ensure separation between red data and black data. Connection managers (212, 222, 216, 226) are used to isolate and control red data ports (214), black data ports (224), red crypto ports (218), and black crypto ports (228). Subsystems are configured to control data flow, provide data separation, access control and prevent single failures from compromising security system (200). Each subsystem is managed separately, and each subsystem has unique access protection provided by controller (202). Within security system (200), the subsystems are kept separate. Functional separation of the red data memory and black data memory is maintained to provide fail-safe data isolation.

Failsafe security system and method

A system and method allows portable, encrypted data to be accessible through multiple hosts, including new hosts (14), without requiring a secure link to the new hosts. A split key encryption system encrypts (52) data and stores the encrypted data on a portable device (10). A split of the encryption key is stored (54) in the portable device (10), and another split of the key is stored (54) in a home host (12) . A password-modified key is then made (58) by combining a password with the encryption key. This password-modified key is then reduced (58), with one split being stored on the host (12) and another split stored on the portable device (10) . Data can be accessed with a new host (14) by transferring (78) the host password-modified split to the new host (14) and entering (80) the password into the portable device (10).

Encryption method and system for portable data

A call is connected between secure terminals (16) through a network (12). If a network address for the call is included on an approved list (46), a secure call setup procedure (54) is performed automatically. One terminal (16) automatically sends an auto-secure signal. If the other terminal detects the auto-secure signal, secure call setup procedure (54) is performed automatically. The secure call setup procedure (54) determines a current user-identity for the opposing party. If the current user-identity corresponds to a user-identity included on an approved list (76), an abbreviated secure call setup process (80) is performed. If the current user identity is not approved, a full secure call setup process (78) is performed. The abbreviated process (80) differs from the full process (78) in that it uses a traffic key obtained from a prior secure communication session and may be performed more quickly.

Growing community of inventors

Scottsdale, AZ, United States of America

Douglas Allan Hardy